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Making it Count: Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early People’s 





This dissertation offers new perspectives on China’s transition to socialism by 
investigating a fundamental question—how did the state build capacity to know the 
nation through numbers? With the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, 
jubilant Chinese revolutionaries were confronted by the dual challenge of a nearly 
nonexistent statistical infrastructure and the pressing need to escape the universalist 
claims of capitalist statistics. At stake for revolutionary statisticians and economists was a 
fundamental difficulty: how to accurately ascertain social scientific fact. Resolving this 
difficulty involved not just epistemological and theoretical debates on the unity or 
disunity of statistical science but also practical considerations surrounding state-capacity 
building. The resultant shift toward a socialist definition of statistics, achieved by 
explicitly following the Soviet Union’s example, was instrumental in shaping new 
bureaus, designing statistical work, and training personnel. New classificatory schemes 
and methods of data collection also raised issues of authority and policy, ultimately not 
just remolding state-society relations but also informing new conceptions of everyday life 
and work. By the mid-1950s, however, growing disaffection with the efficacy of Soviet 
methods led the Chinese, in a surprising turn of events, to seek out Indian statisticians in 
an unprecedented instance of Chinese participation in South-South scientific exchange. 
 
 
At the heart of these exchanges was the desire to learn more about large-scale random 
sampling, an emergent statistical technology, which, while technically complex, held 
great practical salience for large countries like China and India. 
“Making it Count” engages with and contributes to scholarship on the history of 
modern China and on the global and Cold War histories of science and social science. 
While the historiography on statistics and quantification has focused primarily on the 
early-modern and nineteenth century world, the dissertation brings this history into the 
twentieth century, when states, multi-national institutions, and private actors, regardless 
of their ideological hue, mobilized statistics on behalf of positivist social science and 
statecraft. By examining the collection and deployment of data, a process critical to the 
ambitions of the revolutionary PRC state but one that has largely been overlooked in the 
historical literature, the dissertation also provides an alternative account for a decade 
often portrayed as lurching from one mass campaign to another. Finally, the examination 
of the Sino-Indian statistical links reveals that pioneering innovation took place in many 
contexts after 1945 and challenges Cold War paradigms that are predisposed to assume 
the United States or the Soviet Union as the primary nodes from which scientific and 
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“…Thou shalt not sit 
With statisticians nor commit  




Under Which Lyre 
A Reactionary Tract for the Times 
(Phi Beta Kappa Poem, Harvard, 1946) 





























































A Crisis in Counting 
On 1 October 1949, as Mao Zedong stood on the ramparts of the Gate of Heavenly Peace 
in Beijing and declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there 
was no doubt a tremendous sense of optimism and anticipation. The Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) had won the Civil War against staggering odds and a new era of socialist 
peace and prosperity beckoned. But challenges were legion too. And for a state that 
promised to fundamentally re-engineer Chinese society and economy via socialist 
planning, one of the biggest challenges was that of data. After all, planning requires data, 
and good planning presumably requires good data. In 1949, such data was hard to come 
by. Over the preceding four decades, starting with the collapse of the Qing Empire in 
1911, China had experienced warlordism, a Japanese invasion, the Second World War, 
and a debilitating Civil War. What the Communists inherited was a fractured and 
withered state. The Nationalist Government’s central statistical agency on the eve of 
1949, for instance, commanded a mere 5,000 personnel and, despite numerous attempts, 
had never been able to conduct a nationwide census.
1
 For many CCP statisticians and 
economists, the long-term prospects of transforming the PRC into a true socialist utopia 
hinged, to a large degree, on being able to resolve this crisis of counting. 
Today, any mention of China, statistics, and the 1950s is bound to evince in the 
reader specters of a very different crisis. One of the twentieth century’s worst tragedies, 
the famine of 1959-61 and the Great Leap Forward (GLF) that in many ways presaged it 
form a teleological end-point in early PRC history, often constraining our ability to study 
the 1950s on their own terms. Indeed, for those living in 1959, the year symbolized a 
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 Zhu Junyi (Jennings P. Chu) 朱君毅. “The Independently Controlled Statistical System of the Chinese 
Government.” In Proceedings of the International Statistical Conferences, Vol. II, 92-97. Washngton, D.C.: 




very different milestone: the People’s Republic was turning ten. To celebrate the 
occasion, China’s State Statistics Bureau (SSB) produced the volume “Ten Great Years,” 
and declared in its preface that “an epic of world-shaking importance, forever worthy of 
being recalled,” had undeniably begun to unfold. Page after successive page full of 
numbers, tables, and charts followed—a veritable barrage of statistical data corralled to 
provide indisputable proof that the Chinese had experienced “ten years of leaping 
progress in economy and culture.”
2
 And so, we are presented with two starkly different 
images—the crisis of 1949 and the celebration of 1959. How do we reconcile them? 
What kind of statistical infrastructure did the Chinese build during the 1950s? How did 
they count and know what China was? What impact did this counting have on state-
building and state-society relations? This dissertation addresses such questions.  
That statistics are a core concern for all modernizing states goes without saying. 
In general, one can think of two idealized models that a national statistical system might 
gravitate toward: centralized or non-centralized. In a non-centralized system, a variety of 
agencies—central and local government organs, trade bodies, private institutions, 
research organizations, NGOs, etc.—all periodically collect and publish quantitative data 
on social and economic activity. The overall quality and comprehensiveness of data rests 
on the number and diversity of agencies collecting data. When their density is high, the 
data they produce can represent a national whole. An example of this system is the 
United States. On the other extreme is a centralized system in which a nationwide agency 
is responsible for standardization (of methods, concepts, and schedules), supervision and 
coordination (of public and private enterprises), and which has centralized control over 
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 State Statistics Bureau. Weida de shinian 伟大的十年 (Ten Great Years). Beijing: People’s Press, 1959. p. 





the utilization and release of all national data. Centralized statistics are especially 
important for socialist states that rely on centrally planned economic growth. The former 




In its simplest form, the crisis of counting in the PRC was understood as a 
problem of building such a centralized statistical system. In December 1950, Zhang 
Youyu 张友渔, Vice Mayor of Beijing, the first metropolitan area where the CCP formed 
a government, offered the following analysis:
4
  
 Were there statistics in the past? No matter in liberated areas or in areas 
under the old regime, we cannot say there were no statistics; just that they 
were full of inadequacies. It is not that they did not value statistics; for 
example, in the liberated areas, county and district committee reports did 
carry reports and tables, but these materials in all likelihood were 
incomplete, inaccurate, and unsystematic, and therefore couldn’t serve as 
the basis [for anything]. As for areas under the old regime, their numbers 
are even more unreliable since they are a product of formalism [形式主
义].5 
 
This was indeed a familiar criticism, in line with the basic imperatives of state-building, 
wherein expansion of state capacity is a central task for any government seeking to 
establish order after decades of strife and civil war. A decade later, the economist Li 
Choh-Ming’s dismissal of the statistical infrastructure inherited by the CCP would 
largely echo Zhang’s assessment:  
                                                     
3
 Li, Choh-ming. The Statistical System of Communist China. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962. 
 
4
 Zhang Youyu 张友渔 (1898-1992) as first Vice Mayor was in charge of the city’s day-to-day operations. 
Appointed in April 1949 or 1950 (verify), he was one of two vice mayors till 1957 (the other was Wu Han, 
head of the Beijing branch of the Democratic League). Peng Zhen was only appointed Mayor in February 
1951, and Zhang claimed that for much of the 1950s it was he who ran the city, not Peng Zhen. For more 
see: Mary G. Mazur. “The United Front Redefined for the Party-State: A Case Study of Transition and 
Legitimation.” in New Perspectives in State Socialism in China, edited by Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich, 
66-68. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 
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“Since there was hardly any statistical system to speak of before 1949, did 
Peking manage to set one up that was actually workable? When did this 
happen and how did it develop? Where were official statistics produced 
and finalized? Were they used for planning purposes at different 





Within months of Zhang’s analysis, however, a second, much more fundamental 
criticism of pre-1949 statistics was articulated by Li Fuchun 李富春, the deputy head of 
the Central Economic and Financial Commission. This second critique did not waste time 
lamenting the lack of statistical data or institutions. After all, statistical infrastructure and 
activities could be established where none or little existed. Instead, this critique called for 
the wholesale repudiation of existing statistical thought and practice:  
In the past, China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country; strictly 
speaking, it did not possess any statistics [worth speaking of]. Statistics in 
Old China was learned from the Anglo-American bourgeoisie. This kind 
of statistics cannot serve as our weapon, it is unsuitable for [the tasks of] 
managing and supervising the country…we need to build [a new] statistics 




According to such a critique, the problem with Anglo-American bourgeois statistics was 
that it served capitalists, whose sole purpose was profit via the exploitation of labor. This 
argument would be developed and deployed through the rest of the decade by a whole 
range of interlocutors. To cite one representative instance, a mid-1950s essay made the 
case in the following way:  
Bourgeois statistics exists in order to strengthen the exploitation of 
workers, in order to serve the interests of capitalists; it uses unscientific 
formalist mathematical doctrine to conceal the economic dangers of 
capitalism, whitewash class-conflict, and deceive people. The viewpoints 
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 Choh-Ming Li. “Statistics and Planning at the Hsien Level in Communist China.” The China Quarterly, 
no. 9 (Jan. – Mar. 1962): 112-123. See p. 112 for quote. 
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 Li Fuchun 李富春 (July 1951). Speech at the 1st National Statistics Meeting. Li was the deputy head of 





and methods of such statistical theory cannot meet the needs of national 




A year after Li’s dismissal of pre-1949 statistics, Vice Premier Zhu De 朱德 noted that 
the establishment of a new comprehensive statistical system had already become an 




How this call to arms—to set up a new statistics for a new China—was answered 
is the principal subject of this dissertation. Central to the activities of early PRC 
statisticians was a key question: what is the best way to ascertain social fact when you 
need to count masses of things? The solution that the Chinese chose presumed the 
impossibility of a universal statistical science and accepted instead a binary that 
contrasted socialist with non-socialist (capitalist; bourgeois) statistics. Essential to this 
distinction was the place of probabilistic theory in the study of the natural and the social 
world. This dissertation uncovers the reasoning behind that choice and traces its 
implications. 
 
Statistics and tongji 统计—An Etymological Excursus 
The Chinese word for statistics is a compound of two characters: tong 统, which means 
“all” or “together,” and ji 计, which means to “count” or “calculate.”10 Together, tongji 
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 Commercial Press. Xinhua zidian—hanyying shuangjie 新华字典—汉英双解 (Xinhua Dictionary with 




统计 is thus defined as the “collection, sorting, calculation, and analysis of numerical 
data associated with a given phenomenon,” or more simply as “summary calculation” 总
括地计算.11 This is, of course, a relatively recent definition. The Hanyu dacidian 
(Unabridged Dictionary of Sinitic) lists instances of its use in this context as early as the 
Ming dynasty (CE 1368-1644). Explicit links between tongji and statecraft, however, do 
not appear to have been made at that time. Instead, it is the word kuaiji 会计 (accounting) 
that was the standard word for talking about numbers and statecraft through much of 
Chinese history. As several scholars have contended, in ancient and late imperial China 
the relationship between numbers and statecraft was captured in the statement, “[if] 
accounting is proper [correct], [then] it is already enough [and governance will be 
effective].”
12
 The phrase can be found in The Mencius, purportedly uttered by Confucius 
when he was a minor official in charge of warehousing 委吏. At least one Chinese 
statistician has made the case that the phrase’s invocation through succeeding dynasties 




The rise of statistics as a modern discipline in China, however, is frequently 
traced to the work of Roger Hart at the Chinese Maritime Customs Bureau during the late 
nineteenth century.
14
 Hart’s understanding of statistics was informed by its evolution 
                                                     
11
 “指对某一现象有关的数据的搜集、整理、计算和分析等.” See Hanyu dacidian Press. Hanyu 
dacidian—di jiu juan 汉语大词典—第九卷. Beiing: Hanyu dacidian Press, p. 846 
 
12
 “孔子嘗為委吏矣，曰『會計當而已矣』.” See: Mencius, Wan Zhang—II 孟子—万章下. Accessed at 
the Chinese Text Project:  http://ctext.org/mengzi/wan-zhang-ii  
 
13
 See: Yu Yue 于越. “会计当而已矣.” Tongji yanjiu 统计研究, (1986.01): 74.  
 
14
 Andrea Br ard. “Robert Hart and China’s Statistical Revolution.” Modern Asian Studies,  40, no. 3 




within a European context. In the English language, the word statistics is usually traced to 
French (statistique) and German (Statistik) antecedents dating from the mid-eighteenth 
century. In both the French and German cases, the word originally referred to “the study 
of the state, of statecraft, or of the conditions, circumstances, and politics of a state, the 
study of numerical data concerning society.”
15
 Prior to the adoption of statistics, the term 
that incorporated a similar meaning in English was “political arithmetic,” which is 
credited to the seventeenth century English economist William Petty.
16
 An understanding 
that also incorporated “techniques of mathematical interpretation applied to phenomena 
for which an exhaustive study of all data is impractical,” i.e. probability theory, took 
nearly another century to make an appearance.
17
 In China, this modern understanding of 
statistics was denoted by tongji, which reappeared as a “return graphic loan:” a “Kanji” 
term derived from Classical Chinese and used in Japanese to translate modern European 
words that was subsequently reimported into modern Chinese in the nineteenth century.
18
 
Both these definitions of tongji/statistics—the one that links statistics to statecraft and the 
other that is primarily mathematical in nature—and the different ways in which they were 
perceived in the early People’s Republic are central to the arguments of this dissertation.  
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 See, for instance, entries for statistic and statistics in the Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. (Online edition) 
 
16
 For more on Petty and political arithmetic, see: Ted McCormick 2009. William Petty: And the Ambitions 
of Political Arithmetic. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
17
 Oxford English Dictionary (Online Edition). The latter mathematical definition was first recorded in 
English in 1843.  
 
18
 Lydia H. Liu. Translingual Practice—Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, 1900-





An “Impossible Dream” 
In 1974, Leo Orleans, then the China Research Specialist at the Library of Congress, 
wrote a short article pithily entitled “Chinese Statistics: The Impossible Dream.”
19
 
Whether he was inspired by 1972’s Man of La Mancha and Peter O’Toole’s haunted 
rendition of the famous song cannot be known.
20
 But his description of Chinese statistics 
as “notorious” and the Chinese as a “nation that does not value accuracy” suggest he may 
very well have. As he noted in the article:  
The contention here is that this is not the case, but that in fact, the Chinese 
themselves lack much of the statistical data we so desperately seek and 
that their traditional nonchalance toward accuracy in statistics persists 




For long, the study of modern China consistently presented a paradox to the China 
specialist, to whom data was rarely made available.
22
 As the economist Thomas Rawski 
noted in a recent review of scholarship on China’s economy: “The common method 
underlying these studies, particularly those focused on the People’s Republic, was the use 
                                                     
19
 Leo A. Orleans. “Chinese Statistics: The Impossible Dream” The American Statistician, May, 28, no. 2 
(May 1974): 47-52. 
20
 The movie was based on the eponymous 1965 Broadway musical, which in turn was adapted  from the 
non-musical 1959 teleplay I, Don Quixote. The original inspiration for all of these works was, of course, 
Miguel de Cervantes’ seventeenth century The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha (El 
ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha). The musical and movie are both famous for the song 
“Impossible Dream,” in which Don Quixote expounds on his quest and knightly duties. 
 
21
 Orleans 1974: 47.  
And consider the opening lines of the song:  
 To dream ... the impossible dream ... 
To fight ... the unbeatable foe ... 
To bear ... with unbearable sorrow ... 
To run ... where the brave dare not go ... 
To right ... the unrightable wrong ... 
To love ... pure and chaste from afar ... 
To try ... when your arms are too weary ... 
To reach ... the unreachable star ...  
 
22





of fragmentary data to reconstruct the broader economic landscape. This approach arose 
from the paucity of systematic data prior to 1949 and from the limited publication of 
economic statistics under the People’s Republic until the appearance of the China 
Statistics Yearbook [《中国统计年鉴》] in 1981.”23 As a result, each occasion when the 
Chinese released data (e.g. census numbers in 1954, Ten Great Years in 1959, production 
figures in 1970) generated tremendous excitement.
24
 
And so, one gets the impossible dream of the China scholar tilting at the 
proverbial windmill of Chinese data. To abuse another metaphor, for many decades, 
statistics from the People’s Republic of China were treated like gold dust: near 
impossible to obtain, but with the additional (and often justifiable) fear that they were the 
product of alchemy—any moment one may discover what one held in one’s hands was 
dust alright, but hardly gold. Orleans explained the frustrations of the China watchers by 
noting: “Never having known the advantages (and, yes, the frustrations) of a good 
statistical base, they [the Chinese] don’t miss it nearly as much as do many of us who 
look at China from the outside.”
25
 
The mainstream response in the West to the problem of Chinese data has been 
characterized by a tendency to not take Chinese statistics from the Mao years too 
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seriously. The two extant book-length studies on PRC statistics exhibit this tendency, but 
in contrasting fashions. The first study was produced by the economist Li Choh-Ming in 
the early 1960s and the second by the anthropologist Liu Xin much more recently. Li was 
primarily invested in gauging the accuracy of statistical data produced in the early PRC 
and in explaining the statistical failure associated with the famine of 1959-1961.
26
 Liu’s 
more recent anthropological study has focused on the transition from Maoist subjective 
mass science to objective science after 1978.
27
 If the latter paints the entire Mao period 
from 1949 to 1978 with the broad brush of subjective mass science, then the former tends 
to neglect the scientific basis for the design of statistical work during the 1950s, blaming 
its collapse largely on the Great Leap Forward of 1958. In this dissertation, I complicate 
both these analyses. I demonstrate that the picture within the PRC during its first decade 
was one of data richness and a great degree of professional engagement and deliberation. 
While public access to data may have been limited, the 1950s witnessed a veritable 
explosion in data collection, management, and analysis. 
 
Statistics and Big Data Positivism 
To know something through numbers remains one of the most powerful ways of knowing 
in the modern world. Powerful not because it is necessarily or always nearer the truth 
(were we to grant the singularity of such a thing), but powerful because it offers a tool of 
persuasion and a basis for rational, methodical, calibrated, and repeatable action that 
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 Such power has become all-the-more desirable as we have come to 
realize that common-sense understandings of the world are often erroneous.
 29
 It is for 
these reasons that quantification has gained such traction over the past few centuries. Our 
current all-pervasive zeal for Big Data is symptomatic of this general impetus to quantify. 
But such enthusiasm for quantification is not especially new. By my count, since 
the nineteenth century we have experienced at least three major waves of quantitative 
positivism. The first of these was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
when the use of numbers to produce actionable knowledge in society received a major 
boost through the activities of Francis Galton and Karl Pearson.
30
 The ethos—confidence 
in quantitative analysis—that drove Galton, Pearson, and their contemporaries can 
arguably be traced to Auguste Comte and his mid-nineteenth century work on 
positivism.
31
 This first major wave of quantitative positivism gave rise to disciplines such 
as statistics, demography, and sociology. 
The second major wave of quantitative positivism was in the 1950s, the period of 
time that this dissertation focuses on. In chapters III and VIII I provide a more systematic 
treatment of the promise of post-war statistics. For now, I would like to stress that the 
belief that any problem could be remedied and diagnosed as long as enough data was 
collected pervaded not just the world of science, social science, and governance, but was 
rather a part of the very zeitgeist itself. This faith, for that is what it was, is perhaps most 
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vividly captured in Isaac Asimov’s 1940s and 1950s Foundation Series of science-fiction 
novels.
32
 In the series, the “psychohistorian” Hari Seldon, calculates that the Galactic 
Empire is in terminal decline and the galaxy will slowly unravel into a long period of 
chaos. Seldon performs this analysis by using the science of psychohistory, a field that he 
developed from “a set of vague axioms” to “a profound statistical science.” A neologism 
coined by Asimov, psychohistory combined history, psychology, sociology, and 
mathematical statistics to make general predictions about the future of large masses of 
people: “The individual human being is unpredictable, but the reactions of human mobs, 
Seldon found, could be treated statistically. The larger the mob, the greater the accuracy 
that could be achieved.”
33
 Enthusiasm for quantitative positivism clearly was not just 
limited to the domain of stuffy debates about policy and economics.  
And yet, even if the 1950s were a moment of pervasive big data positivism, such 
positivism manifested itself in more than one way. As this dissertation will demonstrate, 
the dreams of Big Data in China were theoretically and substantially different from those 
in the West or in places like India. Chinese statisticians in the early PRC categorically 
rejected the role of probabilistic thinking in the social world and favored counting things 
exhaustively.  
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 Asimov was clearly applying the law of large numbers to prospective large scale human action. 
Elsewhere in the series, he wrote: “The laws of Psychohistory are statistical in nature and are rendered 
invalid if the actions of individual men are not random in nature. If a sizable group of human beings 
learned of key details of the Plan, their actions would be governed by that knowledge and would no longer 
be random in the meaning of the axioms of Psychohistory. In other words, they would no longer be 




In a somewhat ironic twist, our current wave of Big Data positivism, the third in 
my reckoning, has witnessed the return of the dream of total information, though 
unsurprisingly it is also accompanied by legitimate fears about the growth of the all-
powerful and all-seeing state and corporation.  
 
Engaging Fields 
As the first historical study of the development of statistical science in modern China, 
this dissertation fills a critical gap in our general understanding of contemporary Chinese 
history. I draw inspiration from work on the history of science and social science in 
China and elsewhere, the growing scholarship on the history of post-1949 China, as well 
as recent trends in global history. Scholarship on the history of science in modern China 
has persuasively demonstrated modern China’s active participation in globally evolving 
social and political technologies. These studies have, however, tended to focus either on 
the Republican years (CE 1911-1949) or on the post-reform era (CE 1978- ), leaving the 
first few decades of the PRC relatively under-explored.
34
 Building on these studies, my 
research situates itself in the growing subfield of scholarship on 1950s China. Among the 
earliest arguments against understanding 1949 as a moment of rupture was the work of 
William Kirby.
35
 In more recent years, no longer hostage to Cold War geo-politics and 
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disciplinary or temporal boundaries, and spurred by the increasing openness of local 
archives, historians have offered new perspectives on the early PRC.
36
 While some have 
further facilitated a reassessment of 1949 as a rupture,
37
 others have investigated aspects 
of the transition to Communist rule, exploring subjects such as marriage, gender relations, 
skill and rural industries, urban transformations, film, urban outcasts, and much else.
38
 




 This dissertation is also informed by the rich history of science literature on 
statistics and quantification in the pre-twentieth century world.
40
 Equally significant are 
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the works of sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and social theorists who 
have investigated various aspects of knowledge creation, scientific research, state-power, 
and the role of numbers in such processes.
41
 Finally, my focus on the mobilization of new 
technologies in the service of new governance agendas in a global setting goes hand-in-
hand with the wider turn away from Cold War paradigms. The Sino-Indian statistical 
exchanges of the 1950s remind us that experimentation and innovation took place in 
many contexts after 1945. Such transnational flows of ideas, information, practices, and 
people draw attention to reciprocal linkages across places during a century in which 
cooperation between governments, organizations, and individual researchers was the 





The dissertation is divided into three substantive parts and seven chapters. The three 
chapters in Part I, “A Crisis in Counting,” explore what was new about statistics in the 
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People’s Republic after 1949. Chapter II, “Revolutionary Statistics in the Early 1950s,” 
explores early statistical work in the PRC’s Northeast, arguing that this work and the 
practical experience so gained was the foundation upon which the rest of the country’s 
statistical apparatus was based. The establishment of socialist statistical work thus 
preceded its theoretical and ideological justification, which then becomes the subject of 
Chapter III: “Lies, Damned Lies, and (Bourgeois) Statistics: Ascertaining Social Fact.”  
The Chapter also provides an assessment of Soviet technical aid and of the Soviet 
statistical experts who were instrumental to the organization of statistical activity in the 
PRC. Chapter IV, “No “Mean” Solution: The Reformulation of Statistical Science,” 
explores how this new understanding of statistics became dominant in the 1950s and how 
it affected the valuation of key concepts and methods.    
Taken together, the three chapters in Part I return us to an important issue in early 
PRC history: that of understanding the extent to which the shift to Communist rule after 
1949 was a rupture, and tracing the continuities that persisted nevertheless. Statistics 
exhibits elements of both rupture and continuity, depending on our time-frame as well as 
geographic focus. A closer look at the statistical activities in the Northeast produces a 
strong case for substantial rupture—new statistical methods and practices were 
introduced under the direction of Soviet experts and quickly became extensive. The 
picture for the rest of the China till 1952 is much less clear. Thus, in these early years the 
rupture appears regionally determined.  
In contrasting fashion, statistical education continued unchanged during these first 
two to three years. Many academic statisticians maintained their positions after 1949 and 




properly after 1952, that a concerted effort was mounted to redefine statistics, both by 
changing the curriculum, and through targeted criticisms of well-established statisticians 
and their textbooks. Changes in practice thus preceded changes in education and 
academic discourse. Such findings help us rethink 1949 not as a singular moment of 
rupture but instead call for the separation of the rhetoric of rupture (promoted by the CCP) 
from the actual changes on the ground, which were temporally and regionally variegated.   
The three chapters in Part II, “Statistical State, Quantified Society,” focus on 
statistics in practice, thereby tracing some of the implications of the theoretical, scientific, 
and administrative decisions investigated in Part I. Chapter V, “The Nature of Statistical 
Work,” draws upon materials from the Beijing Municipal Archives, including various 
statistical reports generated across all levels of the statistical system, internal bulletins of 
work, and materials from conferences of statistical workers (at local, provincial, and 
national levels), to explore the messiness (contra the idealization unpacked in Chapter II) 
of actual statistical work. It captures not just the centralizing impetus of the expansion, 
but also the varieties of challenges that were encountered in putting into practice the 
methods that were at the heart of socialist statistics: (1) the periodical report system 定期
报表制度, and (2) various forms of typical sampling 典型调查. Even though 
acknowledgement of the problem of excess issuing of reports 滥发报表 and the chaos 
they generated had been present since before 1949, the problem became increasingly 
ominous through the 1950s, fueled in part by a table-as-product rationale, which is 
explored in Chapter VI: “To “Ardently Love Statistical Work”: State (In) capacity, 
Professionalization, and their Discontents.” This chapter analyzes the variety of 




were employed to professionalize and maintain a cadre of statistical workers that 
numbered as high as 200,000 by 1956. The final chapter in Part II, “Statistical State, 
Quantified Society,” investigates the uses and reception of statistics through two case 
studies: economic planning and the institution of the work-points system in the rural 
countryside.  
 Part III consists of one chapter, “The Turn to India: Sino-Indian Statistical 
Exchanges, 1951-1959.” By the 1950s, India had become one of the centers of global 
innovation in statistical technology. And starting as early as 1951, and with increasing 
urgency after 1956, Chinese and Indian statisticians traded visits as they sought to learn 
from each other’s experiences. At the heart of these exchanges was the desire to learn 
more about mathematical statistics, in particular the then cutting-edge statistical method 
of random sampling. Involving such key figures as the deputy director of the SSB, Wang 
Sihua 王思华 and the Indian statistician P.C. Mahalanobis, the unearthing of these 
exchanges forces a reappraisal of Cold-War paradigms and sets out in stark relief the 
extent to which Chinese statisticians and leaders clearly understood the strengths and 
shortcomings of their own statistical system.  
 The Epilogue, “A Great Leap in Statistics,” traces very briefly the impact and 
legacy of an “on-the-spot meeting” 现场会议 in the city of Baoding 保定 in the summer 
of 1958 that was organized to discuss a Great Leap Forward in statistics. Over the 
ensuing months, the tussle between socialist statistics and its alternatives was largely 
overwhelmed by Maoist mass science. In statistics this meant the rebadging and 
valorization of typical sampling, which was now explained as Mao’s synthesis of 




the Peasant Movement in Hunan became the foundational text for this ‘revolutionary’ 
method. It is this notion of mass science, with its anti-expertise and anti-
professionalization, that has come to inform our understanding of much of the Mao era. 
But as this dissertation demonstrates, the picture till 1958 was quite different, far more 













































































































In July 1950, Wang Sihua 王思华, recently designated head of the Northeast Statistical 
Bureau (NSB), proudly declared to his audience that not only were they participating in 
the first meeting of statistical workers in the Northeast’s history, but that their meeting 
was also the largest in the nation’s history.
43
 This was clear evidence, according to him, 
that New China was already on the path towards achieving a planned economy; for no 
planned economy could be possible without the presence of scientific statistical work. In 
his address, Wang observed that since the promulgation of the “Decision Regarding 
Strengthening Statistical Work” on 10 April 1950, statistical work had entered a “new 
phase.”
44
 As a result, “statistical work in the northeast had begun to move from a state of 
decentralization to integration, from chaos to the correct path, from the non-scientific to 
the scientific.” Wang explained that help offered by Soviet experts was critical to this 
change. The Soviet Union possessed over thirty years of experience and it was their 
expertise and aid that allowed Wang to declare: “We have set up a statistical system, we 
possess method, [and] we possess confidence.”
45
  
A few years later, in December 1952, while addressing the third annual meeting 
of the Northeast Statistical Bureau, Wang was even more emphatic. Over the previous 
three years, he would claim, the bureau had successfully established “a new type of 
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standardized statistical work” 新型正规化的统计工作.46 For him, such standardized 
statistical work was the hallmark of socialist countries and was fundamentally different 
from the statistics of capitalist countries. It was also different from the older small- scale, 




At the time Wang delivered the latter speech, a national bureau of statistics (The 
State Statistics Bureau; 国家统计局) had recently been set up in Beijing and, as will be 
described in Part II of the dissertation, the rapid expansion of a national network of 
statistical offices and personnel at provincial, county, and village levels was underway. 
As the first statistical agency in the PRC to fully incorporate Soviet/socialist approaches 
to statistics, the Northeast Statistical Bureau became the model for this rapid expansion.
48
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Under Wang’s leadership, the Bureau had not only carried out statistical work since early 
1950, but also undertook the first major attempt at translating and publishing Soviet 
treatises on statistical theory and methods.
49
  
The NSB’s activities had a seminal impact not just on the ways in which 
statistical work was organized and carried out, but also on the very definition of statistics, 
itself. By valorizing the Soviet Union’s ‘advanced experience,’ debates within China 
starting as early as 1950 came to reformulate statistics as a social science in 
contradistinction to a natural or universal science. This science’s function lay in helping 
build a socialist society. As a result, the new statistics stood bifurcated—rhetorically and 
substantively—from what was labeled the tainted, bourgeois, and socially unproductive 
pursuit of mathematical statistics. Statistical work, first most notably in the northeast 
under Wang Sihua, and then progressively elsewhere, followed suit. By 1952, these 
changes began to be implemented within statistical education as part of a general 
reorganization of the higher education system.  
And yet, in studies of PRC statistics, this early period garners almost no attention. 
Li Choh-Ming, one of the first scholars to focus his attention on the question of statistics 
in the PRC, was dismissive of these initial years. As he wrote in 1961, “from 1949 to 
1952 no effort was made to develop a statistical system national in scope.”
50
 This 
emphasis on a national system led him to begin his longer book-length study on PRC 
statistics not with the founding of the PRC in 1949, nor with statistical activities in the 
                                                     
49
 For more see: Liu Chang 刘畅 and Zhang Yun 张云. Ershi shiji zhongguo de tongjixue  二十世纪中国
的统计学 (Statistical Education in 20th Century China). Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 2000, 118.  
 
50
 Choh-Ming Li. “Communist China’s Statistical System: 1949-1957.” The American Economic Review, 
51, no. 2 (Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic 





Northeast, but with the founding of the State Statistics Bureau in Beijing on August 8 
1952. To be fair, Li did recognize the Northeast as the only region capable of producing 
reliable statistical data prior to 1952, and he also acknowledged the early presence of 
Soviet statisticians in the Ministries of Railways (1950) and Health (1951-52).
51
 But, 
aside from this somewhat perfunctory acknowledgement, his approach only took 
seriously statistical activities national in scale, which were only made possible after the 
formation of the SSB in 1952.
52
  
As this chapter will demonstrate, the early period of 1949-1952 is crucial to 
understanding statistics and statistical work through the decade that followed. Unpacking 
the constituent elements of Wang’s ‘new type of standardized statistical work,’ will 
permit an articulation of the ways in which it was regarded as more standardized, correct, 
and scientific than what preceded it in the years before 1949. At the same time, the 
chapter also seeks to complicate the neat binary that Chinese (and Soviet) statisticians 
liked to deploy—of socialist and bourgeois statistics, of pre-liberation and post-liberation 
statistics. I will show that in the case of the PRC this binary understanding is incomplete. 
The 1950s were shot through with the influence, rarely pedagogical or technical in nature 
but rather all-pervasive and methodological, of what could be termed the Maoist model of 
ascertaining fact. This Maoist model, with its emphasis on direct experience over 
technical knowledge or ideological fervor as a source of expertise, made the earlier 
binary and the clean solutions it offered much more conflicted. As a result, statisticians 
and statistical workers through the 1950s found themselves not just transitioning from a 
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‘non-socialist’ to a ‘socialist’ system of data collection and analysis, but also operating in 
a milieu that particularly valued personal individual practical experience.  
 
Statistics in China before 1949 
In September 1947, Washington, D.C. played host to the twenty-fifth meeting of the 
International Statistical Institute’s biannual conference.
53
 China was well represented at 
the nearly two-week long event. The Director of Statistics of the National Government, 
Jennings P. Chu (朱君毅 Zhu Junyi, 1892-1963), led a six-member delegation 
representing a variety of fields and specializations within and outside the government. Of 
the six members, two were already stationed in Washington, D.C.:  D.K. Lieu (Liu Dajun 
劉大釣, 1890-1962) was the Commercial Counselor at the Chinese Embassy as well as 
the Chinese Representative on the United Nations Statistical Commission, and Alfred 
Bangnee Liu (Liu Pengnian 刘彭年, 1901-?) was the Director of the Chinese News 
Service. These three men were joined by the well-known sociologist, demographer, and 
Tsinghua University professor, Chen Da (Ta Ch’en 陈达, 1892-1975), who had traveled 
from Beijing; by the Shanghai-based Director of the Accounting Department of the 
Central Bank of China, Kuo-Pao King (Jin Guobao 金国宝, 1893-1963); and by the Head 
of the Department of Mathematics of the National Central University in Nanjing, Pei-
Ching Tang (唐培经 Tang Peijing, 1903-1988).54 Born in the late Qing, some of the 
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members had benefited from Boxer Indemnity fellowships and received education in the 
United States, while others had been trained nearer home in Japan. Some had conducted 
and published research using statistical data and methods, while others had written 
textbooks and been involved in the administration of statistical work across China. They 
were each exposed to contemporary social and scientific theories, and, to a large extent, 
their approaches reflected the dynamic and varied characteristics of the world of social 
science research and statistical activity during the first half of the 20
th
 century in China. It 
was this world and its intellectual and administrative traditions that Wang Sihua, Li 
Fuchun, and Zhu De forcefully rejected in the early 1950s.  
The dynamism and variety in the world of Chinese social science research in the 
first half of the twentieth century was itself the outcome, at least partially, of an intense 
search for the causes and remedies for China’s relative political, economic, and military 
weakness on the world stage. As a once-powerful empire had transitioned into a weak 
republic, elites (intellectuals, administrators, and the like) had to contend with what they 
saw as the long shadow of enduring imperial practices and traditions. Enfolded in this 
long shadow were the twin practices of statecraft and data collection.  
The Qing (1644-1911) state had routinely gathered information on prices, rainfall, 
salt, grain holdings, famine, and population.
55
 In 1793, five years before Malthus 
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published his famous tract, the Qing official Hong Liangji 洪亮吉 (1746-1809) had 
already raised the specter of unchecked population growth, thereby challenging the 
deeply rooted theory that population increase reflected good governance.
56
 Towards the 
end of the Qing, increasing incapacity forced the state to give up on attempts to quantify 
and collect information. During this same period, heightened interest in Western 
knowledge forms set off an enduring debate among Chinese elites on the ‘usefulness’ of 
Western knowledge in contrast to the ‘essence’ embodied in Chinese learning.
57
 As a 
result, institutions such as the Jiangnan Arsenal devoted considerable resources to the 
translation of Western tracts, including treatises on statecraft that included some 
statistical analysis.
58
 The advent of ‘modern’ statistics in China can, arguably, be traced 
to the 1859 publication of the first Maritime Customs Report.
59
 By the turn of the century, 
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the Qing civil service exam system had begun to incorporate questions drawn from the 
modern social sciences and mathematics.
60
 Subsequent reforms announced in 1905 




The fall of the Qing in 1911, while aborting those reforms, helped accelerate the 
spread of nascent Western social sciences and witnessed attempts at new forms of 
governance and state-building. A number of Chinese received training as demographers, 
sociologists, anthropologists, and ethnographers, usually in the West or Japan, and began 
to work for the Chinese state and collaborate on data collection with Western institutions 
and scholars. No longer understood purely through an Impact-Response framework, 
recent research into their activities has stressed the level of hybridity—drawing upon 
their Western education, but also deeply cognizant of local realities and traditions— that 
these social scientists achieved in their research.
62
 Through the ensuing decades of the 
1920s and 1930s there emerged what Tong Lam has identified as a ‘Social Survey 
Movement,’ where the desire to document, count, tabulate and survey the nation 
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permeated not just the elite, trained practitioner of social science but also the lay man.
63
 
For Tong Lam, these surveys operated on two levels. “The idea of social science and 
social survey research presumed an external social reality with internal mechanisms 
waiting to be discovered and dissected. On the other hand, Chinese social thinkers 
themselves also vehemently argued that China did not have a real organic and 
functioning society and that their goal was to create one.”
64
 By 1949, social scientists 
such as the demographer and sociologist who headed the Institute of Census Research in 
the 1940s, Chen Da 陈达 (1892-1975), the population geographer Hu Huanyong 胡焕庸 
(1901-1998), the sociologist Chen Hansheng 陈翰笙 (1897-2004), and the economist Ma 
Yinchu 马寅初 (1882-1982), all participated in a well-established, sophisticated, and 
methodologically and ideologically diverse tradition of social science research and 
statistical analysis.  
In the field of statistics and statistical activity specifically, three broad trends are 
discernible. The first is the expansion and diversification of educational materials relating 
to statistics and a concomitant engagement with various approaches to statistical theory 
and practice. In the years immediately following the establishment of the Republic in 
1912, translated texts reflected an awareness and appreciation of the co-existing strands 
of mathematical statistics (with its focus on probability theory), Anglo-American 
statistics, as well as the more descriptive statistical practices prevalent in Germany.
65
 
From the 1920s to the 1940s, numerous original works on statistical theory and 
                                                     
63
 Lam notes that between 1927 and 1935 nine thousand surveys were carried out in China. Lam 2012: 4 
 
64
 Lam 2012: 9-10. 
 
65
 In a recent article, Br ard and Wang see the long-term trajectory from the late nineteenth into the first 
half of the twentieth century to be one of a transition from social statistics to mathematical statistics 从社会




application were also published.
66
 Other volumes offered comparisons of the differing 
statistical traditions and their historical trajectories. For instance, in the 1935 publication 
An Outline of Statistics 《统计学纲要》, Liu Hongwan 刘鸿万 observed that: 
The view of the School of Social Statistics is that the objects of statistical 
research are social phenomena, and the method of analysis is large-scale 
observation [大量观察法]; the view of the School of Mathematical 
Statistics is that it is a mathematical method that helps arrive at statistical 
solutions [统计解析].67  
 
In contrast, Wu Zaoxi 吴澡溪, in his Economic Statistics 《经济统计学》, contended 
that statistics was not an independent social science. Instead, it was “a research method 
that aided [辅助] the pursuit of other forms of knowledge [学问].”68 Indeed, through 
much of the first two decades after 1911, statistics was not taught as an independent 
subject. In 1927, with the establishment of the Central Politics School 中央政治学校, a 
statistics division was set up within the Economics department. It was another ten years 
before a dedicated department of statistics was established at National Chongqing 
University 国立重庆大学.69 Even so, the general practice in most places remained for 
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Concurrent with the gradual expansion and diversification of statistical education 
was a gradual expansion in official statistical work. Within the first few years of the 
Republic, offices and bureaus charged with carrying out statistical work were set up at 
various levels, partly on the foundations of pre-existing local institutional mechanisms. In 
1916 a State Council/Cabinet Office was re-established and contained a Bureau of 
Statistics within it. The general picture up to 1927 is one of various government bureaus, 
some dedicated to statistical work, but most involved in a variety of spheres, that 
collected and disseminated data germane to their briefs.
71
  
As described by D.K. Lieu, the years following 1927 witnessed renewed attempts 
at centralization and expansion of statistical activity. But Lieu considered much of this 
‘mushroom growth’ unsystematic, and in the final analysis, unhealthy, since it meant 
duplication of work and a significant waste of limited resources. He was among the 
people who convened a conference in February of 1930 that sought to address these 
issues. The conference recommended that an independent Central Statistical Bureau be 
established. Concurrently, it also recommended the establishment of a Central Statistical 
Commission charged with coordinating the statistical activities of the different Ministries. 
In the time it took to set these institutions up, the conference suggested forming a Central 
Statistical Association which could immediately set about coordinating statistical 
activities already underway. It also suggested carrying out population and agricultural 
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censuses in 1931. A final recommendation concerned the creation of a Chinese Statistical 
Society, which would provide a private forum for academic discussions of statistics.
72
 
Pursuant to these guidelines, the Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics 
was established on 1April 1931. 
D.K. Lieu’s discussion is indicative of two broad features of statistical activity 
during the latter half of the Republican period. The first is that state statistical activities, 
though they ranged across such subjects as agriculture, population, industry and labor, 
communications, finance, and so on, were fragmentary and essentially of a rather limited 
scope, in terms of the types of data collected, their geographical reach, and their 
representativeness. As the demographer Leo Orleans noted in a 1974 essay, “the 
statistical system [of Republican China] never developed beyond the rudimentary stage 
and almost never reached down to the hsien [county] levels.”
73
 The point is driven home 
all the more forcefully by the number of non-state, in many cases non-Chinese, actors 
whose data collection Lieu notes was an important source for the period. For instance, he 
noted approvingly the statistical surveys conducted by the likes of Sydney Gamble, John 
Lossing Buck, Chen Da, and others.  In so doing, Lieu points us to the second broad 
feature of the period—the lively and fairly diverse private engagement with statistics and 
statistical work across China through the 1930s and 1940s.
74
 Indeed, outside of 
government activity, there had also developed a lively community of scholars who 
participated in research on social issues, generating copious amounts of statistical data as 
a result. Such collaborative social research, frequently heavily statistical in nature, 
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involved Western social scientists, Chinese social scientists trained in the West, and 
locally trained social scientists.
75
 International organizations such as the Council of 
Pacific Relations, and the Rockefeller Foundation played a significant role as well, 
frequently serving as principal funding or organizing agencies.
76
  
 By 1947, Jennings P. Chu 朱君毅 reported to the attendees at the International 
Statistical Institute’s biannual conference that the Republic of China possessed a 
Statistical Directorate that had proven to “be of immense value in government planning, 
execution and investigation.”
77
 He identified five main characteristics of the system, to 
wit: independence (from political interference), liaisonship (i.e. a combination of 
centralized and decentralized administration), uniformity (across bureaus and types of 
data), specialization (of personnel), and finally interdependence (between planning, 
execution, and investigation). The duties of the Directorate included:  
(1) Direction and supervision of statistical personnel and statistical functions 
(2) Design and issuance of statistical forms and enforcement of uniform 
procedures 
(3) Assignment of statistical work across various departments 
(4) Compiling National Census statistics 
(5) Compiling a National Statistical Report 
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(6) Investigation of administrative efficiency and compiling statistics of 
administrative results 
 
The Directorate’s activities were summarized in a variety of publications, such as The 
National Statistical Report and Abstract, The Statistical Analysis of National Problems 




All this is suggestive of a large statistical establishment in the postwar years, but 
the actual numbers of bureaus and personnel that Zhu enumerated paint a different 
picture. According to Zhu, at the end of June 1947, there were eight Bureaus of Statistics 
and 660 Offices of Statistics in the principal and subordinate organs of the central 
government. An additional thirty-two bureaus and 1,196 offices were located in the 
provinces, municipalities, and counties. Total statistical units in the country numbered 
1,905 and the total number of personnel amounted to 5,066, of which 120 were at the 
Directorate of Statistics itself.
79
 In spite of such a seemingly small number of personnel 
for such a large country, Zhu was optimistic about the future of statistical work in China. 
The Japanese had been defeated, and the Communists also seemed to be on the run. A 
stable future beckoned and Zhu looked forward to the establishment of a complete 
statistical network, more trained personnel, and the “attainment of comprehensive, 
accurate, and timely results.”
80
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Zhu’s optimism, we now know, was premature. By 1948, the tide of the civil war 
that had raged since 1946 had begun to turn in the CCP’s favor. As such, Leo Orleans 
perhaps summed-up it up best when he noted that “despite some well-meaning efforts by 
the Nationalist government, when the Communists took over the mainland in 1949 China 
continued to be ‘a land where the statistician may perish for want of a few figures, where 




Wang Sihua 王思华 and the Northeast Statistics Bureau, 1949-1954 
Well before the People’s Republic was officially brought into existence, the CCP had 
begun to organize statistical work and economic activity in the regions it controlled. After 
the end of the Second World War, the Party moved into the northeastern provinces 
vacated by the Japanese. Wang Sihua 王思华 was assigned to these areas to aid in their 
governance. Working under leaders such as Li Fuchun 李富春 and Gao Gang 高岗, 
Wang’s first assignment was to take over the administration of West Liaoning and North 
Liaoning. Early in 1947, he was also appointed the Deputy Secretary-General of 
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Wang Sihua was well suited to these tasks. He was born in 1904 in coastal 
Laoting County 乐亭县 in the northern province of Hebei 河北 and as a student at 
Beijing University in the 1920s, he enjoyed frequent contact with fellow Laoting County 
native, the firebrand intellectual and founding father of the Chinese Communist Party, Li 
Dazhao 李大钊. Under Li’s influence, Wang soon became involved in revolutionary 
work. In 1926, he traveled to Europe and spent four years studying in France and 
England. It was during those four years that he began translating Capital into Chinese. 
Wang returned to China in the winter of 1930 and was appointed a professor of political 
economy at Beiping University and at Sino-French University 中法大学.83 At the same 
time, he also became part of an underground network of left-leaning professors. With the 
support of the CCP, and the help of Hou Wailu 侯外庐, he continued to translate Capital. 
In June 1936, the results of these labors were published as Capital-Volume 1 by the 
International Society 国际学社; an accompanying commentary for the convenience of 
readers was also published.
84
 
A turn towards more active involvement in revolutionary work took place in 1934, 
after Wang had been arrested and released on bail following charges of participating in 
intelligence work. Starting that year, Wang not only collaborated with the Anti-
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Imperialist League 反帝大同盟 and the Anti-Japanese Society 抗日救国会, he was also 
selected as a committee member of the Beiping Second War Zone Mobilization 
Committee 北平第二战区动员委员会. After the fall of Beiping in early August 1937, 
Wang made his way to Yan’an 延安, arriving there in September. He entered the Party 
rolls the following year and was assigned to teach Political Economy at the Central Party 
School 中央党校. During the rectification campaign that began in 1942, Wang, who by 
then was directing research on China’s economy within the Central Research Institute 中
央研究院, conducted an agricultural survey in northern Shaanxi. The primary research 
method for this survey was a form of typical sampling 典型调查. The following year, in 
1943, Wang became the deputy director of the Northwest Financial Planning Council, 
which was under the leadership of Chen Yun 陈云 (1905-1995).85  
By the time that the Second World War drew to a close in Asia, Wang had 
garnered significant experience in economic administration and was an ideal candidate to 
be sent into the Northeast to contribute towards its administration. In October 1948, he 
was appointed to the newly established Statistical Survey Unit of the Northeast Finance 
and Economics Committee 东北财经委员会调查统计处. Among his early tasks was to 
assess the economic conditions in the Northeast. Wang organized surveys of industrial 
and commercial activity in Harbin, led investigations into the recent economic 
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It was organizing statistical activity for the newly liberated Northeast (and China), 
however, that was to become his principal mission. In April of 1950, the Northeast 
Statistics Bureau (NSB) was officially set up in Shenyang 沈阳 and Wang was appointed 
its director.
87
 Under Wang, the NSB laid the foundation of a comprehensive statistical 
apparatus, began the systematic translation of Soviet statistics treatises, and disseminated 
information about the Bureau’s work and the experience it gained through its monthly 
journal Statistical Work  《统计工作》.88 Over the course of its four year existence, the 
NSB would register many firsts in PRC history: the first region 大区 to set up a statistics 
bureau, the first to publish a specialized statistics journal, the first to publish an Annual 




                                                     
86
 These activities were coordinated through an institute set up to research Japanese rule and the activities 
of the Manchukuo Puppet Regime from 1932-1945 (伪满经济研究所). The institute’s work was aided by a 
staff of thirteen Japanese, who helped edit historical materials and also helped calculate the fixed prices for 
1943. They returned to Japan after these activities. See: “Huiwang: lishi shang de dongbei tongjiju 回望: 历
史上的东北统计局 (Looking Back: The History of the Northeast Statistics Bureau).” Tongji gongzuo 中国
统计 (Statistical Work), 2010.8: 22-23. 
 
87
 The offices were originally located near Zhongshan Square; later moving to Heping Distict, Northwest 




 Not to be confused with the journal of the State Statistics Bureau, with which it shared a name, and for 
which it was most likely the inspiration. The SSB’s Statistical Work was published starting in January 1953, 
and most likely assimilated its predecessor.   
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 Under Wang’s leadership, the Northeast Statistics Bureau witnessed a more than 
five-fold expansion in its rank and file. In his July 1950 address, Wang had reported that 
altogether there were 5,860 cadre involved in statistical work (this estimate also included 
part-time workers). Of these, the preponderance was occupied in tracking industrial 
statistics (4778), with the remainder divided unevenly across trade, railways, and 
agriculture.
90
 Two years later, in his December 1952 address, Wang noted that the NSB 
now had 21,000 full-time statistical cadre who were aided by about 9,000 part-time 
workers.
91
 He was also pleased that during the same time various statistical forms 统计报
告表格 had been unified and rationalized, their overall number having been brought 
under control: over the nearly three year period, the bureau had managed to reduce the 
number of forms from 3,318 to a much more manageable 396. This was the first step in 
controlling duplication and the excess issuing of forms 滥发报表, he explained. 92  
 The monthly journal Statistical Work 《统计工作》, which began publication in 
May of 1950, became the primary venue through which the bureau discussed a wide 
variety of statistical issues. It continued publication till the end of 1952, and a total of 
thirty-two issues were produced before the journal was absorbed into its national level 
namesake, which began publication in January 1953.
93
 Periodically, important articles 
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were also compiled and published as anthologies 选辑.94 The subjects covered in these 
anthologies can broadly be classified into four categories. The first category was 
instructional and included essays on how to fill-in statistical tables and forms in industry, 
agriculture, and other areas; how to assess and address problems with calculation, tables, 
original records, and accounting; the nature of training; how to conduct analysis 分析; 
and finally, how to provide explanatory textual material to accompany numerical data 文
字说明. A second category consisted of problems that the bureau was encountering and 
wanted to address. Examples include excess issuing of forms 滥发报表; problems in 
leadership; and dealing with conservatism in work. Thirdly, they included the publication 
of important Statistical Laws and Regulations. A final fourth category dealt with the 
various different kinds of statistical activities carried out by the bureau, and included 
summaries of work and responsibilities; descriptions of surveys of industry (state and 
private), crop production, as well as some early essays on typical sampling 典型调查. 
The picture that emerges from such categorization is of a clear emphasis on establishing 
procedure, unifying systems, and training people to do statistical work. There is 
surprisingly little discussion of actual statistical results.  
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The Primacy of Exhaustive Enumeration 
In terms of method, the system built under Wang consisted of two principal means of 
statistical data collection. The first, and by far the more significant, was exhaustive 
enumeration via the Complete Enumeration Periodical Report System 全面定期统计报
表制度.95 Its bedrock was the institutionalization and rationalization of original records 
原始记录. The idea was that data would be collected primarily through a vast network of 
comprehensive and periodic statistical reports that would span all sectors of the economy. 
As Wang noted, each and every table had clear instructions for how to fill-in data and on 
the timing and sequence of filing forms.
96




1. The April 10 Law, Regarding the Strengthening of Statistical Work 《关于加
强统计工作的指示》, a notification 通知 of which was reissued on July 8th. 
This law established the NSB and called for the setting-up of a centralized 
system of reports and required that statutory forms 法定表格 be used at and 
by all levels. All other pre-existing forms were to be discarded 废除. 
2. The Law of August 22, Regarding the Centralization of the Issuing of 
Statistical Numbers 《关于统一公布统计数字的决定》. This law required 
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that all reported data be checked by the corresponding statistical office before 
being sent to a higher level within the statistical organization. 
3. The Law of October 13, Temporary Regulations for Statistical Reports in the 
Northeast Region 《东北区统计报告暂行规程》. This was the first 
Regional Ordinance 地区条例 for statistics in post-1949 China and clarified 
the relationship between different levels of the statistical apparatus. Such a 
system also enforced the use of a common set of forms and tables. 
In other parts of the country, where statistics bureaus had yet to be set up, similar 
directives were issued a few months later by the city or provincial governments through 
the authority of the Statistics Office of the Central Planning Commission’s Finance and 
Economics Committee 中央人民政府政务院财政经济委员会统计处. For instance, in 
Beijing, a directive to establish and strengthen statistical work was issued on 15 
December 1950. It designated the city’s Research Office to act as the coordinating and 
distributing agency, to which all statistical tables must be sent.
98
 
The following year, in March 1951, the NSB issued The Decision Regarding 
Trials of a Two-Track Statistical Reporting System 《关于试行统计报告双轨制的决
定》, which set up a two-track system for reporting and collecting data. In the first track, 
grassroots units reported data to the enterprise (business, company, or organization) with 
which they were affiliated, and that enterprise then prepared a consolidated statement for 
forwarding to the NSB. But these grassroots reporting units were also required to report 
data using the statistical reporting system. Thus, in theory, data about the same unit 
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arrived at the statistical offices in Shenyang via two parallel routes: one through the 
enterprise, the other through the statistical system. The periodicity of these reports could 
be as short as a ten-day cycle, or as long as an year, and included several possibilities in 
between: monthly, seasonal, semi-annual, and so on. These reports would be sent up 
through each successive level till they reached the headquarters of the NSB in Shenyang 
(and later Beijing). Some of these seasonal and annual reports were also published, such 
as the Northeast Report on Implementation of the National Economic Plan 东北区国民
经济计划执行情况的报告, which was published starting in 1951.99 The first Annual 
Report 年报 was published on 1 April 1952 and provided data for all of 1951. By1954, 
this system had expanded to include data from industry, capital construction, agriculture, 
trade, transport and communication, private enterprise, as well as numerous other fields.  
When data was required with an irregular level of expediency, one-time censuses 
普查 were also employed. A national census of industry was completed by the end of 
1950, and for the first time gave planners in Beijing an idea of the basic production 
situation in each factory across China. On the factory-side it was hoped the census would 
help understand production, discover latent potential 后备力量, correct management 
shortcomings, and implement economic calculation. The census also raised awareness at 
the factory level about the importance of statistical work, partly through the many 
additional statistical cadre who had been trained during the census and were now familiar 
with production processes and related technical issues. The NSB was at the forefront of 
this survey, carrying it out from April through December of that year. A census of private 
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industry was begun shortly thereafter, on 19 July 1950, via the Decision Regarding 
Conducting a Census of Private Industry in the Northeast 关于进行全东北私营工业普
查的决定. This census covered six provinces and five cities, enumerated 39,539 private 
industrial units and took eight months to complete.
100
  
Unlike in industry, statistical work in agriculture did not easily permit exhaustive 
enumeration, wither via a periodical report system or through one-time censuses. 
Accordingly, the second method of data collection relied on sample surveying. The NSB 
designed surveys to produce statistical estimates of agricultural production. These 
surveys were invariably based on some form of typical sampling 典型调查, random 
sampling 随机抽样调查 having been ruled out on account of its mathematical roots. In 
designing them, the Chinese drew upon not just Soviet expertise but also their own 
experiences from the 1930s. They discovered that Soviet experts, in general, were not 
overly enthusiastic about the use of such surveys.
 101
 In the materials produced by the 
NSB, the Soviet statistical experts’ discounting of surveying is perhaps best expressed by 
the absence of the word for representative-ness 代表性.  
The CCP’s experience conducting rural surveys during the 1930s was thus a 
critical factor in determining the survey design of the early 1950s surveys. In his memoirs, 
Xue Muqiao 薛暮桥, the economist and first director of the national State Statistics 
Bureau, observed that the purpose of the 1930s surveys had been to estimate production 
and organize the levying of taxes. Every province and city had established Production 
Survey Committees or Production Survey Offices, which were led by the head of the 
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local Planning Committee. These committees and offices used the method of meetings 会
议的方式 to disseminate what they were doing at the county level. Operating on the 
maxim “divide by type, select [a] typical, really cut [grain] to really measure,” 8,000 
surveyors investigated 1,175 typical 典型 villages.102 First, sown area was surveyed; then 
areas were divided based on the nature of the harvest (good or bad); typical cases were 
selected from within these divisions and surveyed after which overall estimates were 
generated based on the relative weights of good and bad harvest areas.
103
 Such typical 
sampling formed the basis of several other surveys carried out during this period. These 





Besides the collection and collation of data, other statistical activities included the 
calculation of price indices, the periodic rectification of original records, and the cleaning 
of statistical tables. In 1950, Soviet methods were used to compile a Price Index. A 
common program for calculation was subsequently assigned to all provinces and cities so 
that they could calculate local price indices. For instance, a survey of 2,000 products was 
carried out in Shenyang in August of 1950 and the following month the NSB released the 
Shenyang Wholesale Price Index 沈阳市私商批发物价指数. In October of that year, the 
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NSB released a State-Owned Whole Sale Price Index 国营批发物价指数. From 
December onwards, indices were published monthly in the Northeast Daily 《东北日
报》. The following year, the NSB released a price index for the Northeast’s ten big 
cities. After that, provincial and city-level indices began to be calculated in the Northeast 
on a ten-day, monthly, or some other predetermined time-cycle.
105
  
Rectification of original records 整顿原始记录, another practice that would 
continue through the rest of the decade, was initially begun in the Northeast in 1951 in 
statistical data for industry, capital construction, and trade. Over the following two years, 
most industrial units went through two rounds of rectification and their data was widely 
considered to be reliable. Local state-owned industrial units also went through at least 
one round of rectification. In capital construction, rectification was modeled on that done 
in the industrial cities of Angang 鞍钢 and Fushun 抚顺. These cities had begun 
publishing a newspaper, Section Leader Daily 《组长日报》, which shared basic 
information on the changing work conditions on a daily basis: work completion, 
work/labor time, worker’s development, use of materials, and so on. By collecting all 
such data into one report, these daily papers became the basis for unified, regular, and 
accurate statistical data about these industries. This experience was subsequently shared 
with the rest of the country and these methods used everywhere.
106
  
The clean-up of statistical reports was also carried out twice. The first instance 
was in 1950, per the orders of the Northeast People’s Government. The second instance 
was in 1953, following a directive from the recently established State Statistics Bureau. 
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The clean-up involved getting rid of illegal reports as well as unnecessary reports and in 
particular helped reduced the burden on grassroots units. It was also effective in raising 
the standards of cadre, especially in the agricultural sector. 
 
“A New Type of Standardized Statistical Work” 
Taken together, these activities begin to provide a catalog of the basic contours of 
statistical work in the Northeast. Wang’s “new type of standardized statistical work” (新
型正规化的统计工作 xinxing zhenggui de tongji gongzuo) had three basic features. The 
first of these was ‘extensiveness’ 广泛化. For Wang this meant that socialist statistics, 
unlike its bourgeois version, had mass character 大众化. In other words, it ran through 
every sector of the economy and society:  
Not only did it include all branches of the national economy, but also 
culture, education, and health care; its content was extremely extensive, 
and the procurement of materials, the collation of numbers, depended on a 




A unified reporting system also meant that each person and each element within the 
system was absolutely critical. Even if one person’s work suffered from a fault 毛病, then 
the entirety of statistical work was at fault.  
 Accordingly, a second characteristic was the system’s ‘completeness’ 整体性. 
This completeness was a corollary to the extensiveness in that it sought to conceive of the 
statistical work of every unit as an integral part of a unified statistical apparatus. The key 
to achieving such completeness required standardization of forms and types of data so 
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that comprehensive and comparable data were easily available. Equally important was the 
creation of norms for entering data on forms and for their accompanying textual 
explanations.
 108
 Since the integrity of such an extensive and complete system could 
easily be threatened by a kink in any one level, it was imperative to create a unified 
structure of reporting that permitted data (i.e. forms and tables) to be sent up and down 
different levels of the statistical and administrative system.
109
 
Such extensiveness and completeness were the basis for the third feature of 
socialist statistics, namely its ‘objectivity’ 客观性. Unlike bourgeois statistics, which was 
predicated on profit and meant that statistical data were frequently distorted 歪曲 to serve 
the interests of the few and protect their business secrets, the New Statistics was unafraid 
of exposing weakness. Quite to the contrary, it welcomed criticism and even took part in 
self-criticism in the pursuit of objectivity and truth 真实性. 110   
None of the above three ideals could be achieved without a disciplined cadre of 
statistical workers who could calculate and analyze the data. Thus Wang noted that 
discipline undergirded the entire edifice of statistical work. Discipline meant that 
numbers were diligently recorded, that reporting deadlines were strictly observed, and 
somewhat oddly, since Wang had just accused capitalists of the same failing, that all 
statistical numbers were guarded like secrets.
111
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These features—extensiveness, completeness, objectivity—exemplified what was 
deemed scientific by Wang because only by counting everything could an objective sense 
of social reality be achieved.
112
 Such exhaustive counting in turn was the basis of the 
socialist corrective to bourgeois statistics. Indeed, the implication was that a system that 
was socialist was by definition also scientific, and therefore, correct. The three terms—
socialist, scientific, and correct—had become mutually interchangeable. Several years 
later in 1957, the Indian statistician P.C. Mahalanobis would be impressed by these very 
qualities of the by then national statistical system, noting that it was “appreciably better 
than that in India in respect of coverage, availability, and accuracy of data required for 
purposes of planning and current policy decisions.”
 113
 The system described by Wang, 
and one that was first attempted in the Northeast was no doubt an idealization. On the 
ground, a variety of challenges existed: some on account of local variation across China, 
some as problems of calculation, and others because of incentives and disincentives that 
were systemic in nature. Many of these will be explored in later chapters. For now, let us 
turn to an alternate method of ascertaining social fact, which drew its authority directly 
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Maoist Social Investigation as Method 
Mao is known to have personally conducted at least two investigations into social 
conditions in the countryside, the first in 1927 and the second in 1930.
114
 The reports of 
these investigations, along with other writings such as his essay “Oppose Book Worship” 
(1930) and “On Practice” (1937)
115
, served to articulate a form of social investigation 社
会调查 that was at once at odds with not only the bourgeois ‘social survey movement’ of 
the 1930s but also with established Marxist methods of social science research, in China 
and elsewhere.
116
 For Mao, the only way of understanding a situation was to carry out 
several “thorough investigations” 周密的调查 of selected cities and villages and use 
Marxism-Leninist class analysis. “Only in this way,” he contended, was it possible “to 
gain the most fundamental understanding of China’s social problems.”
117
  
Mao’s principal method was to carry out ‘investigation meetings’ 调查会. This 
meant gathering a small select group of informants from whom he would gather not just 
knowledge about the situation on the ground, but also information about local group-
dynamics, solidarities, and inter-personal tension, all with a view to deploying such 
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information to achieve specific political ends. This method valorized the personal 
experience of conducting such interviews. It discounted methodological issues such as 
representativeness and comprehensiveness in favor of the ability to effectively create 
change and bring about consensus.
118
 The method’s importance and its impact before and 
after 1949 have been the subject of earlier work, most notably that of Thomas Mullaney, 
Yung-chen Chiang, and Roger Thompson.
119
 While Chiang and Mullaney disagree on the 
degree to which Mao was self-reflexive about the methodological strengths or 
weaknesses of his method, both insist that the method retained its primacy in the years 
after 1949.
120
 While that may indeed have been true in some spheres, in the realm of 
statistics this method of social investigation was very much a source of tension for its 
practitioners and theoreticians.  
Two things within Mao’s method were particularly at odds with the socialist 
statistics espoused by Wang Sihua. The first was that Mao placed tremendous value on 
individual experience—drawing authority from one’s presence in the field, personally 
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carrying out a survey.
 121
 Personal subjectivity was the basis for the pursuit of objective 
reality. The theoretical basis of this position was best articulated in his essay “On 
Practice.” In it, he noted that “the peoples with real personal knowledge are those 
engaged in practice the wide world over.”
122
 
If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, 
you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, 
to change that thing or class of things…Only through personal 
participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the 
essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them…All 
genuine knowledge originates in direct experience… [and] there can be no 




Mao exemplified this position in practice in his Hunan report. From the reports very first 
sentence, he placed himself squarely in the middle of the investigation:  
 “During my recent visit to Hunan I made a first-hand investigation of 
conditions in the five counties…I called together fact-finding conferences 
in villages and county towns, which were attended by experienced 
peasants and by comrades working in the peasant movement, and I 
listened attentively to their reports and collected a great deal of 
material.”
124
 [Emphasis added] 
 
He was present ‘first-hand,’ ‘fact-finding,’ and ‘listened attentively.’ The local 
informants he preferred to meet were those who had a good understanding of local 
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 “Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could work out their 
theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific 
experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded…” Mao Tse-Tung. 
“On Practice.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Volume I. Peking: People’s Publishing House, 1952. 
Accessed from: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_16.htm  
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 But he would add that picking up information less systematically was just 
as important: “I met all sorts of people and picked up a good deal of gossip.”
126
 Later in 
the report he would note, for instance: “When I was in the countryside, I heard the gentry 
say…”
127
 Mao’s authority to speak also drew from his subjective position of being 
personally present in the field, which allowed him not only to interview informants but to 
also witness events as they unfolded: “I myself saw two [evil gentry] captured in 
Changsha…
128
 Personal testimony was augmented by direct quotes from the people he 
met and interviewed, thereby adding the kind of local flavor that statistical data collected 
through a periodical report system could never hope to attain: “Whenever their 
conversation turns to the heads of the tu and tuan, the peasants say angrily, ‘That bunch! 
They are finished!’”
129
 It was such experience that Mao would extoll but also claim was 
imperative because it allowed you to gather information and make assessments based on 
that.
130
 And the process was not without excitement of impending revolutionary change: 
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“If you revolutionary viewpoint is firmly established and if you have been to the villages 
and looked around, you will undoubtedly feel thrilled as never before.
131
 
 Mao’s enthusiasm for such investigative strategies was accompanied by a lack of 
precision where actual numbers were concerned. Throughout the Hunan report he 
frequently dealt in whole numbers or expressed ranges that could, at best, only be taken 
as having token representative value. Thus, in discussing the number of spears among 
spear corps in the five counties he would offer numbers such as 100,000 in one county 
( Hsianghsiang), or ranges such as “70,000-80,000 or 50,000-60,000 or 30,000-40,000” 
in the remaining counties.
132
 The number of rifles amongst the landlord class was 
discussed with somewhat greater precision, but still with a propensity for neat, whole 
numbers: “An average of 600 rifles for each country would make a total of 45,000 rifles 
for all the seventy-five counties [in central Hunan]…”
133
 Elsewhere, in similar fashion, 
he noted that “a crowd of fifteen thousand peasants,” demonstrated at the houses of six 
evil gentry.
134
 Finally, it remains unclear how he arrived at the results of his surveys of 
Changsha county (where he claimed that poor peasants comprised 70%, middle peasants 
20%, and landlord and rich peasants the remaining 10%) and Hengshan (85% of peasant 
leaders are capable and hard-working, while 15% retain some bad habits).
135
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 The second feature of Maoist social research at odds with socialist statistics was 
the invocation of a telling example as a representation of a larger social reality.
136
 As 
Mao would state in the Hunan report, “quite a few such cases have occurred. There was a 
case recently at Machiahao, Hsiangtan County, where…,” or “once in Hsiangtan when a 
district peasant association and a township peasant association could not see eye to 
eye.”
137
 In similar fashion, when discussing the effect that the execution of one landlord 
can have, he cited the example of his native county of Hsiangtan.  Socialist statistics was 
intrinsically uncomfortable with such a strategy of using the part as a representative of 
the whole. The use of an example was acceptable for illustration, but could not be the 
basis of one’s knowledge about the totality of social reality.  
If Mao’s ethnographic method was a way of ascertaining social fact, so indeed 
was socialist statistics.
138
 For PRC-era socialist statisticians, Mao’s method was 
essentially a form of typical sampling. In his July 1951 speech, Li Fuchun had spoken of 
methods of data collection that were supplementary to the periodical report system, 
pointing specifically to Mao’s method of typical investigations using investigation 
meetings 调查会, noting that they had been in use for well over a decade.139 But within 
socialist statistics such typical sampling was considered a secondary method, only to be 
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used when periodical reports and exhaustive enumeration were impossible. Wang’s “new 
type of standardized statistical work” described above was predicated on abstraction and 
the ability to collate vast amounts of data. An individual statistician or statistical cadre 
drew his authority and knowledge neither from his personal experience of the field nor 
from having participated in data collection at the village and county level, but primarily 
from the power of abstraction. It was not the observation of habit 习惯, the application of 
common sense 常识, or any other individual personal experience that was critical, but 
rather specialized training that allowed him to correctly record data, process it, and 
analyze it. The knowledge and practice that Mao spoke of were not the knowledge and 
practice that socialist statistics would have its statisticians specialize in.
140
 To further 
complicate matters, Mao’s method was also hardly the kind of representative typical 
sampling that had actually been conducted in the Northeast under Wang.  
Socialist statistics remained in uncomfortable tension with the Maoist method for 
much of the decade of the 1950s. In fields that had putatively ceased to exist, such as 
sociology, the methodological vacuum was filled by the Maoist method. But in the case 
of statistics, the method went against Soviet experience as well as the very framing of 
socialist statistics. Given the latter’s dominance during the 1950s, the Maoist method 
served to make it harder to convince cadre, in particular grass roots cadre, of the efficacy 
and need for something as expansive and alienating as the periodical report system and 
exhaustive enumeration.  It was only after 1958, when socialist statistics itself was 
abandoned during the Great Leap Forward that the Maoist method would come to occupy 
center-stage as the principal statistical method of social investigation. 
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For Wang Sihua, three features taken together exemplified the strengths and scientific 
character of the Northeast’s statistical system: extensiveness across economy and society, 
completeness of the statistical system, and objectivity about social fact. By placing the 
periodical report at the core of this system, he articulated a preference for exhaustive 
enumeration. Only in this way, by counting everything, did he and other Chinese 
statisticians claim to achieve an objective sense of social reality. In contradistinction to 
their system of high abstraction lay the personal, anecdotal, and ethnographic model of 
Mao’s early social analyses. For much of the decade of the 1950s, the abstraction of the 
periodical report was the normative ideal in the world of PRC statistics. That is not to say 
that its alienating tendencies did not generate tensions (as will be discussed below in Part 
II), but this tension was largely kept in abeyance. It was only with the launching of the 
Great Leap Forward in the summer of 1958 that Mao’s method would be rebadged and 





























Lies, Damned Lies, and (Bourgeois) Statistics:  























Where did the inspiration for and confidence in exhaustive enumeration via a periodical 
report system come from? In the most concrete terms it came from the desire to emulate 
the success of the Soviet Union. To the Chinese (and many other socialist states after 
1945), the Soviet Union “provided the only historical model for industrializing an 
economically backward country under socialist political auspices.”
141
 The Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) attitude toward such ‘advanced experience’ 先進經驗 had 
been articulated by none other than Mao Zedong 毛泽东 himself. In 1949, he had stated: 
“The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from 
it.”
142
 The Soviet Union had responded with enthusiasm. A principal element of Soviet 
aid was sharing technical knowledge. By 1960, when the Sino-Soviet split became final, 
as many as 18,000 Soviet and Eastern European Experts had spent time in China sharing 
their expertise.
143
 A handful among them were statistical experts—consultants, 
administrators, and teachers—whose advice was instrumental in the organization of the 
Northeast Statistics Bureau and later, the State Statistics Bureau.  
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The confidence in exhaustive enumeration was not, however, a mere artifact of 
emulation (or practicality); rather, embedded in this choice, was a deep-seated and 
sophisticated theoretical criticism of statistics as it had evolved and was evolving at that 
time. Put differently, the confidence in exhaustive enumeration came from a particular 
understanding of how to count and ascertain social reality, and the place of mathematics 
in that process. Within this theoretical framework, exhaustive enumeration came to serve 
as the basis for the socialist corrective to what came to then be labeled “bourgeois” 
statistics. What socialist statistics and its preference for exhaustive enumeration did was 
to deny the universal applicability of mathematics in general and mathematical statistics 
in particular.  
The purpose of this chapter, then, is two-fold: first, to uncover and understand the 
socialist critique of statistics; and second, to investigate the Soviet statistical experts who 
spent time in China and who were instrumental in socialist statistics’ rise to a position of 
epistemological and administrative dominance. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of 
the 1950s (or post-1945, more accurately) as a period where the imperative to ascertain 
social fact took on added urgency across the world. There existed, however, competing 
approaches to ascertaining social fact and the following sections dwell on the rise of 
socialist statistics, in particular its rise in the USSR, and contrast it with other approaches 
to statistics. I then turn toward an exploration of the Soviet experts who spent extended 
periods of time in the PRC, examining the variety of ways—teaching, translation of 
textbooks, and consultation—through which their expertise was mobilized by the Chinese 
State Statistics Bureau as it sought to disseminate the correct understanding and 




Ascertaining Social Fact in the 1950s—A Global Imperative 
Over the last two to three decades the history of quantification, probability, counting, and 
facticity in the early modern and pre-twentieth century world has garnered increasing 
amounts of attention. The rich studies that have emerged have helped establish 
quantification and statistics as independent subjects of inquiry, situating them at the very 
heart of the modern and post-modern experience.
144
 Among the many insights that have 
been offered by this rich literature is the significant role played by the state and by the 
study of the social world (in addition to the natural world), particularly through the 
expansion of bureaucracies and administrative duties, in the realization of what Ted 
Porter has called the ‘statistical perspective.’
145
   
If these were essentially nineteenth century developments, largely limited within 
the boundaries of nation states, or in certain cases, imperial formations, the twentieth 
century presented challenges of a rather new nature. The experiences of World War I led 
to the desire for new international/global institutions of arbitration and peace. The most 
well-known example of this is, of course, the founding of the League of Nations. One of 
the activities the League was involved in was the design and organization of 
commensurable economic and financial data.
146
 At the same time, the duties of the state 
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also expanded far beyond their nineteenth century norms. Fueled in part by the rise of 
Communism and by the experience of the Great Depression, which, in turn, facilitated the 
rise of Keynesian economics, the state began to take on ever expanding responsibility in 
regulating the economy and providing services to its citizens.
147
 From a technological 
standpoint, each of the World Wars also played their role, as they provided opportunities 
for the design, experimentation and deployment of advanced techniques of data collection 
and analysis. Operations Research, for instance, was a field that grew substantially on the 
basis of war time exigencies.
148
 After World War II, the earlier efforts of the League of 
Nations were renewed through the United Nations, which established various institutions 
for global order and communication, including a Statistical Commission in 1947. 
Finally, the collapse of empires that gathered pace in the wake of WWII heralded 
the arrival of several new nation states, each with its own modernizing mission. A 
principal way to be modern, and demonstrate one’s modernity to others, was to know 
oneself and at the same time exhibit this self-knowledge to others. A statistical system 
that gathered and disseminated such knowledge using numbers, and which employed the 
latest methods, became the hallmark of a modern nation state.
149
 For a long time, a 
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 In his discussion of planning in post-colonial India, for instance, Partha Chatterjee has shown how the 




standard imperial argument had been that locals did not even possess an accurate and 
scientific means of ascertaining (social) fact. Empire’s civilizing mission, thus, included 
this ‘gift’ of fact and numerical representation. In the Chinese case, the discourse about 
the lack of facts was keenly felt. Almost on par with the nineteenth century Western 
imperial assertion that China lacked a rational legal system, the lack of factual self-
knowledge came to inform a discourse of national humiliation. As Tong Lam has shown 
in a recent study, the response was the rise of a “social survey movement,” whose 




By the end of World War II, these developments, and the desire for a new world 
[order], contributed in part to what might be termed a more globalized epoch of statistics 
driven numerical positivism.
151
 For, each of these developments depended upon and 
demanded new levels of data collection and analysis. This desire for data, for facts, was 
summed up by the UN Secretary General Trygvie Lie in 1947. Addressing the inaugural 
session of the International Statistical Institute’s twenthieth meeting in Washington, D.C., 
Lie observed:  
“The free exchange of information on economic and social affairs among 
all countries in the world is absolutely necessary to economic and social 
advancement. We cannot cure our troubles unless we know in the first 
place what those troubles are. Likewise we cannot achieve international 
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understanding, which is the basis of advancement, unless the peoples of 
the world are given the facts about each other…There is no substitute for 
facts, for clear and systematically organized facts. They alone can be 
relied upon to measure resources and potentialities for progress and to 
direct policies and actions designed to achieve the objectives of all 
civilized people.”
152
 [emphasis added] 
 
Speaking, as he was, at the pre-eminent gathering of international statisticians, the desire 
for ‘clear and systematically organized facts’ was predicated on a form of numerical 
positivism—numbers alone could help understand ground realities, design solutions to 
problems, and plan for the future. The postwar years were, as a result, a time when 
several statistical innovations achieved tremendous legitimacy, the attendant positivism 
informing actions in all spheres of human activity.
153
 Among these innovations can be 
listed large scale sample surveying (something which we shall return to in Part III), 
operations research, development theory (most notably W.W. Rostow’s theory about the 
Stages of Economic Growth), demographic transition theory, random sampling methods 
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 In 1986, Ted Porter had observed that statistical tools used in modern sciences had been worked out 
over the previous 100 years or so. The phase of invention was mostly in the nineteenth century and the 
phase of development during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Extending his periodization, 
we can label the rest of the twentieth century starting with WWII as the period of application and 





A Universal Science 
Most of these innovations were made possible because of a specific shift in the 
understanding of statistics, quantification, and probability that occurred during the 
nineteenth century. Until the late nineteenth century, statistical activities broadly 
construed progressed along two non-intersecting tracks, one descriptive and the other 
analytic. The descriptive traced its origins to the seventeenth century “political arithmetic” 
of William Petty among others, the German school of descriptive statistics (Statistik, 
from which the modern word originates), and through them to a much more fundamental 
and age-old global phenomenon—the desire of the state to collect information about its 
constituents, its land, its produce, and so on. The analytic, which can be traced at least as 
far back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was principally concerned with 
concepts of chance, probability, and estimating and controlling error, primarily in an 
abstract, mathematical sense.
154
 The shift that occurred in the 19
th
 century involved a new 
understanding of error not as a reflection of chaos but rather as variations in a given 
natural order. As Ted Porter notes, "the acceptance of indeterminism constitutes one of 
the most striking changes of modern scientific thought. With few exceptions, scientists 
and philosophers previous to the late nineteenth century would have agreed with 
Augustus De Morgan that to say an event occurs by chance is to say that it occurs for no 
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 Similarly, Ian Hacking has shown how the erosion of determinism made 
possible “autonomous laws of chance.” 
The idea of human nature was displaced by a model of normal people with 
laws of dispersion. These two transformations were parallel and fed into 
each other. Chance made the world seem less capricious: it was 
legitimated because it brought order out of chaos. The greater the level of 
indeterminism in our conception of the world and of people, the higher the 




For Hacking and Porter, these developments owed as much to the study of natural 
phenomena as they did to social phenomena.
157
 It was not error analysis per se, but rather 
the use of probability as a modeling tool to analyze variation in nature and society, a 
mutual cross-pollination across disciplines and intellectual pursuits, which contributed to 
the evolution of statistics as a distinctly mathematical field of inquiry. 
This, in brief, is the liberal story in which statistics emerges as a universal science, 
capable of studying and discerning patterns in both society and nature. But statistics also 
has an alternate history, which, at least for a significant portion of the 20
th
 century, 
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A Critique of Universality 
Lenin is famously said to have observed that “socialism is first of all accounting.”
158
 
Within the former USSR he enjoyed fame as a skilled statistician who used numbers to 
expose the oppression and injustices of imperialist Tsarist rule and, after 1918, as 
someone who vigorously promoted the development of state statistical institutions.
159
 
Stalin, too, is known to have remarked on the fundamental importance of statistical 
activities and data.
160
 In accepting the centrality of statistics as a tool for understanding 
and shaping economic phenomena, Marxist and Soviet thinkers and practitioners shared 
much in common with thinkers in other parts of the world.
 161
 But in the selection of 
theory and methods to pursue these goals, they drew a sharp line between themselves and 
thinkers in a liberal tradition. While Marx was likely cognizant and appreciative of 
developments in mathematics and statistics made possible by the works of such notable 
figures as Quetelet, Poisson, and Laplace, Soviet and Chinese statisticians were quick to 
point out that he restricted his own discussions on the efficacy of statistics solely to the 
realm of political economy.
162
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 “In the U.S.S.R., statistics cannot be separated from economics either in the field of theory, in the 
establishment of the methodology of study of new economic phenomena, or in practical work in the 
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For Marx and Engels, and subsequently Lenin, Stalin and other Soviet thinkers, 
there were no universal laws of economics and statistics.
 163
 Rather, different historical 
epochs and different social systems generated different statistical and economic laws. 
Accordingly, as A. Yugow noted in a 1947 review of Soviet statistics, it was felt that: 
 the statistical methods applied in the accounting of the results of private 
economic activity, and the patterns established for economies in which the 
chief economic regulating forces are the laws of supply and demand, have 




The nature of the economy and social organization of a particular country, which, in turn, 
reflected a particular stage in its history, required its own sets of statistical and economic 
laws. The distinction between the laws that govern society, and thus appropriately 
belonged to social science, and those that govern nature, was one that could not be 
surmounted. On numerous occasions Marx identified statistics as a weapon that could be 
used in service to the proletariat classes, especially by providing trenchant critiques of 
existing political-economic conditions and as a tool for the realization of workers’ 
statistics. In such a formulation, statistics was fundamentally political arithmetic and 
Marx regarded William Petty, the originator of the phrase, as the founder of both 
statistics and political economy.
165
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While Marx may not have enjoyed the real political power necessary to put many 
of these ideas about the distinctions between the natural and social world into action, his 
intellectual heirs were in positions to do so. They were able to apply statistics to statecraft: 
to use it as a tool not just for analysis and critique but also for administering change. The 
manner in which they chose to do this had implications for the evolution of statistics. For 
instance, in picking up Marx’s mantle, Lenin also gave primacy to statistics as a practical 
tool, going to the extent even of de-emphasizing academically oriented activities among 
statisticians.
166
 He was especially keen on making the Soviet Central Statistical Board the 
primary source for all data relating to society and economy. In a letter to the Board, Lenin 
noted that “the Central Statistical Board, which lags behind an unofficial group of writers, 
is a model bureaucratic institution. In about two years’ time it may provide a heap of data 
for research, but that is not what we want.” He proceeded to demand that “for our 
practical work we must have figures and the Central Statistical Board must have 
them before anybody else.”
167
 [Emphasis in original] 
The result, initially in the Soviet Union and subsequently in the places where its 
influence extended, was to create a distinction in statistical practice and, eventually, in 
statistics as a discipline. Fueled by such an understanding of human activity and how to 
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account for it, an understanding of statistics that was specific, context-based, and non-
universal, had begun to attain legitimacy by the 1930s. 
Statistics [thus] became an instrument for planning the national economy. 
Consequently, its basis is the Marx-Lenin political economy; it represents 
a social science or, in other words, a class science. The law of large 
numbers, the idea of random deviations, and everything else belonging to 
the mathematical theory of statistics were swept away as the constituent 




Prior to the 1930s, Russian and Soviet statisticians had enjoyed a fair degree of freedom 
and saw themselves as participants in the evolving universal discipline of statistics, the 
bedrock of which was mathematics itself. Keenly aware of global developments in the 
field, they also actively sought engagement with methods devised outside the Soviet 
Union. The application of theory to practical problems was a hallmark of this period.
169
 
But this was also the period during which numbers as measures of performance became 
absolutely critical. As Michael D. Gordin has observed in his review of two studies on 
Russian and Stalinist statistics: “For the Soviet state, given its self-professed character as 
a scientific state, these numbers become crucial for measures of how much socialism was 
an improvement over tsarist capitalism…”
170
 As a result, statisticians came under a 
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tremendous amount of pressure, both in terms of how they understood their discipline and 
also in terms of the actual numbers they produced and analyzed.
171
  
By the late 1930s, Vestnik Statistiki, the leading statistics journal in the Soviet 
Union, had begun to reject submissions that used mathematical approaches in dealing 
with statistical problems. As a result, over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, large 
numbers of statisticians withdrew from statistical work, finding a relative safe haven in 
universities or research institutes where they could continue their statistical research 
without identifying it as such.
172
 The practitioners of statistics, in turn, grew increasingly 
ignorant of the latest statistical methods and their potential applications to statistical 
work.
173
 Indeed, by the 1930s, the “most persistent difficulty for these statisticians 
stemmed from their dual task: they were supposed to provide accurate numbers for the 
five-year plans, but they also had to suppress real economic and demographic data that 
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contradicted the official picture.”
174
 In Blum and Mespoulet’s formulation, “in the hybrid 
that was Soviet Statistics, the Soviet triumphed over the Statistics.”
175
 This dichotomy 
extended into the 1950s and was clearly visible to outside observers. During his 1957 
visit to the PRC, the Indian statistician Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis (more on this visit 
in Part III), informed his Chinese hosts that ever since 1947 the Soviet Union had not 
attended any sample surveys activities organized by the International Statistical Institute, 
adding that they just did not attach importance to mathematical statistics.
176
 The 
separation of mathematical statistics from statistical work, of theory from practical 
application, was complete. 
Confusion over the true definition and status of statistics, however, lingered until 
it was officially resolved in 1954. It was only through a national conference held in 
Moscow from 16 to 26 March that year that what had for the most part already occurred 
in practice was also given an official and final imprimatur.
177
 Organized by the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, the Central Statistical Board, and the Ministry of Higher Education, 
the conference’s purpose was “to discuss matters in dispute and to examine the subject 
and method of statistical science.”
178
 In all, 760 invitations were issued across the various 
                                                     
174 
Gordin 2004: 809. 
 
175 
Gordin 2004: 808.   
 
176
 WJB 105-00530-06: 15 
 
177
 Ostrovitianov 1955: 321. This article is a translation from the Russian original, which was published in 
Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1954 No.8. K.V. Ostrovitianov, the author of the report, is identified as “the 
chief organizer of Soviet economists.”  In his commentary to the article, J.M. noted that “Ostrovitianov’s 
main point, broadly stated, is that, at the present time at any rate, the name statistics should be limited to 
the discipline and practice of which handle the quantitative aspects of socio-economic phenomena; that this 
is the only statistical discipline deserving the status of science in its own right; and that statistical work on 
natural and technological phenomena is most conveniently regarded as a branch of mathematics, namely 
mathematical statistics.”  
 
178






 The majority of those invited were academic and practicing 
statisticians, and they were joined by smaller numbers of economists, engineers, 
mathematicians, philosophers and medical men. In all, sixty people spoke at the 
conference and twenty sent in written contributions. Three principal points of view 
emerged during the conference. The first held that statistics was a universal science that 
studies phenomena of society and nature. The second posited that statistics was a social 
science concerned with method, a system of principles for collecting quantitative 
information in order to characterize social phenomenon. The final view was that statistics 
was a social science that only studies social productive relations, that is, the economy.
180
  
Over the conference’s ten days, the first two views were discussed and eventually 
summarily rejected. Proponents of the first claim, which was no different from views in 
the “bourgeois liberal” West, were accused of a “gross error in attempting, with the help 
of a single science of statistics, to study by the same methods the phenomena both of 
nature and of social science.”
181
 This error was not just a scientific one but also had moral 
dimensions, for, as Ostrovitianov declared in his report on the conference:  
The comrades who regard statistics as a universal science which studies 
nature and society make of it some kind of science over and above the 
[socio-economic] classes, coldly indifferent to good and to evil, without 
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In support of this claim, Ostrovitianov offered a criticism of the false comparison made 
by other participants who drew upon similarities between the luminosity of stars and the 
grouping (categorization) of the peasantry.  
What can there be in common between the grouping of stars according to 
their luminosity and, let us say, Lenin’s grouping of the peasantry 
according to their [socio-economic] class characteristics? Nothing, other 
than certain technical statistical devices used in the study of these totally 
different kinds of phenomena. The grouping of stars according to 
luminosity requires no class analysis at all, whereas in investigating the 
differentiation of the peasantry we must make a [socio-economic] class 
analysis of this phenomenon, proceeding from the postulates of historical 
materialism and political economy. Statistical devices and methods of 
investigation, the choice of characteristics for grouping, the combining of 
groups, were entirely without exception subordinated by Lenin to the task 





Ostrovitianov conceded that quantitative relations in their pure form—equally applicable 
to “inorganic nature, to organic nature and to the domain of the social sciences”—could 
be studied by mathematics, more specifically by the subdomain of mathematical statistics.  
But apart from this branch of mathematical statistics, and the socio-economic science of 
statistics, there did not exist a third “non-mathematical but nevertheless universal 
‘general’ statistics.”
184
 This distinction formed the basis of the rebuttal of the second 
claim, that statistics was a science of method. “Every social science,” Ostrovitianov 
explained, “has not only its own subject, but also its own method of investigation.” 
Furthermore, he noted that in political economy, the method employed was abstraction 
(historical materialism in the sphere of economic relations), and not, quoting Marx, a 
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microscope or chemical reagents.
185
 Thus, it was decided that only in the field of the 
study of social phenomena did statistics reach the level of an independent science, with 
its own subject and methods of investigation.
186
  
And so, following almost two weeks of deliberation and debate, the conference 
was in a position to offer a definition of statistics.  
“Statistics is an independent social science. It studies the quantitative 
aspects of mass social phenomena in full awareness of and therefore 
within their qualitative aspect; it investigates the quantitative expression of 





Statistics was thus to serve, in the words of Lenin, as the “rock of exact and indisputable 
facts,” the very foundation on which rested not just political economy but all other social 
sciences as well. The effect, in the end, was to ratify and reify a distinction that was 




Chance Tamed; Chance Rejected 
Trygvie Lie’s desire for “clear and systematically organized facts” thus found an echo in 
Lenin’s evocation of statistics as the “rock of exact and indisputable facts.” But while 
such a desire united the universalist claim and its Marxist critique, the contrasting 
understandings of statistics within each positioned them at loggerheads when it came to 
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questions of theory and method. The contradictory claims regarding statistics’ 
universality outlined above were undergirded by two fundamentally different ontological 
positions on how social reality could be ascertained via quantification. The first, as we 
have seen, by embracing uncertainty, accepted its own limits. Chance and error were seen 
to be part of the natural order of things. Not everything could be counted, at least not 
accurately, and even more to the point, all attempts at counting generated errors. The 
goalposts accordingly shifted: Intellectual energy was no longer channeled towards 
devising methods to count exhaustively, but instead, to devising methods for studying 
variation, and eventually toward how to accurately determine, control, and minimize the 
error that resulted during any count. Probability, the law of large numbers, and general 
mathematical reasoning, thus, became crucial tools in devising new methods of counting 





   
Statistics is a Universal Science 
 
Statistics is a Social Science 
Chance exists, randomness part of both 
natural and social order of things  
No chance in the social world (only laws that 
can be ascertained) 
All counting generates errors;  
can devise methods to ascertain and control 
error of any count 
 
Can count everything accurately;  




















This was in stark contrast to the second approach, which, fueled by the 
teleological inevitability of Marxist historical progression and by the confidence offered 
by dialectical materialism, was predicated on the absence of chance and uncertainty in the 
social world. As long as particular attention was paid to time, place, and stage of 
historical evolution, not only could everything be accurately counted, but it must be 
counted. Within such an ontological world-view there was no place for probability, the 
law of large numbers, or any kind of abstract mathematical thought. The social world had 
no chaos, only laws of production, population, and relations, all of which could be 
discovered via measurement. The result was an emphasis on complete enumeration—the 
counting of everything.  In other words, just as the liberal tradition pivoted on the 
appreciation and eventual acceptance of uncertainty, chance, probability, and error in the 
world and in counting, so did the Socialist-Marxist critique base itself on the comfort of 
certainty, and the desire to enumerate and account for everything.  
In taming and rejecting chance, both traditions were interested in increasing 
overall control. But they had very different expectations about what they could control. 
And each approach taken to its extreme could also lead to perversions in social outcomes. 
Within neoliberal economics, this emphasis on error, accuracy, and calculability would 
lead to a stark distinction between uncertainty and risk. Unlike the former, the latter was 
calculable, and therefore, could be used as the basis for decision-making. For this very 
reason, uncertainty came to be discounted in the design of economic models, which over 
time contributed to an increasing disengagement with real-world actions.
189
 The most 
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recent instance of this is the 2008 financial crisis, with its basis in increasingly 
sophisticated mathematical models that were supremely confident in their ability to 
ascertain and account for risk.
190
  
As we shall see in Part II, socialist statistics’ fetishization of complete 
enumeration would also lead to certain systemic cul-de-sacs. But the illusion of control 
this method offered was extremely attractive. As A. Yugow noted in his review of Soviet 
statistics in 1947: 
Accounting of all economic phenomena on a national scale and the 
possibility of statistically following all economic phenomena in their 
complete economic cycle give Soviet statistics such great advantages in 
comparison with the statistics of other countries, that the forms, methods, 
and the results of the work of the statistical organs of the U.S.S.R. are 
highly instructive to all who work in the field of the theory and practice of 
economic statistics, even in cases when these data are not entirely exact 
and commensurable in particulars. The gathering of primary materials, the 
formulation of problems, and the effect of the plan upon economic factors 
in the U.S.S.R. provide an almost “laboratory” picture; in any case, they 
reflect the existing facts far more clearly and fully than in other countries, 
where the statistical study of national problems and those of individual 
branches is not only greatly complicated, in view of the technical 
incompleteness of the data, but is also deliberately distorted because of 




From a planning perspective, the promise of achieving data collection on a national scale, 
and thereby (in theory at least) ensuring that all manner of economic activity was 
accounted for was hard to resist. It was also the kind of comprehensiveness that non-
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socialist countries with their decentralized statistical apparatus found impossible to 
achieve.  
In many parts of the world, and especially in much of the future global south, 
these strengths of the Soviet system were seen as the basis for its economic performance. 
For instance, the Indian industrialists who drafted the Bombay Plan in 1944 wrote with 
admiration and aspiration: 
This [growth target for India] might appear to be too modest a goal for a 
planned economy to achieve, especially in view of the fact that in the 
U.S.S.R., within a period of 12 years since the beginning of the first Five-
Year Plan, the national income is reported to have increased from 25 




Even so, in India, such high regard for planned economic growth did not extend to an 
adoption of Soviet socialist statistics. In China, however, adoption of Soviet socialist 
statistics in the years after 1949 was enthusiastic and comprehensive. Even as late as 
1957, by which time tensions between China and the Soviet Union had become 
increasingly evident, Xue Muqiao, the director of the State Statistics Bureau noted in an 
editorial:  
[We must] seriously study the Soviet Union’s advanced experience in 
constructing and managing a socialist economy, especially its experience 
in the planned management of the people’s economy and in the 
establishment of planning and statistical work.
193
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In order to achieve this, Xue and the SSB relied heavily on Soviet statistical experts and 
the expertise and experience to which they laid claim. It was upon their advice that the 
PRC’s comprehensive statistical system was envisioned and its construction attempted. 
 
Soviet Experts in China—the General Story 
In his magisterial 1987 study of the PRC’s economic development, Carl Riskin observed 
that Mao’s phrase of “leaning to one side” anticipated, in a sense, the long-term 
unsustainability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. This did not, Riskin clarified, mean that 
Soviet contributions to Chinese development were insignificant.
194
 Rather, it serves to 
caution us against assuming that the PRC blindly emulated the Soviet model. As much 
recent scholarship (discussed below) has shown, the real story is far more complex.  
The general facts of Sino-Soviet cooperation during the 1950s are now fairly well 
known.
195
 In February 1950, the two nations signed the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid.
196
 In the event, Soviet financial aid was rather 
limited. For instance, of the total investment in the first Five Year Plan (1953-57), the 
Soviet share was as little as 3%.
197
 But the aid took non-financial, non-materiel forms as 
well. From August 1952 to May 1953 Zhou Enlai led a Chinese delegation to the Soviet 
Union with the express purpose of drawing up the country’s first Five Year Plan with the 
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help of Soviet experts.
198
 Indeed, equally significant, if not more so, was aid that took the 
form of imparting technical expertise and experience.
199
  
Until recently, this aid had remained a relatively understudied subject and it is 
only in the last fifteen years or so that it has begun to receive significant scholarly 
attention. The opening of archives, both in the former Soviet republics as well as in China, 
has allowed scholars to explore this relationship in much greater detail, focusing on the 
men, materiel, and technology that formed its basis.
200
 These studies generally conclude 
that from 1949 to 1956 China emulated, if not always uncritically, the Soviet experience. 
Chinese conviction in following the Soviet Union’s ‘advanced experience’ 先進經驗 




Soviet advisors and specialists in China have also received focused attention in 
recent years. Deborah Kaple was among the first scholars to address this subject by 
cobbling together scattered and frequently fragmentary Soviet archival materials and 
combining them with oral interviews of several men and women who had served as 
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 Some of her findings were that the specialists were predominantly 
men, that they stayed from as little as a few months to a year, and that they were not well 
supervised once they arrived in China. Most of the specialists had a hard time 
establishing personal friendships with locals. Conversely, the Chinese frequently 
complained about the quality of the specialists being sent to them. Building and 
substantially expanding on Kaple’s work, in 2003 Shen Zhihua published what remains 
the most detailed study of Soviet specialists in China.
203
  
According to Shen, the twelve years from 1948 to 1960 can be divided into four 
distinct periods.
204
 The first, from 1948-49 was marked by a Soviet policy of wait and 
watch. The years from 1949 to 1953 witnessed the beginning of exchanges, but one 
where the experts were found predominantly either in military affairs or in specific 
industrial sectors. Agreeing with this assessment of a limited engagement during this 
phase, Izabella Goikhman has observed that until 1953 interactions were largely 
characterized by the exchange of publications. Even so, according to Shen’s findings, 
about 5,000 Soviet experts, including those working with the armed forces, were in China 
during this period. It is only after 1953 that academic exchanges were institutionalized 
and visiting personnel increased in number.
205
  The late 1952 slogan “completely study 
the Soviet Union”全面學習蘇聯 marked the beginning of this period for Shen. The four 
years starting from 1954 were the high tide 高潮 of Soviet experts in China. As many as 
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11,000 visited and provided their technical expertise and experience. For the visiting 
experts this was also a period when the work environment was at its best, when Chinese 
eagerness to learn was at its most earnest. This was also, however, the period when 
finding China’s own path began to be openly discussed in certain areas. By 1956, the first 
doubts about the Soviet model had begun to be articulated. Even so, in the field of 
science and technology, studying the Soviet Union’s methods was still the pre-eminent 
strategy.
206
 In the final phase, 1958-60, Shen finds a gradual decline and then the sudden 
withdrawal of all experts in 1960. He calculates 2,000 Soviet experts were in China 
during these final years, leaving us with a total of 18,000 Soviet experts over the course 
of the 12 year period.  
 
Soviet Statistical Experts 
In spite of the varied and contingent nature of Chinese engagement with Soviet aid and 
expertise, statistics was one area in which Soviet impact was seminal and long-lasting. 
While it is difficult to assess how many out of Shen Zhihua’s estimated 18,000 Soviet 
experts were statisticians, we can identify several key figures who were assigned to 
important positions as consultants at the SSB or at major educational and cadre training 
institutions such as People’s University 人民大学.207 The first mention of Soviet 
statistical expertise is found in Wang Sihua’s speech of 1950. In it he observed that the 
Soviet Central Statistics Bureau was personally overseen by Molotov 莫洛托夫, a fact 
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which indicated the importance that the Soviets attached to statistics.
208
 He was therefore 
appreciative of the help offered by Soviet Statistical advisors as the Northeast Statistics 
Bureau (NSB) went about organizing and carrying out statistical work.
209
 Some years 
later, Yang Jianbai 杨坚白, Wang’s deputy at the NSB, reiterated the importance of 
Soviet expertise for the NSB’s statistical work. In an article in the People’s Daily he 
reaffirmed the need to take the Soviet Union as their teacher 以俄为师, adding: “The 
Soviet Union’s advanced statistical experience is abundant and completely correct, and 
we must study well her experience.”
210
  
 The Soviet statistical advisors who assisted the NSB (and later the SSB) operated 
solidly within a tradition of socialist statistics. Their own experience in the Soviet Union 
had primarily focused on statistical work and not research in any other discipline. And 
they brought their specific understanding of statistics to the PRC. They belonged to a 
group that would have whole-heartedly agreed with the conclusions drawn at the 1954 
meeting in Moscow. As Xue Muqiao 薛暮桥, the first director of the State Statistics 
Bureau, would recall in his memoirs, the Soviet experts were decidedly un-enthusiastic 
about the use of sampling of any kind.  In his words, “Soviet statistical experts did not 
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promote the use of surveys, [but rather] advocated making comprehensive arrangements 
for statistical reports.”
211
 At one point, he and Li Fuchun had attempted to have V.N. 
Starovskiy’s book Sample Surveys 《抽样调查》issued for study by the Planning 
Commission and the SSB, but they were blocked by the Soviet statistical experts present 
in Beijing.
212
 Thus, from the very beginning, the advice the Chinese received, and which 
they valued highly, was about the primacy of socialist statistics, and the concomitant 
irrelevance of abstract mathematics.  
The first among a series of high-level Soviet statistical experts deputized by the 
Soviet Central Statistical Administration to serve in the PRC was A.I. Ezhov (A. E. Ежов; 
叶若夫).
213
 Ezhov arrived in the PRC in early 1950 and returned to the Soviet Union in 
February 1952. In the Soviet Union, Ezhov was a Deputy Director of the Central 
Statistical Administration and as such brought with him the prestige of his high office.
214
 
As the first Soviet statistical expert, Ezhov quite possibly had the greatest impact in 
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shaping statistical work in the PRC.
215
 During his two years in the PRC, he consulted 
with the Statistical Office of the National Finance Committee 中财委统计总处, played a 
critical role in helping the NSB design statistical work, and was instrumental in offering 
advice and general guidelines for the establishment of a national statistical system.
216
  
Ezhov was followed at the SSB by four statistical experts in succession (See table 
2 below). Sergei Krotevich (S. К от в  ; 克拉特维奇), who spent a little over three years in 
the PRC, was the first among them. In addition to acting as a consultant on financial 
economics, he also played a key role in designing and carrying out the 1953 national 
census. An expert by the name of Semodzhefgin (Ru:    о ж фг   (?); Ch:谢木杰夫金) 
arrived on 22 July 1955.
217
 A specialist in infrastructure statistics 基建统计, he stayed in 
the PRC for about three years. The next expert to arrive was Maximov (Ru:       ов; Ch: 
马克西莫夫), who stayed until1957. The last expert [that I could locate] arrived on 11 
December 1957 but spent less than a year in the PRC, returning to the Soviet Union on 11 
June of the following year. 
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Table 2: Soviet Statistical Experts at the SSB
218
     
Dates in the PRC 
Name in 
Chinese  Name in Pinyin Cyrillic Name in English 




 Ye nuo fu A. E. Ежов  A. I. Ezhov 
February 1952 - 
July 1955 
克拉特维奇 Ke la te wei qi S. К от в    Sergei Krotevich  
July 22 1954 -  (for 
about 3 years) 
谢木杰夫金 Xie mu jie fu jin    о ж фг   (?) Semodzhefgin (?) 
August 22 1955 - 
(for about 2 years) 
马克西莫夫 Ma ke xi mu fu       ов Maximov 
December 11 1957 
- June 11 1958 
索包里 Su bao li  уп     (?) Suparin (?) 
 
Broadly speaking, Soviet statistical experts such as these five were directly or indirectly 
involved in three types of activities: consulting on the design and execution of statistical 
work, aiding the publication of translations from Russian into Chinese, and directly 
teaching statistical cadres. 
 
Consultation 
The most basic form of consultation involved introducing elements of the Soviet 
statistical system and offering advice to Chinese statisticians on how to proceed with 
setting up their own statistical system. Thus, for example, in late 1950 Ezhov introduced 
the structure and key tasks of the Soviet system to statistical cadres in Beijing.
220
 Such 
discussions usually involved a wide-ranging array of questions and topics, including how 
to distinguish between agriculture and industry 工业与农业怎样划分, whether 
handicrafts industries should be regarded as private industries, how statistical survey 
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work should be organized, how analysis of data should be conducted, the importance of 
original records 原始记录, and why statistics was a science of party spirit 党性的科
学.221  
 Soviet advisors were also direct participants in specific survey projects that were 
initiated by the State Statistics Bureau or served as advisors at particular enterprises. For 
instance, Sergei Krotevich offered key advice as the SSB carried out the first complete 
modern census in China’s history in 1953.
222
 Data was collected across only four 
parameters: name, age, sex, and nationality.
223
 Two and a half million central and local 
government workers took part in the actual recording, and they were in turn aided by 
volunteer census workers in the localities.
224
 Final enumerations and tabulations were 
compiled by June of 1954, and on 1 November 1954, the SSB reported that on the 
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midnight of 30 June 1953, the population on the Chinese mainland was 583.6 million.
225
 
This number surprised many observers used to the League of Nations 1933 estimate of 
around 450 million for Republican China.
226
 Krotevich himeself wrote a report on the 
census in Russian published in Vestnik Statistiki in 1955. A Chinese language translation 
was published the following year by the Statistical Press.
227
  
In similar fashion, Soviet consultants also spent time at designated factories and 
enterprises, helping them set up or rationalize statistical work. For instance, in an essay in 
the journal Statistical Work the Anshan Iron and Steel Company’s Planning and Statistics 
Office thanked the Soviet statistical expert 切布尔尼赫 [Qie bu er ni he;   бу     ; 
Cheburnikh?] for his wide-ranging assistance. The essay explained that his with his help 
they were able to appreciate what was distinctive about socialist statistics; improve 
original records 原始记录; simplify forms; establish monthly, ten-day, and daily reports; 
and initiate research and analysis.
228
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 Another important consulting task was the inspection of local statistical work. 
From November to December 1955 the Soviet specialists Maximov 马克西莫夫 and Xie 
Mu Te Jin 谢木特金 were accompanied by SSB Deputy Director Sun Yefang 孙冶方 on 
a tour of Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, with the goal of 
understanding city- and province-level statistical work. Principal questions included how 
to strengthen local statistical work, especially under the conditions brought about by the 
high tide of cooperativization, and how to strengthen county, district, and 
village/township level statistical work. On 18 January 1956 the team produced a report 
that contained three key parts: First, it was severely critical of the work done by the 
various provincial bureaus, noting that no matter how well the local or national bureaus 
worked, the provincial bureaus did not show enough leadership. Their organization was 
incomplete and their materials were either lacking in quality or late. Second, it offered 
suggestions on how to strengthen province, district, and village level statistical work. 






A second way in which Soviet experts contributed to statistical work in the PRC was by 
aiding the translation of Soviet textbooks, organizing curricula at universities and training 
centers, and compiling collections of special articles.
230
  The earliest compilations of the 
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 For more on Soviet advisors at major universities such as Renmin, Tsinghua, Peking, and so on, see: 
(1) Yu Shengqi 俞圣祺. “Sulian zhuanjia bangzhu xia de zhongguo renmin daxue 在苏联专家帮助下的中




Northeast Statistics Bureau’s Statistical Work frequently contained a section entitled 
“Introducing Soviet Experience”苏联经验介绍, which carried a few translated articles. 
For most workers in the Northeast (and in the rest of the country) this was the first 
opportunity to read about Soviet methods through the writings of Soviet statisticians. For 
instance, a relatively early critique of bourgeois statistics can be found in an article by the 
author N. 廖佐夫 (H.   озов?; N. Liao zuo fu). 231 Each of the NSB’s compilations from 
1950 to 1952 carried articles by Soviet statisticians, including in some cases by experts 
who were present in the PRC as consultants.
232
 Subjects covered ranged widely, 
including the meaning, role, and organization of economic statistics in the Soviet Union; 
survey methods in the Soviet Union; the Soviet experience in unifying and simplifying 
tables and reports; and a discussion of statistics in People’s Democracies. At the same 
time, advice on how to deal with local statistical problems was also offered, and dwelt on 
the role of city and village statistics, the methods of statistical and economic analysis, and 
so on. By 1953, when several compilations had been produced, Soviet authors had largely 
been replaced by Chinese authors and the experience discussed was primarily Chinese 
experience of statistical work.  
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University).” RMRB 1953 November 5, 3;  
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Soviet Experts).” RMRB 1954 November 6, 2. 
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With the establishment of the national State Statistics Bureau in August 1952, 
much of the translation and editing work began to focus on textbooks.
233
  By September 
1957 over 100 different items had been translated. Their scope was extremely wide: from 
general outlines of principles of statistics to every kind of specialized statistics such as 
industry, agriculture, capital construction, trade cooperation, supplies, transportation, 
finance and economics, health and education, and so on. In addition to advanced texts for 
specialists, several books were targeted toward the basic statistical worker and were 
therefore at the middle-school or high-school level. Examples of such books, whose 
publication runs were upwards of 20,000 or 30,000, included Statistical Theory 《统计理
论》by the Soviet State Statistics Bureau, Petrov’s (彼得洛夫 П т ов] Guide to 
Economic Statistics 《经济统计学教程》, and Shaensky’s (沙文斯基 ш ы    ) Guide to 
Industrial Statistics 《工业统计学教程》. Starting in 1956, the Soviet and the Chinese 
Departments of Culture began a collaboration, as a result of which many additional books 
were received from the Soviet Union. The Chinese were also able to directly approach 




Finally, starting in 1956, the Statistical Press also began producing compendia of 
translated essays and articles. In 1957, it published a book containing transcripts of 
selected talks by Soviet experts such as Maximov, Semodzhefgin, and others. The book 
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touched upon various standard topics of statistical work, ranging across the various 
sectors of the economy and discussing methods of collection and analysis.
235
 Also begun 
in 1956 was a series titled Collected Translations in Statistics 《统计译文传记》，
which had at least 14 issues (see table 3 below). In its first year, each issue covered a 
wide variety of topics and was intended for wide circulation. By 1957, each issue had 
come to focus on a specialized theme, with reduced circulation numbers suggesting a 
more targeted audience. In its final year, 1958, a couple of issues (numbers 10 and 11) 
were also devoted to introducing materials from ‘bourgeois’ countries, most notably the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
236
  
Table 3: Collected Translations in Statistics 《统计译文专辑》       




   
  
Series No.  Theme Publication Print run Essays 
1 General 1956 May 7100 13 
2 General 1956 June 7150 9 
3 General 1956 September 7140 14 
4 General 1956 December 5060 8 
5 ? ? ? ? 
6 Agricultural Labor Productivity 1957 May 2070 15 
7 Bourgeois Statistics 1957 July 1570 8 
8 Accumulation and Consumption 1957 July 1570 7 
9 Sample Surveying 1957 August 1460 10 
10 
History of the Development and Use of 
Sampling Theory 1958 February 1260 4 
11 
The Use of Sample Surveying in Population 
Research 1958 April 1470 6 
12 Theory of Index Numbers 1957 December 1460 6 
13 ? ? ? ? 
14 
Bulletin of Meeting of All Soviet Statistical 
Workers
237
 1958 March 1480 13 
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 Essays in Issue 10 were drawn from The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society and essays in Issue 11 
were drawn from The Journal of the American Statistical Association. 
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A final method was that of direct teaching via lecture and discussion. During oral history 
interviews, the statisticians Ni Jiaxun 倪加勋 and Lin Fude 林富德 recalled attending 
lectures organized at People’s University and delivered by Soviet experts, in particular 
Ezhov.
238
 Both Ni and Lin remarked that issues of translation and access made these 
experiences rather episodic and of limited value: The Soviet expert would lecture via an 
interpreter. Attendees were not permitted to ask any questions during the session. If the 
attendees had questions, they were required to write them down and hand them to the 
expert’s local liaison 接待员. The liaison would then select and translate a handful of 
these and deliver them to the expert, who would then prepare responses to them. These 
responses would then be delivered at the start of the following lecture.
239
 Such a 
discontinuous learning process with no classroom interaction arguably had limited 
pedagogical value for the attendees themselves. But the lectures may have had a wider 
impact, since they were typed-up and circulated as reference materials for study 学习 
sessions.
240
 Finally, from time to time, larger seminars were also organized by the SSB or 
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one of the universities. For instance, on May 12 1955, the SSB organized a seminar 讲座 
in Beijing where Soviet experts and professors from People’s University delivered 
lectures 讲课 to statistical cadre from all the departments within the State Council 国务
院.241 Such exercises, however, appear not to have been a frequent feature of a statistical 
expert’s work. 
A fourth way of drawing upon Soviet expertise also existed, though its site was 
not the PRC but the Soviet Union. While it is not clear how many Chinese students 
studied statistics in the Soviet Union, at least two senior Chinese statisticians visited the 
Soviet Union. From December 1954 to January 1955 Xue Muqiao visited the Soviet 
Union as part of a Sino-Soviet Science and Technology Cooperation delegation. During 
his time in Moscow, Xue met with the director and deputy director (the recently returned 
Ezhov) of the Soviet Central Statistical Bureau. He also met with members of the 
Planning Commission.
242
 A little over a year later in July of 1956 Sun Yefang 孙冶方, 
one of the SSB’s deputy directors, led a seven man team of statisticians to the Soviet 
Union. They met various officials, visited various bureaus, and studied various statistical 
and planning activities. Altogether the team spent over 30 days and discussed a variety of 
subjects including the calculation of total output value 总产值, constant prices 不变价格, 
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Li Fuchun’s dismissal in 1951 of statistics as it had been practiced heretofore indicated a 
crisis on two levels, one ontological and the other epistemological. What categories 
should the world be divided into? And what forms of knowledge can be deployed to 
ascertain these categories? In line with the discourse within the Soviet Union, as 
summarized by Ostrovitianov in 1954, the point of departure was the premise that there 
was no single universal reality for the known world; rather, different theories and 
methods were applicable to these different divisions—the social and the natural—of the 
world. These different theories and methods, in turn, promoted very different interests 
and led to very different social and economic outcomes in society. For Chinese thinkers, 
drawing upon Soviet and Marxist views, the natural and the social world were not the 
same and could not be understood using the same tools. They gained these views not just 
from reading Marx and Lenin, but especially through Soviet statistical experts who were 
present in the PRC and through a vast array of translated material. The overall effect was 
to engender an overarching theoretical approach to all knowledge that prefigured what 
statistics could be. The practical impact of this theoretical distinction between the natural 
and social world was to idealize and attempt to construct a vast national network of 
statistical offices, from Beijing down to the county level, with the aim of capturing all 
necessary data. In Part II we shall explore the implications of this ideal. For now, let us 















No “Mean” Solution:  























In February 1957, professor of statistics and one-time banker Jin Guobao 金国宝 
published a self-criticism in the journal Statistical Work 统计工作.244 The focus of the 
self-criticism was his successful textbook, “An Outline of Statistics” 《统计学大纲》, 
the most recent revised edition of which had been published in 1950.
245
 An abridged 
version published under the title Statistics 《统计学》in 1935 had also become popular 
as a textbook in vocational schools. In his opening paragraph to the self-criticism Jin 
explained that the ancients’ 古人 possessed an important principle: getting rid of 
hackneyed phrases 陈言务去. By that principle alone, Jin confessed, “An Outline of 
Statistics” was beyond redemption. Copied entirely from Anglo-American bourgeois 
statistics, the book was full of stale words 陈言; not one sentence was the product of new 
thinking or composed of original ideas. The article was thus an attempt to atone for the 
failures of the book and for his failure to correct his thinking in a timely fashion.   
Such strong self-criticism is not entirely surprising, especially in 1957 when 
intellectuals became particular targets for thought reform.
246
 Nor was Jin’s the only self-
criticism written by a statistician in the mid-1950s.
247
 These self-criticisms were 
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themselves part of an extended series of debates within the academy, which from 1950 
onward had sought, on the one hand, to establish the new definition of statistics, and on 
the other, to mark out which statistical tools were appropriate for a socialist society.
248
 
Jin’s self-criticism, in particular, offers a useful route through which to access two related 
strands of inquiry. The first of these has to do with understanding consensus formation 
within the scientific community of early PRC statisticians. As shown in Part I Chapter I, 
the pre-1949 world of Chinese statistics (and social science) was vibrant and 
methodologically and epistemologically diverse. In that chapter I made the case for the 
centrality of the Northeast Statistical Bureau in reshaping the nature and content of 
statistical work, indicating that changes in the practice of statistical work preceded their 
articulation within the theory and pedagogy of statistical science. Crucial to the latter 
transition was disciplining a vibrant and varied community of statisticians so that they 
came to accept and espouse statistics as a Marxist-Leninist social science in the years 
after 1949.  
The sense that practice preceded changes in pedagogy raises questions about how 
we conceptualize scientific change during and after political revolution. How did 
Socialist Statistics become the dominant paradigm during the 1950s? Recent work in the 
sociology of science has devoted much attention to studying how practitioners arrive at 
scientific consensus and closure. One the one hand, these studies stress ‘extra-scientific’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
“Pipan wo zai tongjxue zhuzuo zhong de zichan jieji sixiang 批判我在统计学著作中的资产阶级思想 




 Articles critical of pre-1949 statistics and its practitioners were published in journals such as Tongji 
gongzuo tongxun 统计工作通许 (Statistical Work Bulletin),Tongji gongzuo 统计工作 (Statistical Work), 
Xin jianshe 新建设 (New Construction), and Zhongguo gongye 中国工业(China Industry), as well as in 





factors such as culture, power and funding, politics, and personal credibility.
249
 Others 
have focused on the “social processes within core sets of practicing scientists who 
negotiate results,” demarcate knowledge claims, and construct boundaries.
250
 Yet others 
have explored the cultures of knowledge societies, in particular the disunity of science 
made visible by a focus not on “the construction of knowledge but in the construction of 
the machineries of knowledge construction.”
251
 This machinery is further broken down 
into empirical, technological, and social machinery; the argument being that it is 
combination of these that makes possible the rise of "truth effects.”
252
 The Chinese 
experience with statistics in the1950s reflects many of these forces. But none of these 
studies seem to account for how drastic political change, which brought with it an over-
arching new theoretical paradigm, was negotiated—both by the people promoting the 
paradigm and by those whose original positions were not in agreement with that new 
paradigm. The first half of this chapter explores this question by focusing on the nearly 
decade-long sequence of publications in various journals that sought to criticize Anglo-
American ‘bourgeois’ statistics and its practitioners.  
If the first half of this chapter deals with the statistics community, the second 
explores how this transition affected the very content of statistics and statistical education. 
In broad terms, the consequences of this transition are well known: as a social science, 
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statistics dealt with the social world and not the natural. It was, as a result, bifurcated 
from what was seen as the abstract theorizing of mathematical statistics, which was, in 
turn, banished to departments of mathematics.
253
 But the distinctions ran deeper. To 
merely reject the law of large number 大数法则 and general probability theory 几率论 
was far from enough. Even fundamental concepts such as measures of central tendency 
(especially the mean), indicators 指数, and time series 时间数列, would come under the 
microscope, as earnest attempts were made to excise the last vestiges of any polluting 
bourgeois influence.  A related and critical element in this process was the production of 
new textbooks aimed at both the future professional as well as the common man. 
Comparing these textbooks with Jin’s An Outline of Statistics will permit us to see what 
from the older textbooks was retained and what was rejected. At the same time such a 
comparison also indicates the extent to which the newest global developments in 
statistical science were incorporated in 1950s China.  
 
Jin Guobao and the Road to (Self-) Criticism
254
 
In the immediate years after 1949 most Chinese statisticians were under increasing 
pressure to accord to a new overarching theoretical paradigm, described in the previous 
two chapters, which stood in fundamental contradistinction to the one they were familiar 
                                                     
253
 See: “Chouyang de shuli tongjixue 抽样的数理统计学 (Sampling and Mathematical Statistics).” 
Caijing yanjiu 财经研究 1958 (03): 57. 
 
254
 Jin’s biographical details are primarily drawn from: (i) Shi Tai 施泰. “Jin Guobao 金国宝 (1893-1963).” 
Tongji yu yuce 统计与预测, 1994.06: 60-61; (ii) “Zhongguo jindai tongji xue dianjiren zhiyi—jin guobao 
中国近代统计学奠基人之一—金国宝 (Among the Founders of Modern Statistics in China—Jin 
Guobao).” In Minguo renwu dacidian 民国人物大辞典 (Biographical Dictionary of Republican China), by 
Xu Youchun 徐友春. Hebei People’s Press, 1991; and (iii) “Jin guobao 金国宝.” In Shijie tongji mingren 
zhuanji 世界统计名人传记 (Biography of Famous Statisticians of the World), by Gong Jianyao 龚鉴尧, 





with. In order to attempt an answer to the question of how this happened, it is important 
to first disaggregate the community of statisticians.  
During oral history interviews with the statistician Lin Fude 林富德 (1925-) and 
the demographer Wu Cangping 鄔滄萍 (1922-), both provided contrasting views on how 
they adapted to the new statistics of the 1950s. Both had come of age and been trained in 
the 1940s, and as such, prior to 1949 had a relatively catholic approach to statistics. In the 
years that followed, Lin informed me, he and other statisticians had to recalibrate their 
ideas of statistics and bring them into closer alignment with the new definitions. Wu, on 
the other hand, while accepting that such recalibration took place, observed that the 
change was often only rhetorical or symbolic; the actual statistical ideas were the same. 
Both pointed out that the tangible result was that methodology and statistical work were 
privileged over research and theory and application stood estranged from each other.
255
  
While Lin and Wu may have successfully negotiated the transition, as the 
youngest generation of statisticians trained before 1949 they were hardly in positions of 
influence; that is, positions from where they could have an immediate and widespread 
impact on the state of the discipline and on the education and training of future 
statisticians and statistical cadres. That space was occupied by an older generation of 
statisticians who had been active over the preceding decades; especially the 1930s, when 
the social survey movement was at its peak. This generation had published textbooks that 
were in widespread use. Its members had served in government, in education, in banking, 
and also as researchers in a private capacity. In particular, it was in their role as authors 
of important and popular textbooks that curtailing their activities and reformulating their 
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views became crucial to the disciplinary reformulation of statistics. Prominent among that 
generation was Jin Guobao. 
Today, Jin Guobao is widely regarded as one of the founders 奠基人 of modern 
statistics in China.
256
 Such recognition is based to a large extent on his activities prior to 
1949. A professor of statistics and one-time banker and senior government official, in the 
decades before the CCPs’ victory he had become arguably China’s most famous 
statistician as well as its most prominent teacher of statistics. His text, An Outline of 
Statistics 《统计学大纲》, went through multiple editions and as the standard textbook 
for college level statistics it had become “the most influential statistics textbook in the 
country during that time.”
257
 It was precisely this perceived influence that made him one 
of the targets of concerted criticism in the early PRC.  
Jin Guobao was born Oct. 12 1893 in Tongli Town in Wujiang county, Jiangsu 
province 江苏省吴江市同里镇. His early education was at Shanghai’s Fudan Gongxue 
复旦公学. After graduating from school, he served as an English teacher at the Wujiang 
Middle School. During this time he frequently contributed essays to the journals New 
Bulletin of Current Affairs 《时事新报》and Eastern Miscellany 《东方杂志》. Using 
the nom de plume Jin Lüqin 金侣琴 he was the first person to translate Lenin into the 
Chinese language, publishing Lenin’s “Bolshevik's Statement of Demands” 鲍尔雪维克
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之所要求与排斥 in the first issue (September 1919) of the journal Liberation and 
Reform 《解放与改造》.258 
A few years later in 1921 he traveled to America and studied statistics at 
Columbia University on a scholarship from the South Seas Tobacco Company南洋烟草
公司. Jin received a Master’s degree in 1923, upon which he returned to China and 
successively taught statistics at such institutions as the Shanghai Chinese Public School 
上海中国公学,  Fudan University, and the University of Commerce 商科大学. During 
this time, he was also a Section Chief in the Ministry of Finance. In 1928, on the orders 
of the President of the newly founded Academia Sinica 大学院, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 
(1868-1940), he traveled to various countries in Europe and the Americas to study their 
statistical activities. During well over a year of travel he gathered a variety of statistical 
materials.  
Upon his return to China, he became directly involved in government, banking, 
and statistical education.  In May 1929 he was appointed the Director of the Nanjing 
Finance Bureau and served as a special member of the Capital Construction Committee. 
The following year, he was among the people who joined D.K. Lieu in setting up a 
Statistical Society, which was conceived as a forum for the promotion of private 
academic discussions. In April of 1930 he traveled abroad again, this time to Japan, to 
study local finance and to attend the International Statistical Institute’s nineteenth 
Biennial Conference in Tokyo.
259
 Upon returning from Japan in July of that year, he 
moved to Shanghai and reentered the world of finance. Over the next several years he 
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held various managerial, auditing, accounting, and research positions at the 
Communications Bank 交通银行 and at the Central Bank 中央银行.260  He would 
eventually rise to senior positions such as Director of Accounting and Chairman of the 
Board at several of these institutions. After 1937, Jin also held professorial appointments 
at Shanghai University of Commerce and at Jinan University.  
Of Jin’s various professional identities, the one that would persist into the 1950s 
following the Communist takeover was that of respected professor and prolific author. 
Early in the decade he was appointed a professor at Fudan University, where he also 
served as the director of special training courses in statistics and trade. During these years 
he also concurrently held professorships at the Shanghai Institute of Finance and 
Economics 上海财政学院 and at the Institute of Economics of the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences. Jin was a prolific author and had already produced several monographs 
and textbooks for the study of statistics and economics prior to 1949. In addition to the 
aforementioned An Outline of Statistics 《统计学大纲》, he had published tracts on 
subjects such as England’s tax structure, currency reform, index numbers, industrial and 
economic problems, and Keynesian economics. He continued writing after 1949, and 
authored at least four books on statistics, including an abridged version of the Outline of 
Statistics, titled Statistics 《统计学》.261 He was 69 years old when he passed away in 
Shanghai on 15 February 1963. 
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It was Jin’s An Outline of Statistics, which, because of its content and continuing 
and widespread use after 1949, became one of the early targets of criticism during the 
1950s. An Outline of Statistics was published in 1935 by two different presses: firstly as 
part of a series by the National School of Commerce Press 国立商学院出版社, and 
secondly by the Commercial Press. By 1950, it had gone through 13 editions.
262
  Jin’s 
views on statistics and its links to mathematics, however, were in evidence as early as 
1925. In the introduction to the New Discussion/Theory of Statistics 《统计新论》, his 
first textbook on statistics, published in 1925 shortly after he returned from attending 
Columbia University, he wrote:  
“The study of statistics is subtle and broad. If one is without mathematical 
awareness and a scientific mind, he cannot speak about it. And yet, it is 
used frequently and very widely; there is no one who doesn’t use it. 
Indeed, scholars who care not to learn it are immediately struck by 
dizziness when they come across its charts and tables; and the less said 
about [their reaction to] advanced mathematical principles and refined and 




Ten years later, the first sentence in Jin’s An Outline of Statistics was more direct: 
Statistics is the study of using counting or estimation to represent the 
dynamic-ness and static-ness of social or natural phenomena and to carry 
out the analysis of the relationship between numbers.
264
 [emphasis added]  
 
In thinking about statistics as fundamentally mathematical in nature and universally 
applicable to the social and natural worlds, his views were very much a reflection of the 
prevailing wisdom of the time. Like Jin, the significant number of Chinese statisticians 
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(and economists and social scientists) active in the 1930s had been trained in the United 
States or Western Europe or were students of those that had been trained there.
265
 They 
had served in government and were in many instances active participants in what Tong 
Lam has called the Social Survey Movement of the 1930s.
266
 At this time, a well-defined 
socialist critique of statistics had yet to be articulated in China or elsewhere. The espousal 
of statistics as a universal science by Jin and his contemporaries, many of whom were 
authors of prominent textbooks as well, had no coherent counter-discourse. This view 
was reflected in several textbooks they published shortly after 1949, all of which enjoyed 
widespread popularity: the Jilin based professor of statistics Wang Sili 王思立 published 
The General Theory of Statistics 《统计学通论》in 1951; Zhang Zhihong 张志鸿 
published Agricultural Statistics 《农业统计学》in 1953, and Zou Yiren 邹依仁 
published Industrial Statistics 《工业统计》in 1952.267 By publishing books that 
promoted what was to quickly become a theoretically unsound understanding of statistics 
after 1949, these authors drew the immediate and targeted attention of New China’s new 
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socialist statisticians. As one of these socialist statisticians would go on to explain, the 
hazards such books posed were indeed quite grave:   
… [They] will not only impede the progress of statistical science, but will 
also cause ideological confusion among statistical workers, which will 
lead statistical work to suffer losses; they therefore [eventually] hinder the 




And so, in very short order after 1949, Jin Guobao, many of his fellow statisticians, and 
the textbooks they had composed, all came to represent the most obdurate of foes to those 
seeking to enforce a new understanding of statistics.  
 
Patterns of Critique and Self-Critique  
Obdurate foes Jin and his fellow statisticians may well have been, but they were also the 
type of higher intellectual who the CCP prized tremendously. For the CCP, their value 
lay in possessing skills and knowledge that were sorely needed.  But such groups were 
also the least susceptible to dogma. As Harriet C. Mills noted in a 1959 article,  
Communist policy toward this strategic group [of higher intellectuals] in 
the past decade has consistently aimed at securing most effective 
utilization of its knowledge. Zigzagging steadily toward this goal, the 
Communists have now attacked, now united, now criticized. Meanwhile, 
they are recruiting their own Red intellectuals, but have not yet had time to 




This then was the challenge: to not wholly discredit the statisticians but to reform them so 
that they could continue to contribute from within the system and be held up as 
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exemplars of the potential of remolding.
270
 A lack of adequate numbers of Red experts in 
statistics remained a challenge through the decade, meaning that this older generation of 
statisticians never lost its value.    
The criticisms of the 1950s can also be understood as a younger generation’s 
attempts to supplant an older generation. The people responsible for ‘zigzagging’ toward 
the goal of effectively utilizing statisticians belonged, for the most part, to a middle 
generation, between the Jin Guobaos on the one side, and the Lin Fudes and Wu 
Canpings on the other. While it is unclear if either Lin or Wu directly participated in the 
criticisms (Lin co-authored a textbook in the mid-1950s along socialist lines), many of 
their colleagues did, and they all shared certain general characteristics. Most were born in 
the 1910s or 1920s, had been trained in economics or statistics (sometimes abroad), and 
by the late 1930s had thrown in their lot with the CCP. Many of them had received 
further training in Yan’an and at party schools elsewhere and, as such, were particularly 
receptive toward socialist statistics as it became increasingly clearly articulated by the 
late 1930s. As they took on administrative and pedagogical positions at key institutions 
following 1949—in some cases they had already been involved in administering CCP 
controlled areas prior to that—they turned their enthusiasm towards propagation. Notable 
among these institutions were the Northeast Statistics Bureau (e.g. Yang Jianbai 杨坚白, 
Wang Sihua 王思华, Wang Jianzhen 王建真, others?), the State Statistics Bureau (Xue 
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Muqiao 薛暮桥, Wang Sihua 王思华, Wang Jianzhen 王建真), People’s University (Lin 
Fude 林富德), and Beijing University (Hu Daiguang 胡代光).271  
Newly established journals of the PRC offered the principal channels through 
which this younger generation attacked and cajoled Jin Guobao and his colleagues. Of 
particular prominence were journals that focused specifically on statistics, most notably 
the Northeast Statistics Bureau’s Statistical Work 《统计工作》 (1949-1954) and the 
State Statistics Bureau’s Statistical Work Bulletin 《统计工作通讯》 (1953-1959, 1979-
 ).
272
 Other venues where statistics was debated included the journals New Construction 
《新建设》, the Journal of Finance and Economics 《财经研究》 (1956-1960, 1980- ). 
By the middle of the decade student theses written at Renmin University had also begun 
to tackle the subject of socialist and bourgeois statistics.
273
  
The pattern of these criticisms and self-criticisms did not therefore follow the 
larger patterns of national thought reform campaigns, in which newspapers were a key 
element. Harriet Mills described such national campaigns by noting that they generally 
began “with a series of articles and editorials in newspapers.”  
Since newspaper reading is a political obligation in China and items of the 
day are often taken up in study groups, a subject which has received more 
than usual attention will begin to be discussed. Thus, a demand is created 
for further study, for which materials and instructions are soon 
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As noted, most criticisms of bourgeois statistics, however, were published not in 
newspapers but in specialized journals, which were not available to the general public. 
The readership and target audience for study sessions, therefore, was more narrowly 
conceived: the statistical cadre, student, and teacher. In addition, unlike nation-wide 
campaigns such as the three-antis and the five-antis or the anti-rightist campaign that 
usually had a clear start and end date, the critique of statistics persisted through the 
decade, gathering steam along the way.
275
 The interlocutors in these debates no doubt 
took some of their cues from national developments, but they were also subject to the 
internal and international dynamics of the world of statistics.  
Based on these general observations, we can divide the years from 1949 to 1958 
into four periods (See Table 1 below).
 276
 The relative paucity of critical articles during 
the first phase, lasting from 1949 to 1951, suggests that attention was devoted primarily 
to establishing a basis for statistical work in the PRC. Once this foundation was in place 
in the Northeast, a sustained analysis of existing statistical theory and pedagogy could be 
undertaken. Indeed, through the end of 1951, criticisms of ‘Anglo-American’ or 
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 The periodization here is reconstructed from the following materials: (1) Liu and Zhang 2000: 119-127; 
(2) Various articles from State Statistics Bureau’s Tongji gongzuo tongxun 《统计工作通讯》and Tongji 
gongzuo 《统计工作》; (3) Compilations of the Northeast Statistics Bureau’s serial anthologies of 
materials culled from the monthly journal  Tongji gongzuo 《统计工作》from 1950-1953 (The NESB’s 
journal was discontinued by the middle of 1954); and (4) various other journals, such as Xin jianshe 《新
建设》,  Jingji zhoubao 《经济周报》, Caijing yanjiu 《财经研究》, etc. It should be pointed out that 
this is not a comprehensive listing of all publications attacking ‘bourgeois statistics;’ it does, however, 





‘bourgeois’ statistics were rather limited. On a national level, the first book to be 
criticized was Gou Shisheng’s 勾适生 Principles of Statistics《统计学原理》. Essays 
critical of Gou were published in 1950 by He Sheng 荷生 and in 1951 by Tie Hua 铁华 
and Liu Xin 刘新.277 These initial criticisms appear not have been very detailed. On a 
more regional level, some criticisms were published in the Northeast Statistical Bureau’s 
Statistical Work《统计工作》 starting in 1951, especially following the start of the 
three-antis campaigns late in that year.
278
  
Table1. Frequency of Articles Criticizing "Bourgeois" Statistics, 1949-1958 (including self-criticisms) 
  1949-1951 1952-1954 1955-1957 1958 
Number of Articles 2 6 10 1 
 
Developments in late 1951 and during 1952 provided a clearer focus for the 
critique, which expanded both its targets and its frequency. The first of these 
developments was the publication of new editions of textbooks by Jin Guobao, Zou Yiren, 
and other statisticians. If these new editions offered a significant challenge to the rise of 
socialist statistics, then the preparations for and establishment of the State Statistics 
Bureau (1952) and selection of People’s University as the main training site for the 
(social science) of statistics (1952) provided the twin loci through which this challenge 
was met. Both these developments, as well as the nation-wide reorganization of 
educational institutions 院系调整, encouraged a more sustained analysis of the state of 
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textbooks and academic discourse. Not surprisingly, therefore, 1952 witnessed a larger 
number of articles published on the subject, including those by Yang Jianbai and Wang 
Jianzhen in the Northeast Statistics Bureau’s Statistical Work《统计工作》.279 That 
same year Guo Gengji 过庚吉 published an essay criticizing Jin Guobao’s 金国宝 
Principles of Industrial Statistics 《工业统计学原理》 and Zou Yiren’s 邹依仁 
Industrial Statistics 《工业统计》.280 In his essay, Guo claimed that in spite of claiming 
to have changed their texts to reflect Soviet statistical theory, these authors were guilty of 
still effectively following Anglo-American statistical theory. Additional essays on the 
hypocrisy of capitalist index numbers and the dangers of bourgeois statistical thought 
were also published during 1952.
281
  
In early 1953, Xu Qian 徐前 and Liu Xin 刘新 published what was up to that 
point the most sustained and detailed criticism and analysis of the state of statistical 
theory in the PRC. Their essay, entitled “Criticism Regarding Bourgeois Statistical 
Theory,” appeared in the first and second number of that year’s New Construction 《新
建设》, and expanded on the earlier critiques of several statisticians, including Gou 
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Shisheng, Jin Guobao, and Zou Yiren. Liu and Xu offered specific examples to 
demonstrate the problems with bourgeois statistics (discussed in the following section).
282
 
While one would have expected the article to have served as a clarion call for additional 
critiques, 1954 was an oddly quiet year. One possible reason was the focus on the first 
five-year plan (1953-1957).  
The third period, from 1955 to 1957, is marked by not just a quantitative jump in 
the number of articles, but also by a qualitative shift in their content. Three features, in 
particular, characterize this period: the impact of the 1954 Soviet Resolution, the 
emergence of self-criticisms, and the role of the Shanghai Finance and Economics 
Institute. Let us consider the 1954 resolution first. The meeting in Moscow in Spring 
1954, which had categorically adjudicated in favor of statistics’ definition as a social 
science, had a signal influence on the wider PRC statistical community. News of the 
resolution and the now Soviet state-sanctioned definition of statistics, however, took 
some time to filter through; a complete Chinese translation of the deliberations was not 
published until early 1955.
283
 But its impact was evident in the more confident tone and 
tenor of the critiques that started emerging in 1955.
284
  Close on the heels of the Soviet 
resolution’s publication, Xu Qian 徐前 and Liu Xin 刘新 published an updated version of 
their 1953 article. It retained its earlier title, but this time was published in the SSB’s 
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journal Statistical Work 《统计工作》. A brief editorial comment noted that it had been 
updated based on the conclusions arrived at during the 1954 Moscow Conference.
285
 In 
the ensuing months, additional essays were published by Hu Daiguang 胡代光 and Wang 
Jianzhen 王健真; the former demanding the eradication of the pernicious influence of 




1956 was a particularly fruitful year for criticisms. Early in the year, Li Zhenzhou 
李振周 published an essay criticizing agricultural statistics for their rightist conservative 
thought and demanded that such problems be overcome.
287
 Li was followed by Wang 
Feixian 王飞宪 who critiqued the capitalist thought present in educational materials 
published at the start of the 50s and by Shi Qing 石青 who focused his attention on the 
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  Zhang Zhihong 张志鸿 and his Agricultural Statistics were 
critiqued by Zhang Minru 张敏如.289  
1956 is also significant for witnessing the first self-criticism by a statistician. 
Early in the year, Zou Yiren, who had been one of the subjects of targeted criticisms 
earlier in the decade, published a self-criticism.
290
 Gui Shizuo 桂世祚 responded at the 
end of the year with an essay in which he approved of and welcomed Zou’s contrition, 
but felt that in many instances the self-criticism did not go far enough. For good measure, 
in the same piece he also returned to Jin Guobao’s Principles of Industrial Statistics and 
offered additional criticisms.
291
 Perhaps in response to the increased stridency during the 
previous year, 1957 witnessed additional self-criticisms. Jin Guobao published a self-
criticism early in 1957. As noted in the introduction above, he did not discuss his book on 
industrial statistics or any other works, and focused instead on his most successful 
textbook, Outline of Statistics 《统计学大纲》Tongjixue dagang.292 A third self-
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 Zou 1956.8 remains the first self-criticism that I can locate. Zou (1908-1994) was a Paris University 
trained mathematician and statistician who had taught at Fudan, Chongqing, and the Shanghai Business 
University. In 1952, he was transferred to the Shanghai Finance and Economics Institute. In addition he 
also held appointments at the Shanghai Academy of Social Science and Jiaotong University. For more on 
Zou, see: Shi Tai 施泰. “Zou Yiren 邹依仁.” Tongji yu yuce 《统计与预测》, no. 6, (2001): 52-53. 
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criticism was published a few months later by Wang Sili 王思立, the author of books 
such as A General Theory of Statistics 《统计学通论》.293 Late in the year, Zou Yiren 
also published a short history of the evolution of statistics, and in line with his own self-
criticism from the previous year, described how statistics was, after all, a social 
science.
294
   
These self-criticisms followed a common pattern. Each author began by observing 
that he had been trained within the Anglo-American system, in some cases had spent time 
abroad, and was completely in thrall to bourgeois vices like formalism 形式主义 and 
idealism 唯心主义. After 1949, even though he may have paid lip service to the slogan 
of learning from the Soviet Union, he still regarded Marxist-Leninist statistical theory as 
being too simplistic. Only after extended study of Marxist-Leninist thought over the 
following five to six years had he come to realize statistics’ true object (the social world) 
and theoretical basis (Dialectical Materialism 辩证唯物主义).295 The process can be 
summed-up via the following three-point schema:
296
  
1. He now understood that statistics was a social science that researched large-
scale social phenomena. It was different from all the natural sciences.  
2. Statistics studied the quantitative aspects of these large-scale social 
phenomena. Therefore, it was also different from all other social sciences  
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 Zou Yiren 邹依仁. “Lun tongji shi yimen shehui kexue 论统计是一门社会科学 (Discussion of 
Statistics as a Social Science).” Caijing yanjiu 《财经研究》(1957.04). 
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3. Finally, statistics took into account the qualitative aspects of numerous social 
phenomena in order to study their quantitative aspects; i.e. it took into account 
the interconnectedness of society. In so doing it was again different from 
bourgeois statistics. 
A final feature that distinguishes the 1955-57 years is the role that the Shanghai 
Institute for Finance and Economics 上海财政经济学院 (SIFE) came to play, both as a 
site to which several recalcitrant ‘bourgeois’ statisticians had been relocated, as well as 
the venue where those same statisticians could perform their contrition and restitution via 
structured discussion and criticism sessions. The SIFE’s origin can be traced to Nanjing’s 
Higher Normal School 南京高等师范学校, which had been established in 1917. 
Departments dealing with commerce and business 商科 had migrated to Shanghai in 
1921 and by 1932 they had become the National Shanghai School of Business 国立上海
商学院. In August of 1950 its name was changed to the Shanghai Institute of Finance and 
Economics. Over the following three years the business and finance departments of 20 
schools in eastern China were merged into it.
297
 As a result, by the mid-1950s, it was 
home to many of the major pre-1949 figures from the world of statistics, some of whom 
we have already encountered in this chapter and in earlier chapters: Zhu Junyi (the last 
Director of Statistics under the Guomindang), Jin Guobao, and Zou Yiren, among many 
others.  
By the mid-1950s, many of the statisticians at SIFE began organizing informal 
discussions and meetings that focused on the varying foibles of bourgeois statistics. One 
such meeting was organized in 1956 and engaged in criticism of bourgeois index 
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numbers. Organized by the Statistics department of the SIFE, the meeting and its 
outcome were originally described in a report published in the first issue of The Journal 
of Finance and Economics 《财经研究》 during the second half of the year.298 It 
included the views of statisticians such as Zou Yiren (the journal’s first editor and whose 
self-criticism had just been published), Zhu Junyi, and Jin Guobao. The report was 
reprinted in abridged form later in the year in the SSB’s Statistical Work 《统计工
作》.299 The group at SIFE stayed active into 1958, when, motivated by the tumult of the 
Anti-Rightist movement, they published another lengthy report on an informal meeting 
where the subject was the status and use of mathematical statistics within a socialist 
society. Among the many involved in this discussion were, what should by now appear to 
us, the usual suspects: Wang Sili, Jin Guobao, and Zou Yiren.
300
  
The different periods through which we have viewed the growing intensity and 
changing nature of criticisms permit some generalization. What is evident is that even 
with a top-down dominant paradigm, consensus formation was a process that had to be 
negotiated. For its target audience—the statistical cadre and students—this negotiation 
took place through the pages of various statistics and economics journals, thereby 
producing the veneer of a community of scientists in pursuit of “true knowledge,” and 
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arriving at a consensus about it through debate and discussion—that is, approximating the 
idealized workings of a general scientific community. The testing of boundaries was in 
clearer evidence during the early 1950s, when none of those being criticized had felt it 
necessary to respond in print. As the space for alternate views shrunk to near 
nonexistence after 1955, staying above the fracas was no longer an option. As more 
textbooks in the new paradigm were published, especially by the SSB and by Peoples 
University Press, and as more people were trained in socialist statistics, self-criticism 
offered the only route to salvaging one’s reputation and position. While it is impossible 
for us to parse an individual’s stated acceptance of the new paradigm from his true views, 
the whole exercise very quickly became as much about performance as it was about 
belief. In this way, by 1956 the burden of performing criticism had shifted from New 
China’s socialist statisticians to those they sought to reform—the likes of Jin Guobao, 
Wang Sili, and Zou Yiren. 
Before we proceed to a discussion of how these processes affected the actual 
content of statistics, it is worth asking if any obvious candidates for criticism were 
successful at evading it. Perhaps the most famous such case is that of Chen Da 陈达 
(1892-1975), the famous demographer and sociologist. Chen’s career can be neatly 
divided into two parts. Chen received his doctorate from Columbia in Sociology in 1923 
and from that year until 1951 he taught at Qinghua University 清华大学 in Beijing and at 
South West Associated Universities 西南联合大学. During that time, he led several 
sociological studies, authored numerous books and articles on labor, migration and 
population, and held a number of important administrative positions. He was also a vocal 






  From 1938 to 1948 he directed the Institute of Census Research and developed 
a census program and carried out surveys in and around the southwestern city of 
Kunming 昆明. After 1949, Chen’s activities become virtually untraceable and stand in 
stark isolation compared to his activities up to that point.
302
 And yet, as a practitioner 
who used statistical methods but did not write textbooks or seek to teach statistics he 
remained uninteresting to the exponents of socialist statistics.
303
 Thus, even though Chen 
was targeted during the anti-rightist campaign of 1958, he escaped the attention of 
socialist statisticians. 
 
The Content of Critique 
Unlike the nature and timing of the self-criticisms, which leaves open the interpretation 
that they may have been, in the end, about performance and survival, the impact of the 
imposition of socialist statistics on the content of statistical science is more readily 
discernable. At the general level, criticisms of bourgeois statistics were repetitions of 
arguments already encountered in the previous chapter. Bourgeois statistics conflated the 
natural and social world as a common unit of analysis.
304
 It lacked comprehensiveness 
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and as a consequence lacked objectivity.
305
 It existed to exploit workers and helped 
capitalists and imperialists increase their profits.
306
 Among such broader grievances, 
perhaps the most trenchant and specific charge was that it placed formal mathematical 
doctrine 形式数学 at the very center of statistics. By doing so, it failed to distinguish 
between the causal mechanisms behind functions (common to the natural world) and the 
multifaceted relations captured by correlation (common to the social world).
307
 As a 
result, it did not accurately take into account the economic content and reality of what 
was being studied; nor did it adequately account for the relatedness of events.
308
 Or, put 
another way, it failed to adequately take into consideration the inter-relatedness of the 
quantitative 量 and qualitative 质 aspects of social phenomena.309 As Jin Guobao 
explained in his self-criticism: probability theory was based on the independence of 
events 几个事件各各独立, such as the coin toss or the throw of the dice, but “events in 
society are inter-related and mutually constrained and definitely not independent [of each 
other].”
310
 And so, many critiques concluded dismissively: by detaching itself from the 
real world, bourgeois statistics was nothing but a numbers game 数字游戏.311  
                                                     
305
 Liu Xin & Xu Qian 1955: 32; Zou Yiren 1956: 26; “资产阶级统计指数理论批判” Caijing yanjiu 《财
经研究》(1956.01): 16; Hu Daiguang 1955: 23 
 
306
 Zou Yiren 1956: 25. 
 
307
 Wang Sili 1957: 29. 
 
308
 Wang Jianzhen 1955: 40. 
 
309
 Zhang Zhiji 张知几 and Zou Yiren 邹依仁, eds. Dazhong tongji 大众统计 (People’s Statistics). 
Shanghai: Xin zhishi chubanshe 新知识出版社 (New Knowledge Press), 1953, 3-4. 
 
310
 Jin Guobao 1957: 29. Also see: Wang Jianzhen 1955: 40. 
 
311





These broader critiques filtered into two specific areas where their impact is 
clearly discernible: textbook content and the evaluation of specific statistical concepts. In 
the very early years, form 1949 to 1953, new educational materials including textbooks 
were produced either by the Northeast Statistical Bureau or by the Statistics Department 
of People’s University.  These materials usually consisted of compilations of reports， 
speeches, and lectures by leaders such as Wang Sihua and Di Chaobai 狄超白 as well as 
Soviet experts. By 1951, the compilations had taken the shape of sector- or activity-
specific handbooks. For instance, in 1951 the first in a series of reference materials was 
published for trade and industrial statistics.
312
 Over the following two years, reference 
materials were published on statistical theory, agriculture, the Northeast’s statistical work, 
national income, and much else.
313
  
By 1953, the Statistical Press 国家统计局出版社, the publishing division of the 
State Statistics Bureau, had become active and would rapidly become a major producer of 
didactic material. In addition to general textbooks, the Press published books that 
discussed specific methods in various fields, shared experience gained, and so on.
314
 
Provincial and city level statistics bureaus established their own presses and followed suit. 
By the mid-1950s, general introductory textbooks were being produced for all levels of 
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students by several different organizations. Representative examples of such books 
targeting beginners and non-specialist cadre are listed in Table 2 below.
315
  
Table 2. Introductory Statistics Textbooks 
Title Authors/Editors/Compilers Publisher Date Comments 











Revised editions May 1954 and 
1956. Self-Study material for the 
common cadre; Middle-School 
level 
Lectures on Statistical 











This was the 4th edition (first 
edition was in 1952) but the 9th 
printing; including this print run, a 
total of 60038 copies had been 
produced 
Common Problems in 
Statistical Theory318 
 
Lin Fude, Liu Xin, Jiang 
Zhao, Xu Qian, Zheng 





First edition; By January 1957 six 
print runs, total 59,910 copies 
 
These new volumes differed from pre-1949 textbooks with regard to their content 
and their focus. In his 1954 report on Soviet statistics, Ostrovitianov had noted that the 
controversy over the true nature of statistics had prompted some Soviet “economists and 
statisticians to be afraid of making use of mathematical methods in investigating social 
phenomena. This, evidently, is why the methods of mathematical statistics are almost 
entirely neglected in the drafts of the textbook prepared by the Moscow Institute of 
Economics and Statistics.”
319
 A similar pattern is discernable in the production of 
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textbooks and related educational material in China. As an illustration, Table 3 below 






























Table 3. Comparison of Statistics Textbooks (n.b.: the shading identifies similar content across books) 
Title An Outline of Statistics People's Statistics 
Lectures on Statistical 
Principles—Vol. 1 & 2 
Common Problems in 
Statistical Theory 
Year 1934 September 1953 
first ed 1952, 4th edition in 
1956 
1956 
Author Jin Guobao Zhang Zhiji 
People's University Statistics 
Department 
Lin Fude, Liu Xin, Jiang 
Zhao, Xu Qian, Zheng Yao, 
Zhou Fugong 
Publisher Commercial Press New Knowledge Press People's University Press Statistical Press 
Print run ? ? 60,000 (upto 4th Ed) 59,910 (upto 6th ed) 
Chapter 
    
1 Introduction 
The Idea of Statistics 
(Introduction) 
The Object and Method of 
Statistics 
The Object and Method of 
Statistics 
2 Statistics Tables 
The Principle Method 
of Collecting Data: 
Statistical Reports 
Statistical Surveys 
The Organization of 
Statistics in the PRC 
3 Statistical Charts 
A Subsidiary Method of 
Collecting Data: 
Specialized Surveys 
Statistical Grouping Statistical Observation 
4 Average Numbers 
Birds of a Feather: 
Grouping and Sorting 
The Organization and 
Technology of Statistical 
Summaries and Statistical 
Tables 
The Aggregation and 





The Organization and 
Technology of Summary 
Statistics: The Statistical 
Table 
6 
Probability and Error 
normal curve 
What is the Average?--
Average Numbers 
Dynamic Series 
Absolute and Relative 
Numbers 
7 Skewness and torque 
Changing because of 
Time: Dynamic Series 
Indices/Indicators 
Average Numbers in 
Statistics 
8 Index Numbers 
Did the prices rise or 
fall?--Price Indices 
Sample Surveys Dynamic Series 
9 
Important index numbers 
in 5 countries 
Did Production Rise or 
Fall?--Product Volume 
Indices 




Even More Striking are 
Diagrams: Statistical 
Illustration 
The Development and Recent 
Organization of Statistics in the 
USSR and New China 
The Graphical 
Representation of Statistical 
Data 
11 Long-term trends 
   
12 Seasonal variation 
   
13 Cyclical Changes 
   
14 Linking of Time Series 
   
15 
Non-linear 
systems/correlation?    
16 
Other Types of Relations 
(?)    
17 
Partial Relations? 偏系
联    
18 响应 
   
19 Business Forecasting 
   
20 
Collection and Collation 





The first striking difference is the overwhelming emphasis on the collection, 
grouping, and aggregation of data in the PRC era textbooks, where chapters devoted to 
these activities usually follow the introductory chapter (Chapters 2, 3, 4 in two cases; 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 in one). In contrast, An Outline of Statistics does have early chapters 
discussing statistical tables and charts, but leaves a discussion of actual collection and 
collation to a single chapter (20) at the very end. This inversion and change of emphasis 
is indicative of the much more practical orientation of the PRC era textbooks. The 
purpose of statistics was to produce data that could inform National Construction. 
Statistical work, therefore, was the principal task and enjoyed preeminence over anything 
else. In general, chapters in the three PRC era textbooks can be divided into four 
categories: (1) Introduction; (2) Methods of collecting, collating (grouping), sorting, and 
summarizing data; (3) exposition of key analytical tools (average numbers, indices, etc.); 
and (4) graphical representation of statistical results. Even the chapters on analytical tools 
focused only on various forms of average and index numbers (chapters 5-9; 5-8; and 6-9 
respectively), which were the principal tools used to process rates of change, ascertain the 
level of plan implementation, and carry out related analysis.  
The most salient change, however, is the absence in the PRC volumes of any 
chapters or content focusing on ‘mathematical’ statistics. In contrast, Jin devoted 
individual chapters in An Outline of Statistics to topics such as Variance (chapter 5), 
Probability and Errors (chapter 6), Correlation (chapter 10), and Time Series (chapters 
11-14).
320
 Most of these topics were predicated on the acceptance and employment of 
probability theory and the law of large numbers. Their elision in the PRC textbooks raises 
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the question of what exactly was the status of mathematics within the new socialist 
statistics. Chinese statisticians were quick to point out that they did not altogether reject 
mathematics. Rather, they insisted that what was wrong was to take mathematical 
statistics as the basis of all statistics; the use of mathematics to pursue statistical 
calculations itself was perfectly reasonable.
321
 Thus, it was left to decide what particular 
methods were best suited for use within a socialist society and economy. These debates 
usually centered on four concepts: Measures of Central Tendency 平均数 (Average 
numbers), Indices and Index numbers 指标与指数; Time Series 时间数列, and Sample 





Measures of Central Tendency 
 Among the most important concepts that came up for debate and discussion were 
measures of central tendency. Of the five principal measures of central tendency—the 
mode 众数, the median 中位, the arithmetic mean 算术平均数, the geometric mean 几何
平均数, and the harmonic mean 调和平均数/倒数平均数—it was the last three that 
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generated the greatest amount of debate.
323
 Among the key points of interest were the 
importance of grouping 分组 and problems of bias 偏误 and of weights 权数.324   
 The problem of grouping brought together the socialist concern for melding 
theory with economic realities on the ground. In his self-criticism, Jin Guobao cited an 
example from Marx’s own writings to illustrate how average numbers could easily 
mislead:  
Imagine a situation where ten workers each worker earns 2 shillings every 
week, five workers each earn 5 shillings per week, and another five earn 
11 shillings per week. Thus, the total weekly income of these 20 workers 
is 100 shillings, or 5 pounds. Now, imagine if total wages rose by 20%, so 
that now the total weekly wage stood at 6 pounds. If we were to calculate 
the new average wage, we would expect to see everyone’s wages rising by 
20%. But in reality the wage hike only affected the two five-man teams, 
one of which saw weekly wages go up to 6 shilling, and the other to 14 
shilling. Thus, half of the total workforce saw no improvement in their 




As this example indicated, calculating the average wage hike actually served to distort 
class distinctions. A similar analysis was made of American per capita GDP calculations, 
which did not take into account the differences between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, thereby covering up 掩盖 the class contradictions of capitalism.326 In 
textbooks, the importance of grouping was framed in a more positive light: attention to 
group averages permitted the identification of advanced 先进 workers as well as those 
lagging behind 落后.327  In this way, Chinese statisticians sought to stress that it was 
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absolutely critical to calculate not just total averages 总平均数 but also group averages 
组平均数.328  
The problem of bias 偏误 was used to interrogate which type of average was best 
suited for making economic calculations. Most discussions of this subject initially offered 
a simple example to illustrate that for any set of numbers the arithmetic mean (AM) was 
larger than the geometric mean (GM), which was in turn larger than the harmonic mean 




 AM =  (400+300+200)/3   = 300 
  GM =  √             
 
   = 286 
  HM =   3/(1/400 + 1/300 + 1/200) = 277 
But as Wang Sili explained, such numbers did not represent any real situation on the 
ground and therefore this example merely served to highlight the different results 
obtained via the use of the three different methods. Given such an example, therefore, 
each type of mean could theoretically be correct. If, however, examples with actual 
economic content were considered, then it would become apparent that in one instance it 
was the AM that was the only correct choice, and in another, the HM. Consider the 
following two cases that were discussed by Wang Jianzhen
330
: 
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Case I: Three types of food products 甲、乙、丙 have the following production and 
pricing characteristics.  








甲 5,00 400 20 
乙 1,000 300 30 
丙 2,500 200 50 
 
If all products were considered together, what would be the combined average price of 
each ton be? According to Wang Jianzhen, the only suitable method to arrive at such a 
price was to use the arithmetic mean: 
 Average Price =  (500x400 + 1000x300 + 2500x200) / (500+1000+2500)  
   = 250 元 
Case II: If, on the other hand, the only information available was the price of each 
product and their relative value in monetary terms, that is columns C and D, then to 
answer the same question only the method of the harmonic mean would suffice:  
Average Price = (20 + 30 + 50) / (
  
   
 
  
   
   
  
   
) 
  = 250 元 
In neither case was the geometric mean the appropriate choice. And yet, that is precisely 
what bourgeois statistics would have preferred and what had been preferred by the 
various bureaus of the Nationalist Government prior to 1949.
331
 As Wang Jianzhen and 
other Chinese statisticians explained, bourgeois statistics considered the GM superior to 
the AM and the HM because it lay between the other two, and therefore was putatively 
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 Indeed, in a paper read at the eighty-second (1920) annual meeting of the 
American Statistical Association, the noted mathematical economist Irving Fisher had 
observed:  
As to bias, it can be shown that the arithmetic average has an upward bias, 
i.e., has in the very nature of the arithmetic process a natural tendency to 
give results too large, that the harmonic has a downward bias, that the 




The tendency in the PRC, therefore, was to ignore the GM. For instance, the 
chapter on average numbers in People’s Statistics did not even discuss GMs, listing only 
the four other measures of central tendency and devoting the most space to the AM.
334
 
But the GM was not entirely dismissed. The SSB’s Common Problems in Statistical 
Theory discussed it, but explained that its use was extremely limited.
335
 As Hu Daiguang 
explained elsewhere, the appropriate use of the GM to calculate rates of growth ought to 
be restricted to only those instances where the individual rates represented unidirectional 
change (consistently up or consistently down) over the entire time-period under study.
336
 
In all other instances, the GM was nothing but an example of mere mathematical 
formalism.
337
 And it was in this form and this form only that we see the GM being used 
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to calculate the combined annual growth rate in industry and agriculture.
338
 The 
implication of much of this is that several growth rates and related statistical measures 
were calculated using measures such as the AM, which leaves open the possibility that 
our sense of the changes in the 1950s is based on numbers that may possess an upward 
bias.  
 
Indicators and Index numbers 
The mean is a specific type of indicator and the distinction drawn between its three types 
was itself part of a wider discussion on indicators and index numbers. Broadly speaking, 
an index number is “a quantity which shows by its variations the changes over time or 
space of a magnitude which is not susceptible to direct measurement in itself or to direct 
observation in practice.”
339
 Examples of index numbers include those for wholesale 
prices, labor productivity, cost, business activity, physical volume of production, cost of 
living, and many more. The calculation of index numbers were considered absolutely 
essential to socialist statistics and it is here that the antipathy toward mathematical 
statistics became most transparent.
340
 In a book on industrial statistics A. I. Ezhov, the 
Deputy Director of the Central Statistical Administration of the Soviet Union and the first 
Soviet statistical expert in China (1950-1952), had stressed the superiority of socialist 
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statistics by observing that: “Industrial statistics of all major capitalist countries does not, 
owing to the absence of a centralized governmental statistics, possess a number of 
important indicators and many indicators are estimated indirectly.”
341
  
The central challenge in arriving at a good index number is to be able to account 
for changes in all variables; for instance in the case of price indices, this would mean 
accounting for changes in price and in quantity. While numerous indices had been 
proposed and numerous tests devised to check their quality, the problem of over- or 
under-estimation had remained unresolved.
342
 To get around this problem, in 1921 the 
mathematical economist Irving Fisher had proposed what he labeled the ‘two supreme 
tests’ that could help determine the formula for an ideal index: first, that it “should work 
both ways as to the two factors, prices and quantities”; and second, that “the formula 
should work both ways as to time.”
343
  
Irving Fisher, who was regarded as the foremost American economist by several 
of his most accomplished peers, including Joseph Schumpeter, James Tobin, and Milton 
Friedman, was also a brilliant statistician and among the pioneers of the subfield of 
econometrics.
344
 Among the many areas in which he made seminal contributions was the 
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 For instance, two basic price indices are the Paasche index (named after the Hermann Paasche) and 
the Laspeyres index (named after the Etienne Laspeyres). In the former, prices are weighted by the 
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study of index numbers.
345
 Fisher also had a direct link to Chinese statistical practice 
during the 1920s and 1930s. During his time as a PhD student at Yale, the economist 
Franklin L. Ho (He Lian 何廉, 1895-1975) had worked with Fisher in developing index 
numbers. Upon his graduation in 1926, Ho returned to China and took up an appointment 
as professor of public finance and statistics at Nankai University. At Nankai, Ho put to 
good use the $500 gift he had received from Fisher and organized the Committee on 
Social and Economic Research. This committee would eventually become the 
Department of Economics in the early 1930s. Among Ho’s first research related activities 
was the compilation of historical price indices calculated by applying Fisher’s ideal index 
to over sixty years of price and quantity data from the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. 
These indices, as well as others that Ho and his colleagues calculated, were published 
between 1934 and 1936 in Nankai Index Numbers.
346
 
For China’s socialist statisticians after 1949, however, in promoting the concept 
of an ideal index formula 理想公式347, Fisher was conflating two distinct problems: what 
type of mean to use and what type of weights to use. According to them, Fisher had 
begun by assuming that the problem was a mathematical one. He had completely ignored 
the economic content of the various indices.
 348
 Fisher thus became the embodiment for 
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the failings of bourgeois statistics as a whole.
349
 His two tests as well as “eight big 




Fisher may have served as a productive focal point for the critique of Anglo-
American bourgeois index number theory, but for all their deliberations, socialist 
statisticians in China did not propose any suitable or sophisticated alternatives.
351
 Given 
such an absence, the most frequently used types of index numbers were of a much 
simpler kind, which focused on year-on-year change, or took one particular year as the 
base year and tracked nominal changes in future years based on that. The following two 
tables from Ten Great Years provide an example of each such case.
352
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The table above provides index numbers for annual Industrial and Agricultural 
Production from 1950 to 1959. For each year (row), the previous year (row immediately 
above) is taken to be the base (i.e. 100). Thus, we can see that total industrial and 
agricultural output in 1957 was 107.8 or 7.8% greater than that in 1956. The primary 
driver of this increase was industrial growth (114 or 11.4%) and not agricultural growth 
(103.5 or 3.5%). In the table below, on the other hand, all comparisons were made taking 
1949 as the base year (=100). Thus, the growth in modern industry by 1957 was just over 







Neither of these transitions—the disciplining of a generation of statisticians and the 
changes in content—happened overnight, even though that was very much the idea 
behind the re-organization of schools and disciplines in 1952 院系调整.353 Genuine 
concerns about capitalism—such as the existence of incentives to dress up data to fool 
people and favor private interests—were conflated with the perceived weakness of 
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specific statistical methods. In some ways, many of these criticisms and self-criticisms 
may have been storms in a teapot, since the bigger and significantly more far-reaching 
changes were happening in the world of actual statistical work. Indeed, the far more 
telling rupture in statistics in the early PRC was in statistical practice, where changes in 
practice preceded and served as markers for the changes in scientific discourse that were 
to follow. In Part II of this dissertation we shall explore different elements of statistical 
practice in greater detail.  
The narrower range of statistical theory that was taught starting in the 1950s did, 
however, significantly limit the abilities of several generations of practicing statisticians. 
The strong boundaries established between the social science of statistics and 
mathematical statistics left both communities of scientists (and practitioners) mutually 
ignorant. Particularly revealing in this regard is the case of the statistician Xu Baolu 许宝
騄.354  Born in 1910355 in Beijing, Xu did his undergraduate work at Tsinghua University 
清华大学, from where he graduated with a degree in mathematics. He then spent four 
years at University College, London, earning a PhD in 1938 and a ScD in 1940, both in 
mathematical statistics. Upon his return to Beijing, he was appointed a professor in the 
Department of Mathematics at Peking University. Barring a two-year stint in the United 
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 There appears to be some disagreement on his date of birth. One biography lists September 1, 1910; 





States from 1945 to 1947, he spent the rest of his career there. Xu’s major area of 
research was probability theory and mathematical statistics and he is today identified as 
the first person in China to engage in research in these areas:
356
 “He was the first Chinese 
who was internationally recognized in the area of probability and statistics,” and counted 
among his friends E.A. Pearson and Jerzy Neyman.
357
 These are precisely the areas that 
socialist statistics refused to include within its purview. And yet, none of the criticisms 
targeting bourgeois statistics ever touched Xu. Why?—because he was based in a 
department of mathematics. 
This dichotomy between statistics and mathematical statistics cut both ways—it 
constrained what each knew of the other—and remained influential into the 1980s. In a 
recent conversation, the Harvard statistician Xiao-Li Meng related to me that the first 
time he encountered a histogram with actual data was in graduate school in the United 
States in 1986. Before that, as a student of mathematics and mathematical statistics at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, his curriculum had been purely theoretical and did not 
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Too much Civil Service work consists of circulating 
information that isn't relevant about subjects that don't 






From a very early stage, the idealized version of statistical work that had been espoused 
in the writings of Wang Sihua and claimed as having been largely achieved by the 
Northeast Statistical Bureau had to face up to reality of expansion across a vast, complex, 
and largely agrarian landscape. Through the work of the Northeast Statistics Bureau and, 
in particular, the writings of Wang Sihua, a model of statistical work had been articulated 
that valorized extensiveness (across economy and society), completeness (of the 
statistical system), and objectivity (about social fact). This model was predicated on the 
primacy of exhaustive enumeration; other methods of data collection, notably surveys, 
were of secondary importance and only to be used in a supplementary or as-needed basis. 
As shown in Part I, that such a valuation of methods was the only correct choice had been 
based on a concerted and unambiguous theoretical understanding of the social world and 
how to account for it. By 1951, the state and party leadership were in a position to start 
thinking about expanding the Northeast’s system across the country and establishing a 
unified national statistical system. 
 This chapter focuses principally on the roughly six years from 1952 to 1957, a 
period during which a national statistical bureau and a large nationwide network of 
subsidiary statistical offices at provincial, city and county levels were set up. The concern 
here is no longer with the articulation of an ideal, but with its actual practice. As a period 
that includes within it China’s first five-year plan (1953-1957), it witnessed the 
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inextricable linking, at least in a putative sense, of statistics and planning. In the third 
chapter in this part, I shall explore this linkage in greater detail. The goal of this chapter, 
however, is to offer a sense of the nature of statistical work and the challenges that it 
faced. The chapter is divided into five principal sections. The first section offers a brief 
institutional history of the establishment of the State Statistics Bureau and the expansion 
of a national network under it. The remaining sections are organized schematically 
around the four key tasks of statistical work in the PRC: Collection 收集, 
Collation/Ordering 整理, Research 研究, and Supply提供.360 Of these four, collection 收
集 and supply 提供 were considered the more fundamental tasks.361 
The nature of statistical activity during this period not only mirrored broader 
bureaucratic and governance-related trends and forces frequently identified with the mid-
1950s, but by constraining them also gave them their shape.
362
  The first of these key 
trends was the increasing degree of complexity across the economy as new factories and 
industries were set up, agriculture was re-organized and subsequently nationalized, and a 
new system of remuneration put in place, all against the background of sustained 
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economic growth. For statistics, this meant an expansion of the types of data that needed 
to be collected as well as an expansion into the more virgin territory of performing 
statistical analysis and research based on the data that had been collected. Complexity 
also brought into focus issues of bureaucratic organization and coordination across 
various bureaus and organs. Another key trend through the mid-1950s was the push 
towards greater decentralization. Decision-making power, especially as it pertained to 
implementation of policies decided at the central level, was frequently devolved to the 
Provinces or lower. In statistics, this broader push toward decentralization came up 
against the centralizing tendencies of the statistical apparatus. A resolution was attempted 
via the principle of ‘unified leadership, dispersed (by grade) management’ 统一领导，分
级管理, which favored allowing local party and government administration to execute 
the work as they saw fit and without too much oversight.
363
 This tension between 
centralization and decentralization, in turn, brings into focus the two forms of political 
and executive authority—horizontal and vertical—that were a feature of both the 
organization and prosecution of statistical work.
364
 Finally, a third key feature of the 
period was the realization that agriculture was absolutely critical to the economic fortunes 
and socialist goals of the PRC. Best articulated in statements that simultaneously 
reiterated the primacy of industry while also elevating agriculture to near equal status, 
such a rebalancing of emphasis forced the SSB to confront the unreliability of 
agricultural data and the unsuitability of the methods used to collect that data. 
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Statistical work was thus carried out within the larger unfolding context of 
increasing complexity, changing (economic) focus, and struggles over administrative 
devolution. As work got more complicated and demanding, the engagement with and 
discussion about statistical activities grew more sophisticated—methods were expanded, 
analysis was undertaken, and the results of such analysis circulated amongst leaders and 
bureaucrats. However, as the following chapter will show, a key problem remained—the 
system that had been set up incentivized the over-production of reports and the state had 
little or no capacity to handle the resulting excess reports. This meant that in the interests 
of maintaining timeliness 及时性, which director of the SSB, Xue Muqiao would 
repeatedly state was of higher importance than correctness 正确性, there was an ever 
increasing disjuncture between local data and regional and national data. Whereas local 
data collected was often of reasonably good quality, the need to report it up it in a timely 
fashion meant that estimation was permitted.
365
 As a result, the further up it was reported, 
the more estimation was likely used, rendering provincial and eventually national data 
victim to gross inaccuracies.  
 Furthermore, given their reliance on the systematic collection, collation, and 
upward reporting of data, statisticians had no independent and systematic means available 
to check the accuracy of the numbers their system was generating.
366
 At the same time, 
such a system was particularly prone to delays. Archival reports of statistical work are 
full of complaints about factories, work units, as well as agricultural cooperatives, all 
falling behind reporting schedules. Delays combined with excess issuing thus created an 
absolutely chaotic situation by the mid-1950s, leading Wang Sihua to lament that 
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statistical work remained unable to address the needs of the Planning Commission and 




Expansion of a National Network 
Prior to September of 1952, when the State Statistics Bureau (the National Statistical 
agency) was set up, the only bureau 局 of statistical work in the People’s Republic was 
the Northeast Statistics Bureau, headquartered in Shenyang (and discussed in Part I, 
Chapter 1). That does not, of course, mean that no statistical work was carried out during 
the first three years.  Much of this work was coordinated through Finance and Economics 
Committees 财政经济委员会 and statistical departments 处 and branches 科, which 
collected data or prepared estimates based on pre-existing data. In similar fashion, 
regional and provincial levels of government possessed statistics divisions, as did the 
various ministries. Most statistical reports were compiled through their efforts.
368
 The key 
national level coordinating institution was the Central Finance and Economics Committee, 
which was set up on July 21, 1949. Composed of six departments, it was led by Chen 
Yun 陈云, who was in turn supported by such figures as Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ma Yinchu 马
寅初, Li Fuchun 李富春, and Xue Muqiao.369   
 It was this Central Finance and Economics Committee that initiated discussions 
about a national statistical system. In July of 1951, Li Fuchun 李富春, a Deputy Director 
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of the Committee, chaired a national level conference on Financial and Economic 
Statistics to start discussing how to implement the Northeast model on a national scale. 
Held in Beijing from the 16
th
 to the 20
th
 of the month, this conference would in later years 
be retroactively dubbed the first National Meeting on Statistical Work.
370
 Eighty-five 
delegates, joined by 91 observers 列席代表, gathered to address for the first time the 
statistical needs of the country as a whole.
371
 Echoing Stalin decades earlier, Li would 
observe in his speech that without statistical data the tasks of national construction, 
planning, and economic work could not be undertaken. He also went on to make clear 
that China would learn socialism from the Soviet Union, and take Marxism-Leninism as 
her guiding principle, criticizing Anglo-American capitalist statistics along the way. But 
the key task before the conference was the question of a national statistical system; 
something that even after two years the PRC did not possess. It was Wang Sihua who 
proposed setting up a national statistical agency, which would centrally guide statistical 
work across the country.
372
  
 The details of such a national system were articulated by the main Soviet 
Statistical expert and advisor, A. Ezhov 叶诺夫.373 In an address delivered on the 
penultimate day of the conference, Ezhov pointed out that while all across at the regional 
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level a lot of statistical work had been done, China still lacked national statistics under a 
unified leadership structure. Therefore, the most urgent task was to link the different 
statistical activities under one unified system. Yezhov identified nine key tasks. The most 
important of these was the absolute necessity of one unified seamless system that linked 
the local to the central and the ministry to the work unit, with clear lines of command and 
oversight. To man this system, a large body of trained cadre was needed. The Northeast 
Statistics Bureau was to serve as the model for all other provincial and city level bureaus 
across the country as they went about setting-up such a system.
374
    
 It took nearly another year for the National Meeting’s recommendations to be put 
into effect. On August 7 1952, Xue Muqiao was appointed the head of the newly 
established State Statistics Bureau (SSB).
375
 The Bureau began operations the following 
month, on September 8. In a report delivered to the Central Finance Committee 中财委, 
Xue noted that the Bureau had set up a secretariat 秘书厅, and departments for 
summary/comprehensive 综合 statistics, industrial statistics, agricultural statistics, trade 
statistics, capital construction, and communications statistics. In addition, also set up 
                                                     
374
 The nine points were (See: DSJ: 5-6):  
1. From the enterprise to the bureau/department and from the local to the central, institutions and 
systems should be set up as part of one seamless system.  
2. Cultivation of cadre must begin with cultivation of their thought. Their training can be dispersed, but 
must be centrally administered. Should also consider distance learning. 
3. The Center and regional administrations must produce a Statistical Work Handbook 《统计工作手
册》 
4. Upper levels of the apparatus must oversee the lower levels: inspect their work, enforce deadlines, 
and offer guidance and help. 
5. Rapidly clean-up useless, chaotically issued reports. 清理无用的、乱发的报表. 
6. Reports should be simplified, especially comprehensive reports.  
7. Lower levels should report, upper levels should offer judgment and instructions 
8. Extensively use and study the experience of the NE. 
9. Extract the essence 抽取精华 from already collected statistical data and carry out analyses so that it 
is easy to compare [and assess] the development that has been made 
 
375
 See: DSJ: 7. Wang Sihua was appointed one of the Bureau’s Deputy Directors and put in charge of 




were sections devoted to labor wage statistics 劳动工资统计, distribution of goods 物资
分配, and the world economy 世界经济, for a total of ten sections.376 Departments 
devoted to culture and education and to social statistics 社会统计 had yet to be set up. 




 A few months after the establishment of the SSB, a Second National Meeting of 
Statistical Work took place from 15 to 22 December in Beijing. It included an agenda-
setting address by the famed military commander and recently appointed vice-chairman 
of the central government, Zhu De 朱德. For the most part, Zhu’s speech covered ground 
already trodden by Ezhov. One notable difference was in how he framed the importance 
of statistical work. In this, he was much more in agreement with Wang Sihua’s speeches 
from his time in the Northeast: statistical work was necessary because it was the basis of 
a planned economy. Zhu thus reiterated Wang Sihua’s call for a united statistical 
apparatus and his exhortation was subsequently repeated by Xue Muqiao in his own 
speech to the delegates.  
 One of the primary tasks identified at the Second National Meeting was the need 
to set up regional, provincial, and city level statistical offices as part of one unified 
national network. In a letter dated 14 April 1953 and delivered to all regions, provinces, 
and cities, Xue Muqiao noted that by March-end five regions and eighteen provinces and 
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cities had reported the successful establishment of statistical offices.
378
 But the status of 
statistical offices of the South-Central Region as well as twenty-three other provinces and 
cities remained unknown. He proceeded to accept the SSB’s culpability in causing some 
of these delays: the organizational guidelines about a national statistical network had, 
after all, only been disseminated in early March. Even so, he urged the recalcitrant to 
rapidly establish statistical offices.
379
  
 As shown in Table 1, Xue’s exhortation met with direct results. By the end of 
June 1953, all but Liaoning and Qinghai had set up regional, provincial, or city-level 
statistical offices.
380
 According to the sanctioned size of different provincial bureaus at 
time of establishment, 1275 statistical workers were distributed across twenty-four 
bureaus. Average bureau size was about fifty-three workers.
381
 City level bureaus, 
however, were often larger: Shanghai had ninety-six statistical workers and Beijing sixty-
five. Most bureaus were organized into Departments 处, Offices 室, Branches 科, and 
Teams 组.382  
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the DSJ. For instance, the BMA document notes that Anhui had already set up a statistical bureau by March 
1953. The DSJ, however, lists it as happening in June of that year.  
 
381
 These numbers and estimates are based on information culled from the DSJ: 7-35. 
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 I have not found uniform guidelines delineating a department from an office and a branch; considerable 
variation likely existed. For instance, in 1957, the Henan Statistics Bureau made the following 
recommendation: cities with populations greater than 0.5 million should set up a Bureau 局, those with a 
population between 0.2 and 0.5 million should set up a Department 处, and those with fewer than 0.2 





Table 1. Establishment of National, Regional, Provincial, and City Level Statistics Bureaus
Source: 中华人民共和国统计大事记，1949-2009 （国家统计局编）, pp. 1-35
Date set up Province/City
Authorized 
Staff Notes
August 7 1952 National SSB Established, Xue Muqiao Director
September 8 1952 National SSB Starts Operations
January 12 1953 National
Set up stats 局、科、处 in various bureaus and organs of the 
central government 
November 26 1954 National SSB first Bureau listed under reorganized State Council
April 4 1950 Northeast ?
January of 1953 Northwest 80
February 1 1953 North China 60
Stopped funtioning on August 5 1954, when large admin 
regions were canceled.
March 13 1953 Southwest 70 Located in Chongqing
March of 1953 East 110 Located in Shanghai. Stopped work by end of year.
May 1 1953 South-Central 80
December of 1952 Inner Mongolia 45
The Suiyuan 绥远 Bureau was set up in March 1953, and later 
incorprated into the Inner Mongolia Bureau
January of 1953 Hebei 70
January of 1953 Hubei 60
February 1 1953 Guangdong 57
Built on work done by the province's 调查统计委员会 and 
the 华南财委计划局统计处
February 9 1953 Yunnan 55
March 4 1953 Zhejiang 65
March 12 1953 Shanxi 55
March 14 1953 Shandong 90
March 15 1953 Henan 66
April 1 1953 Shaanxi 
April 24 1953 Guizhou 
April of 1953 Heilongjiang 50
April of 1953 Jiangxi 50 Prior organ: 省财委统计室 
May 25 1953 Sichuan 80
May of 1953 Jilin 55
Established by abolishing 
吉林省人民经济计划委员会统计处
May of 1953 Hunan 50
May of 1953 Xinjiang 15
统计处 was changed to 统计局. Oct. 1 1955 the 
新疆维吾尔自治区 was established, 统计局 accordingly 
transferred. June 1957 started setting up 科室机构.
June 9 1953 Anhui 65 Built on foundation of: 安徽省人民政府财经委员会统计处
June of 1953 Fujian 45
In December 1957, became part of the 福建省计划委员会; In 
October 1959 it was again separated became again
June of 1953 Guangxi In 1958 it was changed to the 广西壮族自治区统计局
June of 1953 Ningxia 99 1954.9.23: Ningxia merged with Gansu
July of 1953 Gansu 50
August of 1954 Liaoning 124
辽东 and 辽西 were merged to form 辽东.  辽东 and 辽西 
Bureaus had been set up separately in May and August 1950
January of 1955 Qinghai 29 Previously: 省人民政府计划委员会统计处
1950? Shenyang
1953? Chongqing
Jaunary 30 1953 Beijing 65
March 5 actually set up on the foundation of the 
北京市财委统计科
March 5 1953 Tianjin 65








As a result of the restructuring of government organs that took place in 1954 (in 
the wake of the first people’s Congress), the State Statistics Bureau was identified as the 
first among 20 organizations [机关 or 机构] directly subordinate 直属 to the newly 
formed State Council 国务院 (which had replaced the Government Administrative 
Council of the Common Program era, 1949-1954).
383
 This is the national structure that 
remained in place till the summer of 1958.  
By 1956, the SSB main office in Beijing had expanded and consisted of thirteen 
key branches. Two of these were offices 室 dedicated to administration and research. Six 
divisions 司 handled statistics relating to comprehensive/summary 综合, industry, 
agriculture, capital construction, trade, and distribution of supplies. In addition, there 
were five departments 处 dedicated to transportation, labor wages, culture, education, and 
compilation (publication).
384
 By the following year, the total number of statistical cadre 
claimed was in the region of 190,000 to 200,000.
385
 The SSB headquarters in Beijing 
itself reported about 650 dedicated staff. Outside of regional, provincial, and city level 
offices, statistical activity was undertaken by a mixture of full-time and part-time staff. 
This was especially the case at the more local level. For instance, statisticians at the 
factory level frequently doubled up as accountants 会计 as well.  
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 The reorganization occurred after the First People’s Congress, wherein the Common Program, in place 
since 1949, was set aside for a more formal governmental and administrative structure. For a copy of the 
actual government notice 通知, see: BMA 153-001-01221: 1-3. Also see, Schurmann 1968: 183-185, 
where the full list is reproduced. For Schurmann, the order of the list indicated the relative importance of 
the organ. I have not found anything to categorically substantiate this.  
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 DSJ: 492. 
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 See: State Statistics Bureau. Re’ai women de tongji gongzuo  热爱我们的统计工作 (Ardently Love our 
Statistical Work). Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1956, 10; and Tongji ganbu de zixue 统计干部的自学 




By 1957, the four-fold description of statistical work—collection, collation, 
research, and supply—reflected both the de jure and the de facto situation.
386
 Of these 
four, collection, collation and supply were part of the original tasks listed by Wang Sihua 
when describing the work of the Northeast Statistics Bureau. Research at that time was 
largely aspirational. But by the end of 1957, it had come to occupy a normatively equal 
status. In reality, however, statistical workers perceived the importance of these activities 
in unequal ways. In 1957, Xue Muqiao noted that some workers preferred performing 
supervisory 监督检查 or research 研究分析 tasks over the more basic tasks of collection 
and collation, thereby failing to recognize that without these latter tasks the former were 
impossible to undertake.
 387
 As he explained: 
If, in order to supervise or [carry out] research, one were to become 
relaxed about the collection and collation of statistical work, this was akin 
to one destroying the foundations of one’s own work; exactly like the 





The overemphasis on control was at least partially contingent on the early experience 
gained in the Northeast. In 1951, Li Fuchun had observed that statistical work should first 
focus on the industrial sector. Later, with additional experience and capabilities, the work 
could expand to cover other sectors. The Industrial sector, given its localization in space 
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 Xue Muqiao 1957: 6. A truncated version of this report is also located in BMA 133-01-00090: 66-80 (第
六屆全國統計工作會議文件 (一)), (it is missing the final two sections in the published version (on 如何
运用各种调查方法（略）and 统计工作的今后任务 (略)). The report was also reproduced in 《统计工
作重要文件彙編—第三輯》, 1959. In similar fashion, collection (here identified as survey 调查) was 
described as the basis of all other statistics work in the 1956 introductory textbook People’s Statistics (see p. 
9).   
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and its discrete nature (when compared to villages or cooperatives), permitted a focus on 
control 监督作用 and vertical leadership 垂直领导.389 In the following chapter, I shall 
look more closely at such problems of professionalization and motivation.  
 
Collection 
Collection 收集 (the term 搜集 was also frequently used) was the most basic statistical 
task performed by the SSB and its subsidiary organs. For Chinese statisticians and their 
Soviet advisors, the best way to count was to count exhaustively. As explained in Part I, 
Chapter 1, this understanding generated a hierarchy of methods used for data collection. 
The most important, because it was the most fundamental, was the Complete 
Enumeration Periodical Report System 全面定期统计报表制度.  The periodicity of 
these reports ranged from ten-day (旬) cycles, to monthly, from quarterly, and annual 
reports. Amongst these, the Annual Report was the most important, especially because it 
was used most directly in arriving at planning targets and in checking their success and in 
summarizing the state of affairs in the economy and in society.
390
 Reports at shorter 
frequencies were more useful at the provincial level and below. Of secondary importance, 
but widespread use, were censuses 普查. Finally, unlike the first two methods which 
were based on complete enumeration, surveys 调查 which only counted a selected 
sample 样本 were also used, but sparingly.391 
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 BMA 133-001-00090: 82. 
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 Xue Muqiao 1957: 6).   
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 Over the course of the 1950s, there was a general trend in the direction of 
increasing complexity, both in terms of the nature of data collected, as well as in terms of 
the methods used to collect that data. At the start of the 1950s, the emphasis was on 
setting up the periodical report system and conducting basic assessments of industry. If 
one-time specific sets of data were needed, then the census was the chosen form to do get 
such data.
392
 For example, even before the establishment of the SSB, a census of state-
owned and public-private industries had been carried out in 1950. In 1952, the year the 
SSB was established, censuses of industrial production and employment were completed. 
A population census in 1953 was followed by censuses of private enterprises and the 
handicrafts industry in 1954. Private activity, in particular, was tracked using the census 
method. By the mid-1950s several additional censuses were announced with this specific 
goal. For instance, an urgent notice issued on October 20 1955 ordered that four types of 
surveys were of critical importance and must be completed in the fourth quarter of the 
year. These were surveys of Merchants, Private workers in Key Industries, National 
Employment, and Material Inventory.
393
 That same month, another report also issued via 
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 Another listing of major censuses 普查 carried out in the 1950s is provided in: Wu Hui 吴辉. 
“Zhongguo de tongji diaocha fangshi 中国的统计调查方式 (China’s Statistical Survey Methods).”  In 
Zhongguo shehui zhuyi tongji gongzuo de jianli yu fazhan 中国社会主义统计工作的建立与发展 (The 
Establishment and Development of Socialist Statistical Work in China), edited by the China State Statistical 
Bureau’s Institute of Statistical Science, 34-35. Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1985. 
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 BMA 002-020-00746: 22-23. 
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 BMA 002-020-00746: 16-22. The report observed that the actual completion rates were uneven across 
the country.  Among those provinces and cities that had more or less completed the surveys were: Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Rehe, Shandong, Hunan, and Jiangxi. Another group 
was in the midst of carrying the survey out, and included Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Zhejiang, 




The key method for collecting data, however, remained the periodical report 
system.
395
 And by 1956, an integrated statistical system extending down from the SSB in 
Beijing allowed for unprecedented levels of penetration. With a staff of about 650 
personnel, the SSB, headquartered in Beijing, served as the apex body of this system. 
Below it, at the provincial level, statistical offices coordinated work across roughly 2,200 
counties. Under the counties were village administrations, which coordinated the 
statistical work of about 750,000 village cooperatives. Unlike in the Soviet Union, where 
a similar unified chain of command was free from oversight by other party and 
government organs, in the People’s Republic a statistical unit at any level was 
simultaneously also under the authority of the Party Committee at that level. In other 
words, a provincial bureau took its orders not just from the SSB in Beijing, but was also a 
constituent part of the provincial People’s Committee, which had a say in its organization. 
Thus, the provincial People’s Committee could make its own requests for data to the 
provincial statistics bureau. A statistical worker at each level usually had more than one 
set of leaders to answer to.
396
 Such an arrangement it was hoped would make the 
statistical system flexible enough to meet local and national needs.
397
 But it also 




                                                                                                                                                              
the survey itself: Gansu, Anhui, Fujian, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Shanghai. Xinjiang was the lone region that 
had yet to even begin making preparations for the survey.  
 
395
 “Among all the various methods of investigation, the complete enumeration periodical report system is 
the basic and [most] important method.” [在各种统计调查方式里，全面定期统计报表是基本的主要的
方式] See: Wu Hui 1985: 32. 
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 Xue Muqiao 1957: 8. 
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Given the goals of extensiveness and completeness (as identified by Wang Sihua), 
the management of reports was a major challenge for the SSB. At the Second National 
Meeting on Statistical Work in December 1952 the emphasis had been on stressing united 
leadership 统一领导, which gave all decision-making authority regarding forms and 
schedules to the SSB in Beijing. The result was the proliferation of forms such as Annual 
Reports for which the State Statistics Bureau in Beijing was the sole recipient. From the 
center’s perspective, this was a world of neatness, simplicity, and legibility. All data 
would be collected via exhaustive enumeration at the level of the enterprise and received 
via successive rounds of upward reporting and collation as they traveled from the unit 单
位 and county level up to provincial bureau and eventually to the SSB.  
State Statistics Bureau (Beijing) 
Provincial Bureau Provincial Bureau Provincial Bureau 

























































































































Let us consider the example of “The Basic Annual Report for State-owned, Local 
State-owned, and Private-Public Large Scale Industrial Enterprises for the year 1953,” 
which encapsulates this idealized vision.
398
 Below is the summary sheet from the Report. 
 
 
Several centralizing and comprehensive features, meant to make an industrial enterprise 
‘legible’ to the SSB are readily visible: its basic identifying attributes such as ID number 
and geographic and administrative location, industry division, key products produced, 
total labor input, and gross value of industrial output for 1953 and 1952 at current and 
fixed prices. The summary page was followed by 12 additional pages which sought 
further details on various activities at the industrial enterprise: 
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 BMA 018-011-00054: 80-91. Basic Annual Report for State-owned, Local State-owned, and Private-






Page 2:  Total Output Value and Commodity Output Value  
总产值及商品产值 
Page 3: Output (quantity) of Principle Products  
主要产品产量 
Page 4:  Labor and Wages  
职工人数及工资 
Page 5: Training of new workers and improvement of workers’ techniques  
新工人培养及工人技术提高情况 
Page 6: Production, Allocation, and Balances of key materials  
主要物资的生产、拨出与结存 
Page 7: Receipt, Outlay, and Balance of Key Raw Materials (semi-manufactured 
goods) and Fuel  
主要原材料（半成品）及燃料收拨与结存 
Page 8: Consumption of Main Raw Materials (semi-finished goods) and Fuel  
最主要原材料（半成品）燃料及电力的消费情况 
Page 9:  MISSING 
Page 10: Power Plant 
  电力设备 
Page 11: Metal Cutting Machine Tools and Forge Equipment 
  金属切削机床及锻压设备 
Page 12: Dedicated Railways and Main Transportation Tools 
  企业专用铁路及主要运输工具 
Page 13: Housing and Educational Welfare Facilities of Workers  
  企业职工住宅及文教福利设施情况 
  
By collecting Annual Reports from all industrial units in this way, the SSB hoped to 
capture the total reality of industrial production in the entire country.  
 In order to arrive at the neatness of the Annual Report described above, each 
industrial enterprise had to track its activities on a far more frequent level (daily, ten-day, 
monthly, quarterly) by using a much wider array of reports. Given the goals of 
extensiveness and completeness (as described above), the management of reports was 
thus a major challenge for the SSB. It soon became clear that the kind of focused 
authority called for in December 1952 had led to numerous contradictions between lower 
and upper levels within the statistical structure as well as across the same administrative 




during the first year of work. As a result, demands were too high, too many, too urgent, 
and a general impatience 急躁情绪 characterized all work. This situation was reversed 
during a national meeting in May 1953. A few years later the national policy of “More, 
Better, Quicker, Cheaper”  多、好、快、省 put forward during the 8th Party Congress in 
1956 also generated tensions since statistical work often focused on ensuring “Better” 
and “Quicker” at the expense of “More” and “Cheaper”.
399
 A similar flip-flopping 
between simplification and complication was also reported by the Jiangxi Statistics 
Bureau. As an example, it cited the case of commercial statistics in the province, which 
had gone through four instances of simplification and complication during the five years 
between 1953 and 1957.
400
 
 It was in the field of agricultural statistics, however, that the SSB would meet its 
most intractable foe. For much of the decade, agriculture occupied a secondary, 
subsidiary position to industry within the economy. As Carl Riskin has noted, at the 
“most general level, the principal themes of the [first five-year] Plan did not include 
agricultural production.”
401
 And yet, it was the surplus generated in agriculture that was 
an essential source of investment needed to drive growth in heavy industries. The 
efficacy of the periodical reporting system as a means of assessing agricultural output, 
and thus the surplus, was however constantly undermined by the scale of the agricultural 
sector, the variability of terrain and produce, seasonal differences, and a lack of 
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 BMA 133-001-00091: 16. 
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 BMA 133-001-00091: 21. In its own report, Henan province observed that the simplification was 
successful to varying degrees based on the level of administration. For instance, the simplification at the 
county level and above was quite successful. Below the county level, especially at the village level, the 
reverse was true. See:  BMA 133-001-00091: 11. 
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manpower. Take for instance a March 1955 telegram delivered to planning and statistical 
bureaus across the nation in which Xue Muqiao bemoaned the quality of the 1954 Annual 
Reports for agriculture. Xue observed that when compared with figures from earlier years, 
both the yield and area sown showed massive upward and downward fluctuations for 
agricultural staples such as grains, cotton, oilseeds, peanuts, and sesame. He concluded 
that “such large volatility 波动幅度 in area sown and in the production figures for 
various crops amply illustrated that statistical work in agriculture still lacked a solid 
foundation and was badly in need of strengthening.”
402
  Even the use of typical sampling 
典型调查, which was meant to supplement the periodical report system,  generated 
problems since most cadre were unfamiliar with what specific methods to use, how to 
select typical cases, and other basic principles.
403
   
Part of the problem lay in a lack of personnel. Unlike in industrial units, many 
villages and cooperatives did not possess a dedicated statistician. And even if they did, 
this person, in many cases, could only work part-time 兼做. The actual duties of 
statistical work often fell to the village clerk 乡文书, whose regular duties became 
increasingly onerous as life in the countryside went through successive waves of 
cooperativization and eventual collectivization. In this milieu, some clerks even refused 
to perform statistical duties, claiming that since it was not formally listed under their 
responsibilities it was an ‘additional burden’ 额外负担, which they could or could not 
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perform 可做可不做.404 Already by the mid-1950s, agricultural statistics had thus 
become a particular source of embarrassment for the SSB.  
Even as a constant battle was fought to standardize and simplify the overall 
numbers and types of forms, there was a growing realization that the scope of data 
collected had to be expanded. As a report on industrial statistics poignantly noted of the 
state of statistical work in1957: “thus [we are] able to reflect production, but [can only 
offer] a poor reflection of livelihood.”
405
 That same year, Xue echoed the report’s 
sentiments, stating: “in the past we spent more time thinking about production and 
construction statistics, and did not emphasize [enough] surveys of people’s lives.”
406
 
Indeed, already by the end of 1954, this need to better understand changes (and 
improvements) in people’s livelihood had precipitated a turn toward systematically 
collecting data on rural and industrial family income and expenditure, purchasing power, 
wages, population, prices, and much else previously outside the purview of the SSB.
407
 
Exhaustive enumeration, ill-suited to these tasks, had to be augmented by newer, more 
sophisticated representative methods. Coupled with the challenges already being faced 
due to the re-elevated status of agriculture, where exhaustive enumeration via the 
periodical report system had already proven ineffective, 1955 and 1956 thus witnessed a 
broader engagement with non-exhaustive forms of counting—in other words, with survey 
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 “因而能反映生产，不好反映生活” See: BMA 063-007-00088: 5. 
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 See: BMA133-0010090: 85. 
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  Even so, per the dictum of centralized leadership and dispersed 
management, the SSB could only offer regulations and suggestions on how to conduct 
work.
 409
 The actual work had to be carried out by local units at the provincial, city, 
county, and village level and be coordinated by various bureaus at each level.
 410
  
A household income survey that the Beijing Statistics Bureau planned to carry out 
starting in 1955 reflects these themes of expanded scope, new methods, and 
coordination.
411
 As a clear instance of an attempt to carry out a city-level typical 
sampling survey 典型调查, it is indicative of the kind of coordination that was required. 
The directive called for the coordination of several different units 单位; the SSB’s role 
was one of providing guidelines and not of carrying out all the work, highlighting again 
the limits of actual SSB control. In earlier years, smaller-scale surveys exploring some of 
these questions had been attempted by individual bureaus. In 1951, the Labour Bureau 
had organized about fifty people to survey more than 200 workers families; and in 1952, 
the City Finance Committee had organized over 120 people to survey 700 households. 
None of these were regular surveys and the surveyors’ lack of experience meant that the 
surveys were poorly executed and their data deemed unreliable.  
In December 1954, the City Statistics Bureau offered guidelines to the City 
Finance Committee concerning setting up a Resident’s Family Livelihood Survey 居民家
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 Xue Muqiao 1957: 1-2; BMA 133-001-00091: 13-14. 
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 A 1953 directive had put SSB in charge of all statistical regulations. See: Xue Muqiao 1957: 9. 
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 BMA 133-001-00090: 84. For an example of the SSB sending out guidelines for conducting a particular 
set of surveys, see: BMA 002-020-00746: 22-23. 
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 Starting in 1955, there was a nationwide campaign to collect such data. This was the kind of more 
intrusive but also complicated statistical activity that the SSB (and the State) started to conduct during the 





计调查 for 1955.412 The purpose of the survey was four-fold: first, to understand the 
material and cultural living standards of the people; second, to organize and plan the 
circulation of goods; third, to plan for the circulation of currency; and fourth, to prepare 
indices of worker’s cost of living. Regular surveys would thus measure the income and 
expenditure (cash and kind) of every level of society, their purchasing power, changes in 
the rate of consumption of major commodities, changes in disposable income and in 
savings.
413
 These new types of statistical data were to be collected across all members of 
society, who were classed into four groups: workers, independent workers, private 
industrial and commercial workers, and peasants and other grassroots people.
414
 
If the survey had already indicated an expansion of the types of data to be 
collected, then the method for the survey was also a departure from the exhaustive 
enumeration of the periodical report. Typical or purposive sampling 典型调查 was a 
method of sampling that relied on the selection and exhaustive surveying of a 
representative handful of sample units. In order to ensure that the samples selected were 
indeed representative, the guidelines suggested using the method of proportional 
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 BMA 004-010-00805: 1-3. In a letter dated December 31 1954, the City Economics and Finance 
Committee (财经委员会) agreed with the Beijing Statistics Bureau’s suggestions and began preparations 
for setting set up a Resident’s Family Livelihood Account居民家计帐. 
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 BMA 004-010-00805: 4-9, “关于建立居民家计账的初步意见;” the rest of the discussion on the 
survey draws from this document. 
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 The following definitions were used: 
Workers: People at various Agencies and Organizations; Cultural & Public Health Organizations; State-
owned enterprises; and at Private Enterprises.  
Independent workers: Individual Handicrafts Makers; Cycle-rickshaw drivers; Laborers; and Mental 
Workers [white collar]. 
Private Businesses: Shopkeepers; Peddlers; and other relatively stable industries or those that had already 
been flagged as possessing characteristics of state capitalism. 
Agricultural Households: Distinguished by whether they were members of a cooperative or not, and by 
crop grown (land, cotton, vegetables, etc.). 





sampling. In other words, urban and rural residents were separated into various classes 
based on certain characteristics and on income. Once this was done, the relative weight of 
each class in the total population was used to establish the numbers from each class 
within the sample of typical households in the survey. In concrete terms, this meant the 
250 households to be surveyed were divided into four groups: a little over 170 were 
classified as workers (Group 1), a little over twenty as independent workers  (Group 2), 
twenty-five as private businesses (Group 3), and another twenty-five as agricultural 
(Group 4).  
A general lack of experience with such survey work led to a cautious, staggered 
implementation scheme. By January 1 1955 all preparations had to have been completed 
for surveying Group 1; the remaining three groups would wait till April 1.
415
 Furthermore, 
different methods were recommended for surveying urban and rural households: urban 
families would fill the form with the help of a surveyor, whereas rural families would be 
interviewed and the surveyor would himself or herself fill in the form.
416
 In order to 
preserve labor capacity 节省力量, typical households belonging to Group 1 were selected 
based on regional distributions; for the remaining three groups, typical households were 
selected at the level of the administrative area. For rural surveys, a surveyor was 
invariably sent to the household to conduct the survey. The survey was tasked with 
collecting data across four parameters: family population and property; sources and 
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 If this was felt to be too onerous, then Group 4 could be delayed till July 1.   
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 The problem of survey design and the need for trained interviewers is a fairly universal problem. D.K. 
Lieu, writing in 1948 had drawn attention to this problem and the possible solutions that had been 





categories of monetary and in-kind income; expenditures (both commodity purchasing 
power and non-commodity expenses); and lastly, daily cash savings. 
Given its wide ambit, the survey also required additional coordination across 
various government bureaus, vertically and horizontally. Ten bureaus were identified and 
asked to send personnel to form a central team and a survey team. The central team’s job 
was to guide the survey team. It was also supposed to periodically call meetings to 
discuss problems, and to coordinate work across bureaus, get help in selecting typical 
households, and in propagandizing the survey. The total combined strength of both teams 
was 58 persons, with their composition outlined in Table 2 below:  
 
Preparatory work for the survey had to be completed by December 1954 and involved the 
preparation of account books, making announcements and spreading information about 
the survey, selecting typical households, training surveyors, and so on. Twenty million 
yuan 元 were allocated for the survey, and included a special outlay for rewarding 
households being surveyed. The instructions noted that based on experience in other 
cities, such awards were necessary for the success of the survey.
417
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 The 20 million was further divided into the following categories: 
Cost of account books:  Each book estimate at: 3,000 元; Total 3,000 books;  
Total cost: 9 million 元 (900 万元) 
Table 3
City Bureau/Unit Central Survey
Planning Committee 1 1
Stats Bureau 1 1
Commerce Bureau 1 12
People’s Bank (Beijing branch) 1 14
Cooperatives 1 12
Grain Bureau 1 3
Labor Bureau 1 2
Federation of Trade Unions 1 1







By the mid-1950s, collection of statistical data had expanded to include heretofore 
neglected subjects and also begun to employ methods that required the development of 
capacity and expertise in new areas such as systematized survey sampling. Ensuring the 
quality of this data proved to be just as daunting a task as the actual collection itself. At 
each annual statistical meeting, reports on measuring quality were shared and discussed, 
but the SSB also intermittently approached provincial bureaus in order to obtain a more 
real-time sense of the problems of organization and administration in statistical work.
418
 
For instance, a telegram from the Northern Region Statistics Bureau (华北统计局) sent 
to the statistics bureaus of Hebei, Shanxi, Suiyuan 绥远, Beijing, and Tianjin in June 1953 
sought responses to the following three questions: 
1. What kind of data did the bureaus provide to local leaders? How was this data 
supplied? (Report not just successful experience but also point out problems and 
their possible solutions). 
 
2. What other data do local leaders ask for? What is it [currently] possible to supply? 
 
3. Among data currently being supplied, what kinds are regular/periodic and what 
kinds are of a temporary 临时 nature?419 
 
As a result of numerous such inquiries and the debate and discussion they generated, we 
can classify problems of quality into three inter-related categories:   
                                                                                                                                                              
Cost of awards/meetings: Per HH/per year: 30,000 元 (三万元); Total HHs: 250 
   Total cost: 7.5 million 元 (七五 0 万元) 
Other office expenses:  Included preparatory work: 3.5 million 元 (三五 0 万元) 
See: BMA 004-010-00805: 4-9.  
 
418
 This was in addition to the reports they received during the annual National Meetings on Statistical 
Work, of where there were a total of six: the first in July 1951 and the last in September 1957. 
 
419
 See: BMA 002-020-00670: 32. Another telegram asked for provincial and city bureaus to report 
problems and their experiences in cleaning up false (illegal) reports. See BMA 002-020-00670: 30. In 
similar fashion, a Provision/Regulation 规定 called for the coordination of planning and statistical work. 





1. Over-production/Duplication/Chaotic reporting 滥发报表 
2. Reconciling statistical and accounting data 统计、会计不一致 
3. Delays  
 
Overproduction/Duplication/Chaotic Reporting 
Overproduction and duplication of forms, which were prepared to meet the needs of 
various claimants, was a key difficulty faced across all levels of the statistical 
administration. A survey of a Glassworks and a Machine Factory carried out in 1957 by 
the Nanjing Statistics Bureau offers an illustration of this range and the duplication of 
forms and data that resulted. Table 3 shows the results of the survey.
420
  
Table 3. Excess Forms at Two 
Nanjing Factories               
  
  
Nanjing Glassworks First Machine Factory   
  
  
 Forms  Proportion 
% of 
total  Forms  Proportion 
% of 
total   
  Total   351 - 100% 242 - 100%   
  
Used within 
the Industry   192 100 55% 107 100 44%   
    
Used at the 
factory 
level 78 40.6 22% 47 43.9 19%   
  
For outside 
submission   159 100 45% 135 100 56%   
    Planning  34 21.4 10% 32 23.7 13%   
    
Financial 
Accounts 50 31.4 14% 24 17.8 10%   
    Statistics  66 41.6 19% 63 46.6 26%   
    
Technical 
Accounts 9 5.6 3% 16 11.9 7%   
                    
 
At both the Nanjing Glassworks and at the First Machine Factory, not only were too 
many reports generated, but they were also generated for several different 
destinations/clients—the statistics bureau was only one among many destinations. In each 
factory, a sizable number of forms, roughly half (192 out of 351, or 55%, for the 
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Glassworks; 107 out of 242, or 44%, for the Machine Factory) were produced for internal 
use. Among these, a further distinction was drawn between those used at the factory/shop 
level and those used at the industry/unit 单位 level. The remainder was produced for 
outside submission. Among them, those sent to the statistics’ offices accounted for 41.6% 
and 46.6% of the total respectively. The corresponding shares out of the total forms for 
the statistics bureau thus were 19% (66 out of 351) and 26% (63 out of 242). The share of 
forms actually issued by the SSB in Beijing accounted for an even smaller number: 12% 
and 14% respectively.
 421
 As a result, the survey noted, the bulk of the requests 
constituted a duplication of data.
422
 On the basis of such surveys, provincial bureaus 
requested that the center clarify and standardize only those reports it needed reporting up 
and not try and standardize all reports. The other tables could then be based on local 
requirements without having to conform to a national standard. 
 Attempts at simplification, touched upon in the previous section on collection, 
were also often ineffective. One 1957 survey of three bureaus—Education, Transport, 
and Public Health—in Jiangxi observed that two out of the three had failed to simplify 
and had on the contrary increased their output of forms. In another survey, it was found 
that twenty-two offices and organs spread across eight industrial enterprises produced 
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 More numerical and textual examples in: Si Gengsheng 司更生. “Fanlan chengzai de diaocha tongji 
biao 泛滥成灾的调查统计表 (Swamped by Statistical Tables).” RMRB, September 12 1953, 3.  
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 That the SSB was particularly mindful of this duplication of data is evident from the interview of a 
statistical worker from a county-level Industrial and Mining Bureau who Li Choh-Ming interviewed in 
August 1961. Sometimes such duplicate data was based on genuine need. At other times, Li reported Wang 
commenting “that some agencies liked to obtain all types of information regardless of whether the 
information would be of use to them or not.” Li also noted in his report that “Without prior permission 
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Choh-Ming. ““Statistics and Planning at the Hsien Level in Communist China.” The China Quarterly, No. 
9 (Jan. – Mar., 1962b): 112-123. (quoted text is from p. 119). Li also described a system of introductory 





477 types of forms and 25,771 indicators for outside submission. Many of these forms 
were extremely complicated 繁杂 and some were also duplications of each other.423 
Made repeatedly clear through such surveys was the point that what was of relevance to 
local agencies was not necessarily of relevance to the center.
424
 
The picture on the ground thus looked quite different from that envisioned by the 
SSB in Beijing.  Every administrative level complained of a flood of papers and numbers, 
and little capacity to make any sense of them. Excess issuing 滥发 and chaotic issuing 乱
发 were the terms frequently used to describe such a state of affairs. The SSB tried to 
tackle this problem in September 1953 by going public, as it were. Prior to that, 
discussions about excess issuing and duplication had circulated internally via memos, 
telegrams, and reports. But on September 7 the People’s Daily published two directives 
that addressed the issue head-on.
425
 The first of these, “Instructions regarding the 
cleaning-up of existing statistical survey forms and [concerning] the cessation of their 
reckless issuing,” was issued by the State Administrative Council (SAC) and carried the 
authorial imprimatur of Zhou Enlai himself. The second was an SSB document that had 
been vetted by the SAC, titled “Temporary Methods to formulate and approve statistical 
forms.”
426
 In addition, the People’s Daily also published an editorial on September 7 
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426






1953 titled “Wipe out chaotic phenomena from statistical survey work.”
427
 These three 
documents together served as a rallying cry for reducing duplication and mitigating chaos. 
As a Beijing Statistics Bureau notice 通知 from a couple of weeks later declared:   
These three documents are extremely important for current statistical work, 
[and it is] hoped that statistical bureaus and offices at all levels will 
organize study sessions for all statistical cadre, [so that the instructions] 




In this manner, solutions continued to be sought so that a gradual decrease in excess and 
chaotic issuing could effected.
429
 In some instances, such as instructions for statistical 
work for the year 1954, documents even contained claims that the “serious problem of 
excess reports had by and large been conquered.”
430
 And yet, by 1956, hardly any long-
term improvement had occurred. On the contrary, as the SSB expanded data collection 
into new areas, the People’s Daily could only bemoan that their still excessive numbers, 
complicated content, constant emendations, and urgency, all meant that it was finally 
“time to reduce statistical reports.”
431
 Indeed, things were so serious that internal 
memoranda from a year later deemed reports useless as soon as they were produced 随发
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随废.432 Unless action was taken, such an unchecked spread would, it was felt, lead to 
unmitigated disaster 泛滥成灾.433  
The possibility of unmitigated disasters was very much on Xue Muqiao’s mind in 
September 1957 when he observed that the problem of excess issuing remained 
unresolved. Given the demanding nature of exhaustive counting (investigations) 全面调
查化, he insisted that only the SSB should issue demands for periodical reports. If other 
levels of the statistical system needed their own data, they should resort to one-time 
surveys, typical surveys, or annual reports, and not monthly or quarterly reports.
434
 
According to him, three principal reasons were behind the problem: micro-management, 
the twin tendencies of subjectivism 主观主义 and bureaucratism 官僚主义, and not 
enough oversight by the statistical organs. Looking ahead to the second five-year plan he 
exhorted the Planning Bureau, the Finance Bureau, and the Statistics Bureau to join 




Reconciling Data 核对、整理 
A second major problem was the presence of wildly disparate numbers for putatively the 
same observation or activity. The need to have reconciled data was particularly important 
in a fast expanding economy undergoing comprehensive nationalization, since terms and 
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categories were constantly in a state of flux. Wang Sihua had touted standardization as 
one of socialist statistics’ key characteristics, but that ideal too needed to be reconciled 
with the reality on the ground.  
One reason for different numbers can be traced to confusion over what exactly 
was being measured. In 1953, for instance, a Beijing Statistics Bureau bulletin 通报 (sent 
to all industrial units in Beijing, and copied to various central government organs) 
required that all entries for the Annual Report as well as for monthly periodic reports be 
made according to the Catalog of Industrial Products 工业产品目录. This would help 
avoid the problem of leaky reporting 漏报, which was defined as consisting of not 
reporting goods produced for internal consumption or goods that factories considered 
unimportant. Similarly, sometimes there was confusion over units of measurement: 
should one report tons 吨 or bags 袋?436 Even four years later, ensuring that production 
was reported according to the Catalog of Industrial Products remained a challenge.
437
  
But the challenges of standardization also reflected a more deep-rooted and 
systemic problem. In the earlier section on overproduction we have already seen that data 
was collected by numerous agencies.  In order to ensure data was properly reconciled, 
two systems of reporting were used: the single track 单轨制 and the double track 双轨制. 
The former system was used for data in fields where already a high level of 
professionalization existed, such as rail and air transportation, postal services, education, 
and public health. The business offices of these services were expected to directly report 
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statistical data to statistical bureaus at the same level and also to make reports to their 
own higher levels.
438
 In contrast, the dual track system was used for the more important 
and much larger types of data, such as those relating to industrial and agricultural 
production, fixed capital investment, retail sales, and labor and wages. According to this 
system (see chart below) statistical and business data were collected independently; the 
former being reported through the statistical apparatus and the latter through the 
particular ministry concerned. The two sets of data thus produced were then compared to 
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County Business Office 
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County Statistics Bureau 
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Provincial (Self-
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Provincial (Self-
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In practice, however, because of varying conditions of work and administration, 
the procedures of data collection were rarely standardized. The natural result was 
inconsistent data. In matter of fact, in most cases a third source of data also existed: the 
finance bureau also collected accounting data.
440
 But instead of solving the problem, this 
merely exacerbated inconsistencies across three sets of numbers. In other words, 
inconsistencies across statistics, accounting, and business reporting constantly brought 
into question the quality and reliability of all data being reported. The archives abound 
with bulletins, regulations, suggestions, and instructions that all attempt to grapple with 
this problem.
441
 Many of these discussions stressed the generally superior reliability of 
statistical data, observing that accounting or business reporting was relatively vague 
because it was prone to variations on account of local conditions and local practices.
442
 
Yet others held the exact opposite view, asking not just for the abolishment of the dual 
track system but also for the removal of local level statistical units and a sole reliance on 
business/industry reports.
443
 The problem was severe enough that on June 20 1956 the 
SSB and the Ministry of Finance jointly released “Common Responses to questions about 
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inconsistencies in accounting and statistics,” which it was hoped would provide 





Excess issuing, duplication, and the need to reconcile data all also contributed to another 
chronic problem: delays. A case in point is the 1954 Agricultural Production Annual 
Report. In order for the national version of this report to have been prepared in a timely 
manner, provincial reports, themselves compiled on the basis of periodical reports, should 
have been received by the end of January. But as late as 22February, only sixteen out of 
twenty-nine provinces and cities had submitted their reports.
445
 In similar fashion a 1955 
notice from Xue Muqiao requested that all provincial and city level bureaus undertake 
reconciling work in a timely manner, observing that only a handful of provinces had 
actually begun such work, with most others lagging behind.
446
  
Unclear procedures and confused systems of measurement also contributed to 
delays. For example, when reporting Commercial Statistics, the SSB regulations called 
for all forms to be filed thirty days after the end of the quarter. But the Commerce 
Bureau’s regulations called for the reporting to be done within twenty-six days. And the 
Finance Bureau, in turn, demanded them within forty-five days (though in reality it took 
sixty days).
447
 Such multiple deadlines did little to ensure the timeliness for any of the 
bureaus concerned.  
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Much as in collection, the agricultural sector again offered the greatest challenge 
for the reconciliation of data. We have already noted agriculture’s secondary position 
within the economy for much of the 1950s. In 1953 Mao had observed: 
In the present transition period we cannot introduce unified and planned 
production in agriculture, except on the state farms, and interfere too much 
with the peasants. We can only guide agricultural production and co-
ordinate it with industrial production by our pricing policy and necessary 
and practicable economic and political work so that it can be integrated 
into the national economic plan.
448
   
 
It was as a result of such views, which acknowledged that agricultural sector could not be 
administered with the same degree of control as other parts of the economy, that some 
proposed making the county level planning and statistics office the main unit for 
reporting agricultural data. The reason behind such a suggestion lay in recognizing that it 
was the county level at which local conditions and requirements became particular 
enough to warrant local control.
449
 An even more drastic scheme suggested transferring 
the responsibility of agricultural statistical work to the Agriculture Bureau.
450
 But this 
was tempered by other less radical points of view, which recommended that the SSB and 
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By 1957, different solutions were offered for each of the different levels of government: 
provincial, city, county, and village. At the Province Level it was felt that neither a 
system that granted too much centralized control to the province nor one which let 
authority devolve entirely down to the various departments was appropriate.
452
 The 
problem at the provincial levels included limited manpower and an unfamiliarity with the 
work of the various departments, which resulted in much ado for very little result 忙乱尽
缓 and could not help mitigate the chaotic issuing of reports 乱发报表. If, on the other 
hand, authority to issue and manage reports was distributed to individual departments, 
then on account of their numbers and variety, a chaotic situation 混乱现象 was also 
unavoidable. The solution, as proposed by the Henan Statistics Bureau, was for the SSB 




 At the City and Special 专 Administrative level, it was felt that forms should only 
be issued after all city-level statistical departments had come to an agreement. This meant 
granting significant autonomy to city level statistics bureaus. The logic to doing this lay 
in the fact that many city level governments were close to and familiar with local 
conditions and hence had a better sense of the ground realities. Therefore, if their 
expertise and experience was not brought into play, chaotic issuing 乱发报表 of reports 
could easily result. At the same time, if certain departments had a strong foundation in 
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statistical work, then they could be permitted to issue reports themselves, as long as 
periodic checks were still performed.
454
  
 At the County Level, one-time reports/surveys usually outnumbered periodic 
reports. Since county offices were frequently far from the provincial office, they 
exercised greater freedom and could respond more freely to short-term requirements for 
data, issuing new forms per need 随用随发.  This reality, and the fact that time was 
always in short supply, meant that most forms reported from the county level up to the 
province level could not be approved. One solution proposed was to give the authority to 
approve one-time survey results to the county office, and require that only periodic 
reports be submitted for approval to the provincial office. As for the village level, most 
provinces felt that statistical work at this level was poorly administered. Villages were 
too many and tables and reports were generated in an erratic fashion. Frequently, most 
reports were useless the moment they were produced 随发随废. The majority did not 
have a shelf life of more than one day and rarely made it to the County Level for approval. 
Accordingly, even as late as 1957, the pressing need was to better oversee village level 
statistical work by introducing a simplified periodical reporting system and do away with 
the chaotic collection and issuing of reports.
 455
 
 By the mid-1950s, proposal such as these had led Xue Muqiao to promote the 
general policy of centralized leadership but dispersed management 统一领导，分级管理. 
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In his report at the Sixth Annual Meeting of Statistical Work in Beijing in September 
1957, Xue Muqiao had explained that the people’s economy was extremely complicated, 
and the result of the intertwining of a variety of intricate factors. It was the task of 
statistics and the statistician to explain and simplify this extremely complicated world by 
providing sound research and analysis of statistical data. Research, thus, was the third 
major service that statistics had to perform. The most important element of such research 
and analysis was the production of statistical indicators. As Xue noted:  
When conducting investigations 调查, in order to make calculations easier 
we must simplify complicated phenomena by converting them into 




The calculation of indicators lay at the heart of most of kinds of analysis, ranging from 
studies of comprehensively balancing various sectors of the economy, to calculating the 
relations between different factors , to increasing savings and measuring the successful 
implementation of plans.
457
 In general, though, such work had been neglected because the 
primary emphasis had been on establishing the basic framework for collecting and 
collating data.
458
 As the Anhui Statistics Bureau observed in 1957: 
Over the past few years, our work in this area [analysis] is extremely 
inadequate. Our statistics bureau has done a much better job than other 
bureaus of mastering [the collection of] abundant data, but we have not 
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One reason for this was that given the overwhelmingly large numbers and types of forms 
and tables, most bureaus had no time for analysis.
460
 
 Until about 1955, most research and analysis was left to the SSB in Beijing, to 
whom provincial and lower level bureaus supplied Annual Reports. The SSB, in turn, 
collated and analyzed the data to produce annual bulletins 公报 that summarized 
economic growth and progress in plan implementation. These bulletins sought to achieve 
as comprehensive a picture of the economy as possible and included information in 
absolute and relative terms about changes in industry, agriculture, livestock, 
infrastructure, transportation, communication, investment, commerce and trade, prices, 
labor, education, publications, and public health.
461
  
 By the mid-1950s two additional developments had taken place that expanded the 
capacity to carry out research and analysis. The first of these was the establishment of a 
small scale computing facility at SSB headquarters. This foray into mechanized counting 
permitted the SSB to collectively summarize data from annual reports and censuses.
462
 
By 1957, Xue Muqiao was able to encourage those provinces where statistical work was 
particularly onerous to also begin considering the gradual mechanization of their 
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 The mid-1950s also witnessed the creation of dedicated research 
sections within provincial and city level bureaus. I have already discussed the household 
livelihood survey, something which these new research sections became responsible for. 
Now let us look at another example of the type of research that began to done by more 
local level units.  
In 1956, the Beijing Statistics Bureau began producing and circulating statistical 
analysis briefings 統計分析簡報.464 Each issue was a few pages long and offered basic 
analysis of recent trends for a particular sector of the economy. In all, these briefings 
were organized under eight categories: summary, capital construction, commerce, 
industry, agriculture, communications (including transportation), [consumer] goods, and 
labor. Topics ranged from tracking agricultural production and urban incomes, forecasts 
of plan completion in various bureaus during the first quarter of 1956, construction work 
completed during the first half of 1956, the arrival of capital construction equipment for 
local industries during the first half of 1956, the result of attempts to reduce costs, the 
ahead-of-time attainment of targets for the sale of retail goods, etc. On the whole, the 
analysis drew upon actual figures and simple indicators of growth, along the lines of what 
was discussed in Part I Chapter III.  
Each briefing was sent to two sets of recipients. The primary recipients included 
various city level leaders and related offices, such as the city committee and its general 
office, and the city planning commission. The reports were also sent to the director of the 
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SSB and to the various relevant departments at the SSB. So, for example, the industry 
and capital construction briefings were sent to the industrial statistic department , the 
agriculture briefing was sent to the agriculture statistics department, and the commerce 
briefing was sent to the department of trade statistics. The second set of recipients 
consisted of those that the briefings were copied to. Here we see a far wider set of 
agencies, including various ministry level bureaus. Four among them received copies of 
every kind of briefing, regardless of the category; they were the Bureau of Finance, the 
Bureau of Taxation, the Beijing branch of the People’s Bank, and the Supervision Bureau.  
By the mid-1950s, there was thus a fairly robust network of agencies sharing interim 




Supplying data was the last of the four principal duties that SSB and the statistical 
apparatus were tasked with. While the annual bulletins 公报 noted in the previous section 
were the most visible examples of the SSB’s work, they were not what comprised the 
bulk of the data that Xue Muqiao had in mind when he put forward his four-part 
categorization of SSB activities. Indeed, the bulk of the data and research that the SSB 
supplied was intended not for the public but only for designated governmental agencies 
and the leadership at various levels. Many of the reports and briefings cited in this 




标) often carried the stamp “internal issue; not for publication” 内部发行、不得对外发
表.465  
It was the supply of this kind of data, which was spoken of as absolutely critical 
for the planning process that was the final and most important output of the statistical 
system. And yet, according to Xue Muqiao its fundamental importance was ignored in 
favor of more frivolous pursuits. In 1957 he noted that “in the past there were some 
comrades who underestimated the glorious task of supplying data. [Instead] they 
particularly emphasized the ‘supervisory role’ and ‘vertical integration’ of statistics.” 
Xue explained that these cadres went to unreasonable lengths to focus only on the 
supervisory role of statistics. For Xue this was a gross error, especially when overall 
statistical capacity still remained rudimentary, when the SSB still struggled to produce 
reliable data in a timely fashion.
466
   
In the previous three sections we have already seen some of the problems that 
plagued the accurate and timely supply of data. As we have seen, data was supplied at 
various levels: frequently between bureaus, to various central agencies, and eventually 
reported up 上报 to the SSB headquarters in Beijing.467 But the question of who used 
what kind of data remained: the center often only wanted annual data, but at provincial 
and local level, monthly and quarterly data were usually more important.
468
 The result 
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was to stimulate duplication and chaotic issuing and the competing deadlines also 





In the end, for all the valorization of an extensive, complete, and objective statistical 
system, Xue Muqiao admitted that in certain important situations, the timeliness of the 
data outranked their accuracy. 
Even though statistical data should possess a high degree of accuracy, it is 
not necessary that all data must be highly accurate [all the time]. In order 
for the leading authorities 领导机关 to understand the situation, research 
questions, and decide on policies, they frequently needed reference data on 
a timelier basis. Such data need not possess a high degree of accuracy or 




Implicit in this statement was the admission that in most cases data produced was neither 
timely nor accurate. The archival materials that comprise the principal source base for 
this chapter suggest why such a bleak picture of statistical work during the 1950s is 
justified. While they demonstrate a tremendous degree of engagement and 
professionalization, they also clearly highlight how much a struggle it was to make 
manifest an idealized system centered on exhaustive enumeration via a periodical report 
system.   
This was not, however, the way statistical work was presented in more public 
materials. To promote the work they were doing and to keep morale high, the SSB 
published a whole range of books and pamphlets that sought to share positive experiences. 
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 The statement was made during his main address at the sixth annual meeting of statistical work in 





Usually composed of essays written by cadre at different local, regional, and provincial 
statistical offices, these works had titles such as “Compilation of Experiences of 
Grassroots Agricultural Statistics Work,” “Our Country’s Experience in Industrial 
Statistics Work,” and “How To Do Analysis of Industrial Statistics.”
471
 Even though such 
works extolled the successful experience of selected cadre and statistical offices, read 
against the grain they only serve to further sharpen the sense we already have of a system 
bogged down by the weight of its own expectations. At the same time, they also highlight 
the fact that statistical activity was as much about capacity building as it was about 
claiming legitimacy; that is, creating the appearance of capacity and ensuring that the 
Communist revolution was seen to be a success. This is precisely what the Annual 
Bulletins cited above sought to achieve. The 1959 publication of Ten Great Years 《伟大
的十年》 was perhaps the ultimate legitimizing weapon in this regard.  
 A critical element of both capacity building and claiming legitimacy was training 
adequate numbers of statistical cadre.
472
 Given the challenges to statistical work 
described here, this was a far from straightforward task. It is to that topic that we shall 
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To “Ardently Love Statistical Work”: State (In) capacity, 




























Comrade Li Ming Dismisses Statistics 
In July 1955, the Tongji gongzuo tongxun (统计工作通讯 Statistical Work Bulletin), the 
principal journal of statistical work in the People’s Republic, published a short letter from 
a youthful statistical worker.
473
 Just twenty years old, Li Ming noted that he had already 
been engaged in statistical work for three years. Prior to beginning work he had received 
a year and a half of statistical training at a Statistics and Accounting Vocational School 
专科学校. When he began work, Li told the editors of the journal, he was full of 
enthusiasm. He hoped to wholeheartedly devote all his abilities to statistical work and 
thereby serve the people. To that end, he spent an additional three months during the 
latter half of 1954 at the Central Fuel Industry Ministry’s Cadre School中央燃料工业部
干部学校, supplementing his training. Such training and experience should have led him 
to achieve success at work. And yet, he lamented that the reality was not so. Quite to the 
contrary, Li Ming discovered that the more he worked the more he lost faith in statistics 
and the less he knew where the future career prospects of statistical workers lay. Having 
already worked for three years, he could not deny that he had a basic grasp of statistical 
work, but was this not merely the addition and subtraction of numbers or the calculation 
of percentages 加加减减，算算百分数? After all, he did not directly participate in 
production work and, as such, was reliant on the information provided by others. Even if 
he visited the factory floor, there was much about the production process he did not know 
or understand. Such ignorance about the production process meant that the blind 
application of statistical methods and tools was not in the least bit useful and rather a 
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waste of time 一无所用, 白费时间. So were born his doubts regarding the usefulness of 
statistical work; doubts so acute that he had reached a point where he was unwilling to do 
any work.  
 Statistics’ perceived worthlessness made unambiguous and his own lack of desire 
powerfully expressed, Li Ming proceeded to note that his frustration was all the greater 
given his youth. The better part of his life lay ahead of him and he still yearned to make a 
practical and real contribution 实际的贡献 to the motherland. Statistical work, clearly, 
did not qualify. And so, he found himself in a dilemma. On the one hand he found 
himself increasingly unwilling to participate in statistical work; on the other, he could not 
but recognize the resources the nation had already devoted to his training in statistics. 
How could he now let the nation down by seeking other work? Caught between the 
Scylla of patriotic desire and the Charybdis of patriotic duty, Li Ming implored the 
editors of the journal to help him find a solution.  
In publishing Li Ming’s letter, a solution is precisely what the editorial team at the 
journal hoped to unearth. In a short preface to the letter, they explained that the kinds of 
doubts and general attitudinal problems that Li Ming wrote about were present in a not 
insignificant number of statistical workers.
474
 Accordingly, they invited readers to 
respond with their reactions and suggestions. So was begun a national debate on 
statistical work. Responses were published over the following several months. The 
discussion was eventually brought to an end in the December issue of the journal. That 
issue included a brief overview of the letters that remained unpublished, as well as an 
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essay summarizing the discussion since July and its lessons, written by Jia Qiyun 贾启云, 
one of the deputy directors of the State Statistics Bureau. The following year, the State 
Statistics Bureau (SSB) compiled what it deemed were the best responses into a small 
booklet for wider dissemination. To those responses they added introductory and 
summary essays that provided additional didactic content regarding the value and 
revolutionary nature of statistical work. For the booklet’s title they appropriated the title 
of Deputy Director Jia’s December article: “Ardently Love our Statistical Work” 热爱我




It is more than likely Li Ming did not exist. He was probably a composite 
character created to embody the real concerns and problems confronting Chinese 
planners and statisticians.
475
 Indeed, the putative Li Ming and the campaign his letter 
instigated lay bare a crucial anxiety through much of the early PRC—the creation and 
maintenance of the ideal (statistical) worker. Several forces, each pulling in a different 
direction, made this an especially challenging task. While some of these forces were a 
part of the general problem of bureaucratization following revolution, and have been 
addressed in earlier scholarship
476
, many others were specific to the nature of statistical 
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work, and to statistics’ role in the economy and what it ‘produced.’ It is the notable lack 
of reverence for the power and positivism of numbers in Li Ming that sets up the basic 
contradiction. In Part I we saw that the early 50s were a time when a new theoretical and 
methodological paradigm for statistics and statistical work was established in the PRC. 
But what was one to do when the common worker refused to even acknowledge the 
transformative power and potential of statistics, far less any putative resolutions to 
definitional and methodological distinctions? Indeed, on the ground, the concerns were 
far more basic: the creation of a professional cadre and attendant infrastructure, ensuring 
adequate number of such cadre, and maintaining their morale; all while keeping in mind 
the central and fundamental role that statistics and statistical workers were supposed to 
play in the economy. It is with almost metonymic, and perhaps entirely predictable, 
precision that Li Ming’s mini-biography and complaints mirror these concerns. 
 This chapter, then, is about the state’s attempts to build statistical capacity. 
Alternatively, it is about how the state dealt with incapacity. My thinking about capacity 
draws upon Michael Mann’s formulation of infrastructural power. In his seminal 1984 
essay he characterized infrastructural power, in contra-distinction to despotic power, as 
“the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically 
political decisions throughout the realm.”
477
 Statistics is a powerful example of 
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infrastructural power. Such power, Mann argued, was a characteristic of modern 
industrial societies. Accordingly, in this chapter I investigate how the PRC state went 
about establishing infrastructural power in the realm of statistics, something that the 
Republican state arguably lacked, and suffered on account of. In a much more recent 
working paper Francis Fukuyama, building on Mann’s ideas, has stressed the need to 
better understand such capacity as part of a larger definition of governance, regardless of 
the nature of the government in power.
478
 According to him, one key marker of this 
capacity is the level of education and professionalization among government officials.
479
 
Thus, if the previous chapter focused on the nature of statistical work, this chapter shifts 
the spotlight to the creation and maintenance of a cadre capable of doing that work. Our 
opening story, the ensuing national debate in the TJGZTX, and the eventual publication of 
RWTG, all hint at how massively challenging this task was. 
A variety of stratagems—training, supplementary training, self-study, motivation, 
and reward—were employed to tackle these challenges. They began with training in 
preparation for employment and, in theory, were continually mobilized throughout one’s 
career. The chapter traces this training and motivation work, using Li Ming as a foil 
wherever possible. Beginning with his claims of youthfulness and education, the chapter 
first explores the kinds of statistical training offered by the state. For a select few, such 
training may have been available at the university level, but the vast majority was trained 
in technical schools through training courses 训练班. But even this was inadequate and 
                                                     
478
 Francis Fukuyama. “What is Governance?” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 314, 
January 2013, 3. In his introduction, Fukuyama notes about the field of political science and policy studies: 
“everyone is interested in studying political institutions that limit or check power—democratic 
accountability and rule of law—but very few people pay attention to the institution that accumulates and 
uses power, the state.”  
 
479




by the middle of the decade the SSB observed that it was unable to train enough 
statisticians through such means. A solution was suggested via self-study while on-the-
job 在职自学. Self-study, in turn, casts a firm and unwavering spotlight on morale and its 
maintenance. The final third of the chapter is devoted to discussing this issue. Starting 
with an exploration of the role of the TJGZTX, which straddled the line between training 
and motivation, serving as a forum for both activities, I proceed to a sustained discussion 
of the RWTG, dwelling on its production and its content. I conclude by observing that if 
Li Ming had been at the heart of the campaign, serving as a model subject in need of 
reformation, then by 1956 other more locally organized campaigns began to promote 
local activist model statistical workers as subjects worthy of emulation. 
 
Red and Expert: The Need for Revolutionary Professionals  
The Communists had won the Civil War on the back of a large-scale peasant revolution. 
Their experience in governance prior to 1949 had been restricted to small pockets of 
territory and tiny populations in Jiangxi and the Shan-Gan-Ning border regions.
480
 The 
transition to greater political control, starting in 1948 in the Northeast and spreading 
elsewhere over time, was hamstrung by a severe shortage of trained and educated 
personnel.
481
 Such personnel were needed to effectively man the various and expanding 
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organs of the state and help govern the newly established republic. Given that the 
revolution and civil war era “conception of the cadre as a combat leader was not ideally 
suited to the tasks of civil administration that faced the Chinese Communists after 1949,” 
new cadres were needed.
482
 Recruits were, for the most part, drawn from three strata of 
society. 
First, the “positivists” who gushed up from the movements; most of these 
were working class-people with more “virtue” than “ability”; we know 
that many workers were rapidly promoted to supervisory positions in 
factories, but probably only a few of them were given complex 
administrative positions. Second, the students, undoubtedly a much more 
promising source of recruitment; most of them had been sympathetic to 
the Communists, even though they were usually not involved in the illegal 
Party organizations of the cities; these were the “new intellectuals.” Third, 
the “old intelligentsia”: the new regime preferred young to old 





Accordingly, the number of civilian cadres increased fourfold by 1953: from 720,000 in 
1949, to 2,750,000 in September 1952, to 3,310,000 the following year.
484
  
 While discussions linking “virtue” 德 and “ability” 才 have a long history in 
Chinese political and moral philosophy, they appear to have been first deployed in a 
communist revolutionary context by Mao in speech he made in 1938.
485
 In its later 
expression as Red and Expert, the dichotomy and relative dominance of one over the 
other at any given point in time has been an influential heuristic device for understanding 
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events and policies in China since the 1950s.
486
 But we would do well to remember that 
the ideal cadre was to be Red and Expert in equal measure.
487
 He was to have the 
technical and organizational skills to promote the work done in his unit, while at the same 
time also be brimming with ideological purity and revolutionary fervor so that any 
counter-revolutionary elements could not regain a foothold. Mao himself would note 
twenty years after his 1938 speech: “there is no doubt that politics and economy, and 
politics and technology should be united. It has been so in the past and will be so forever. 
This is what red and expert mean.”
488
 The Red Expert thus drew his authority both from 
his expertise and from his ideological correctness. To the extent that experience was 
important, it was the cadre’s personal experience garnered in the present. The only 
significant past experience of value in this formulation was the advanced experience of 
the Soviet Union. In this way, the Republican era dichotomy between experience and 
expertise as two clashing sources of authority was neatly side-stepped.
489
 The PRC aimed 
to produce a new kind of cadre (professional).
490
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 This distinction has been illustrated particularly well in the field of medicine, where the experience of 
traditional Chinese medicine was pitted against the expertise of modern medical science, setting up two 
contrasting sources of authority. See: Daniel Asen 2012. “Dead Bodies and Forensic Science: Cultures of 
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Students and young people more generally were quickly identified as the target 
group for achieving the ideal balance of Red and Expert. The “positivists,” because they 
were often too old to train, and the “old intelligentsia,” who were needed in the 
immediate short-term but would always be politically and ideologically suspect, were 
both deemed less suitable. Accordingly, the training and ideological indoctrination of the 
young was carried out at all possible levels, keeping both expediency and long term goals 
in mind.
491
 On a national scale, “of the 2,750,000 cadres in China in mid-1952, 66,000 
[2.4%] had graduated from regular universities, 100,000 [3.6%] had been processed at 
“people’s revolutionary universities,” but over 1,100,000 [40%] had been trained in 
rotating training courses.”
492
  Furthermore, this ideal of Red and Expert was applied not 
just to cadres who were, after all, defined by their leadership roles and by specific 




University Education and Training: The Case of Renmin University 
Discussions concerning the setting up educational institutions to train cadre picked up 
pace after the official declaration of the People’s Republic in October of 1949.
494
 Surveys 
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by visiting Soviet advisors had already investigated the nature and content of education at 
various institutions across the country. Eventually, it was decided that most major pre-
existing universities would not disturbed.
495
 Instead, a new university would be 
established that would serve as a national model. Dubbed the People’s University 人民大
学 (Renmin Daxue), its principal focus was to train students in “economic-managerial 
specialties that were the regime’s highest priorities in 1949-1950.”
496
 The University was 
inaugurated on 3 October 1950.  
 In plans drawn up in November and December of 1949 it had been proposed that 
the University would offer two types of courses. The Regular-Course 本科 would involve 
two to four years of study in one of eight departments: Economics, Economic Planning, 
Finance-Credit, Trade, Cooperatives, Factory Management, Law, and Diplomacy. Short-
term training classes 训练班, envisaged as six-month courses offered by the same 
departments, emphasized economic management and state administration with the idea of 
producing trained cadre who could be put to work straightaway. In the December plan, 
the name of these short courses was changed from “training class” 训练班 to “specialized 
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advanced classes” 专修班.497 As for who would attend these classes, it was decided that 
“students of the “young intellectual” category should be eighteen to thirty years old and 
graduates of senior middle schools or “young intellectual” CCP cadres who had 
graduated from junior middle school or the equivalent and had at least three years of 
experience in CCP revolutionary work or specialized organs. These students would be 
enrolled in the Regular-Course Division.” In contrast, the Short-Courses would enroll 
cadre with education equivalent to lower middle-school, who had more than three years’ 
experience working in the “liberated area” and were between twenty and forty-five years 
in age, as well as retrained, old intellectuals.
498
  
 While not part of the November list of disciplines, Statistics was added by the 
time of the revised December plan.
499
 At this early stage, Statistics was conceived as 
being offered only in a short-term capacity and the November 1949 plan called for 300 
students out of a total planned enrollment of 3,800 short term students. Of the planned 
2,700 regular course seats, not a single one was in statistics. In the December plan, which 
involved a general downsizing, the corresponding numbers were 200 out of 3,000 short 
term students; and zero out of 1,400 regular-course students.
500
 Dedicated teachers too 
were downsized, from five out of 185 in the November plan to two out of fifty in the 
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 It was from such humble origins that Renmin University became the 
center of research and training in statistics over the course of ensuing the decade. 
By June 1952, when a formal department of Statistics was established, the 
University had become the central node for theoretical and pedagogical research in 
statistical training.
502
 As Table 1 shows, over the rest of the decade, at least 2,200 
students received some form of training in statistics at the University.
503
 
Table 1. Renmin University Statistics 
Graduates/Enrollees504         
    1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Total 
             
专修生 
Short-term 
Students  71 145 493 172 136 0 135 99 80 51 1382 
             
研究生
Research 
Students  0 13 5 0 25 31 0 2 0 0 76 
             
本科生 
Regular 
Students  0 0 23 109 0 192 99 104 82 135 744 
                          
Total  71 158 521 281 161 223 234 205 162 186 2202 
Source:               
 
It is unclear whether the targets set in November and December 1949 for the first batch of 
students were actually met. Data from the Alumni Record indicates that only students 
attending ‘advanced specialized classes’ were graduated in the first two years.
505
 The first 
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 The data from the Record may be incomplete and as such the assertions made and conclusions drawn 




class of graduates with the equivalent of an undergraduate degree was produced in 
1953.
506
 This makes sense if, per the plans, regular courses were to last two to four years 
and students had started instruction in 1950. Even so, only twenty-three undergraduates 
were produced that year, less than five percent of the total (521) students enrolled in the 
statistics program. 1953 was also the year with the highest number of graduating students, 
coinciding with the start of the first five year plan (1953-57) and a push towards greater 
planning and statistical work.
507
 After that peak, the number of people trained in any 
given year was in the neighborhood of 200, with the share of undergraduates gradually 
rising to constitute the majority by 1960. The total number of graduate students or 
researchers 研究生 was just seventy-six for the entire period, with the majority 
concentrated around 1955 and 1956. The most significant and suggestive result for our 
purposes here is that even at a place like Renmin University, the focus was on preparing 
statistical workers via short term courses: over the entire decade 63% (1382 out of 2202) 
of all students were trained in advanced specialized classes. 
In addition to Renmin University, other departments and schools were set up at a 
variety of other places during these early years. Table 2 provides a basic chronology of 
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 After 1955 pressure to replace cadres (per Vogel) had reduced (find page citation), and this seems to fit 
with the numbers above, where the number of 专修生 declined after 1955. 
 
508
 The Renmin University School of Statistics’ Alumni Record for 2007 observes that the Renmin 
Department of Statistics was the first to be set up under the aegis of the new economics of the PRC. Right 





Table 2. Establishment of Dedicated Statistical Schools or Departments 
Source: 中华人民共和国统计大事记，1949-2009 (DSJ) 
Date Name of Bureau/Activity Province/ Region 
      
Sometime in 1950 Xiamen University Statistics Department Fujian 
August of 1951 Northeast Planning Statistics Institute  Northeast 
June of 1952 Renmin University Statistics Department Beijing 
November 29 1952 Northeast Finance and Economics Institute Northeast (Changchun?) 
July of 1954 Chongqing School of Statistics Chongqing 
August of 1954 Xi'an School of Statistics Xi'an 
June of 1955 Shanghai School of Statistics Shanghai 
March 27 1958 
Control of the Shanghai, Chongqing, and Changchun Statistical 
Schools transferred to respective provinces 
Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Changchun 
March 27 1958 
Control of the Nanchang and Xi'an Statistical Schools transferred to 
respective provinces Nanchang; Xi'an 
 
Some of these schools and departments offered Regular Courses, but most of them also 
provided shorter term training. In many instances these were institutions that had existed 
prior to 1949 and had been reorganized and re-designated special schools. Even if we 
assume that these schools trained a similar number of students as Renmin University, we 
would arrive at a total of roughly 20,000 students, at most. Yet, by 1956, claims that there 
existed 200,000 statistical workers had been put forth.
509
 Clearly most of the training that 
occurred was not at major universities but elsewhere. One major training site was the 
vocational school: the 专科学校.  As Li Fuchun had explained in 1951: 
[We] cannot train advanced statisticians only at the university level; rather, 
under specific requirements and within the overall plan for education, 







Li Ming did not have the good fortune to be trained at Renmin University or at any of the 
dedicated schools of statistics established in the early 1950s that are identified in Table 2. 
In his letter, he denies us the name of his training center, noting only that it was a 
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vocational/technical school. In this experience he was not alone. Expediency and 
overwhelming demand meant that most of the tens of thousands of statistical workers, a 
significant portion of the 1955 claim of 200,000, were trained in vocational or technical 
schools. Such schools, often established anew or created by the takeover of pre-existing 
institutions, dotted the entire country and came to supply an entire generation of state 
employees, including, of course, statistical workers. This section uses the example of the 
Beijing Finance and Economics School to provide a sense of what such schooling may 
have been like.  
 The Beijing Finance and Economics School 北京财经学校 (BFES) was 
established on 31
st
 March 1951. In its pre-liberation avatar it had been the Beijing 
Business and Vocational High School 高级商业职业学校, which had been founded in 
1929.
511
 Originally located in Wuying Hutong, by the time of its conversion to the BFES, 
the school had moved to a much more spacious location and could accommodate 900 
students in eighteen classrooms and 180 dorm rooms. Facilities also included a library 
and rooms for various other activities. By the end of that year, when a short report on the 
school’s activities was drafted, total enrollment at the school stood at 575 students 
divided across Regular and Intensive classes. During those initial months, the school also 
graduated 179 students in the Regular Class stream, as well as ninety-eight students 
through short-term courses in accounting and statistics.
512
    
 Four courses of study were offered by the BFES during these initial years: 
Regular Classes, Intensive classes, and two types of short-term classes. Each course of 
                                                     
511
 BMA 004-010-00008: 7-9.  
 
512





study was designed with a different target audience in mind, and was set up to meet 
different goals. Table 3 summarizes these differences. 
Table 3. BFES-Early characteristics (1951-1952)
513
 
    Regular Classes   Intensive Classes   
Short-term: 
Accounting & Tax    
Short-term: 
Statistics 
                 
Educational 
Qualifications   
Middle-school 
equivalent   High-school equivalent   
Middle-school 
equivalent   
Middle-school 
equivalent  




work   Correct thought, healthy         
Age   15-20   
18-28 unemployed 
intellectuals   
20-40; mostly 
unemployed 




Course of Study   




economics   
3 months; per pressing 
needs, receive basic 
scientific and econ./fin. 
skills    
3 months; per 
pressing 
requirements, 
specialized training in 
relevant skills   




training in relevant 
skills 
No. of classes   16   1   1   1 
No. of students   543   32   49   49 
After graduation   
become middle 
level cadre   
Participate in city 
government work (likely 
low level?)         
Remarks           
Discontinued after 




The Regular Course was designed as a three-year program for young teenagers with 
roughly the equivalent of a middle-school education. The School offered more than 16 
regular courses (more than the stipulated 12) but could not meet the stipulated student 
teacher ratio of 2.5 to three teachers per course.
514
 Graduates were subsequently assigned 
to work in various bureaus of the city and central government as middle-level cadre. A 
report written in November of that year observed that while they were enthusiastic about 
work and willing to take on responsibility, their skill levels were inferior to the average 
university trained economics graduate .
515
 The content of the Regular Courses was often 
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modified to meet the requirements of relevant city and central government bureaus but, in 
general, three types of majors were offered: Accounting, Statistics, and Factory 
Management. Accounting majors would focus on cost accounting, government 
accounting, banking, and other specialized areas. Instruction in Statistics included 
advanced statistics, industrial statistics, and other related specialized fields. Factory 
management included such courses as Industrial economics and management and labor 
organization. In addition, basic disciplinary classes were part of each major, such as math, 
introductory statistics, and economic geography.
516
  
 In contrast to the Regular Classes, the intensive and short term training classes 
were designed to meet immediate and urgent staff shortages, usually in the city 
government. Such training normally lasted only three months and dealt with the highly 
specific skills required to carry out specific tasks. Students were generally older, and in 
many cases had complicated backgrounds because of their identification as unemployed 
intellectuals.
517
 For these students, political study was deemed especially vital in ensuring 
their loyalty to the revolution. The report lamented, however, that this was not done in an 
organized manner and their subsequent performance at work clearly indicated this. The 
two short-term training classes in Accountancy and Statistics appear not to have been 
permanent course offerings since they were discontinued after July 1951. A total of 
ninety-eight students (forty-nine in each course) were trained this way.  
 While Li Ming’s self-description of his education in statistics does not exactly fit 
any of the forms of training offered by the BFES in its first few years, it was probably 
closer to a truncated version of the three-year program described above. This may have 
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been as much an outcome of differing courses of study drawn up in different parts of the 
country as it was an outcome of expediency, which may have led to a premature work 
assignment. It is likely, however, that the nature of his study itself was a close 
approximation of the situation in Beijing, where, by the end of 1951, sixteen regular 
courses were being offered by the BFES. The standard teaching method employed 
involved the use of the Five-Stage Teaching Method 五段教学方法.518 The five stages 
were: planning the class; checking previously assigned homework; teaching the lesson; 
consolidating (revising?) the lesson; and, finally, assigning homework for the next class. 
Study materials involved a variety of textbooks designed for specific courses. In many 
instances, some of the Renmin University texts discussed in Part I were the principal 
study materials.
519
 Just as significant was study outside of the classroom. This mainly 
involved three things: i) monthly current affairs broadcasts; ii) the regular reading of 
papers; and iii) additional subject matter reading relating to class-work. In addition, 
various forms of teaching, support and guidance were provided in class and outside.
520
 
We shall return to these extra-class forms of training in a later section.  
 On occasion, the BFES’ facilities were also borrowed by other agencies and 
companies to carry out additional training. This was especially sensible in the early years 
when the emphasis on practicality and expediency meant using all available resources to 
solve pressing concerns and because the school had space to spare. The November report 
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on the state of affairs at the BFES had noted with some satisfaction that after the move to 
its new location, the school’s infrastructure was more than adequate. In matter of fact, in 
November 1951, only 575 students were registered when there was space for 900; 
similarly, only 521 students lived in dorms that could accommodate 900.
521
 As various 
agencies and companies sought to adapt to the changing economic goals put forward by 
the state, they were able, on their own initiative, to take advantage of this extra space to 
meet their short term requirements. One such instance is that of the Beijing City Public 
Enterprise Company 北京市公营企业公司 and their attempts to deal with personnel 
shortages. In June 1951, the Manger and Deputy Manager of the company approached 
the City Government and the City Finance and Economics Committee with a request that 
they arrange short-term statistics and accounting courses over the summer and avail the 
facilities of the BFES to do so. They explained that the company was going through a 
major expansion of existing factories and the establishment of new ones but lacked cadre 
for such work. In particular, the lack of statistical workers and accountants was gravely 
impeding their work. They estimated that the University graduates already assigned to 
them that summer would not be enough to meet their ever-mounting needs. To solve this 
widening incongruity, they planned a three-month short-term course to develop statistical 
and accounting talent 会计、统计人才. To that end, they requested they be permitted to 
borrow 借 empty classrooms at the BFES to carry out this training.522 The request was 
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subsequently approved and in August the company reported that they had gotten in touch 
with the BFES and classes had commenced the previous month.
523
  
 By 1954, such ad hoc arrangements appear to have become less common. This is 
most obvious in the changed nature of reports and planning documents from that year and 
the year before.
524
 Differences with the 1951 report exist at the levels of form and content 
both. The nine-page 1951 report was hand-written, concise, and focused primarily on an 
empirical discussion of classrooms, types of classes, and style of teaching. Everything 
about it suggested immediacy, urgency, and improvisation. In contrast, the planning 
documents from 1953 and 1954 ran to several tens of pages, were typed or printed, and 
adopted formulaic language and standard outlines. Planned action, via regulation and the 
setting of specific objectives with specific deadlines, was the stated ideal. By 1953 
already, certain basic themes were evident. The first and foremost amongst these was the 
elevation of the Soviet Union to the status of role-model. As a planning document noted, 
“the teachers, after having studied and analyzed Soviet syllabi and teaching materials, 
have realized their superiority and the concordant importance of studying them 
intensely.”
525
 A 1954 planning document was even more explicit in discussing past 
achievements and future plans.
526
 According to it, an educational system was being built 
on a foundation of Marxism-Leninism. For guidance and advice it relied on the advanced 
experience of the Soviet Union and on the devotion of students and teachers alike, all of 
whom wanted to contribute toward the construction of a socialist society. Accordingly, 
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the report noted that over the past few years the level of planning had been raised. 
Teachers had also raised their political and professional standards. New testing methods 
had been put in place and specialized syllabi and course materials had been prepared. 




The School’s brief had also become narrower by this time. From a general 
vocational school for the training of cadre, it had transformed into a dedicated school 
focused on Industrial Management 工业管理, preparing middle level 
vocational/technical cadres 中等专业干部.528 Statistical training remained a core 
component of the school’s activities, though the scope of the courses was reduced to 
reflect the School’s new character. In 1953, statistics course offerings had included: 
General Principles of Statistics 统计学原理; Industrial Statistics 工业统计; Capital 
Construction Statistics 基本建设统计; and Social and Economic Statistics 社会经济统
计.529 By 1954, the latter two were jettisoned, leaving two qualitative forms of classes, 
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A further form of training was supplemental, often carried out by taking a break from 
one’s job. Li Ming claimed to have received such supplementary training, which lasted 
three months. Such training likely became more and more common as the nature and 
quantum of work increased during the first five-year plan period. For instance, in 
February of 1954, a joint notification from the Beijing Statistics Bureau and the Bureau 
of Personnel Administration was delivered to eight city bureaus concerning the transfer 
of already employed cadre for the purposes of further study.
531
 The notification stated 
that the BFES, in order to co-operate with the needs of the large scale economic 
construction going on in the country, would train on-the-job 在职 statistical cadre in a 
planned way and thereby raise the level of their professional skill. The notification went 
on to lament that in recent times the city’s statistical cadres were lacking in backbone 缺
乏骨干 and this problem needed to be addressed. After an investigation, it was resolved 
that additional training was especially needed for statistical cadre involved in capital 
construction work. Of the sixty-one cadre to be selected for training, thirty-five were to 
be selected from that group and, if feasible, the training was slated to begin the same 
month and last a total of six months. In addition to the thirty-five seats reserved for the 
Construction Bureau, the remaining twenty-six seats were divided across seven bureaus: 
Construction and Engineering Bureau (建筑工程局): 35 
Local Industry Bureau (地方工业局):   8 
Public Works Bureau (建设局):    5 
Sanitation Engineering Bureau (卫生工程局):   5 
Public Health Bureau (公共卫生局):    1 
Public Services Bureau (公用局):    3 
Education Bureau (教育局):     1 
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Housing Administration (房管局):    3 
Total:        61 
 
By 1957, a two-tier structure had emerged for such supplemental training classes. 
In the first tier were classes organized by schools that were directly overseen by the State 
Statistics Bureau. These were normally attached to universities or to dedicated statistics 
schools (see table 2). Every year, the SSB approached Provincial Statistics Bureaus with 
a request to send students to these schools. Candidates had to have the rank of section 
chief or higher and had to be vetted by the SSB before they could begin their studies. In 
addition, some schools insisted on administering admission tests. The training usually 
lasted one year. In the second tier were training classes set up by Provincial and City-
level Statistics Bureaus, on occasion working in concert with the local Planning 
Committees. The BFES was likely one such school. The student body consisted of cadre 
already employed in statistical workers in the local district/area. The training period was 
usually in the three to six month range. In 1956, approximately 5,000 students were 
attending such classes in schools across fourteen provinces (including Shandong, 
Zhejiang, Heilongjiang, Henan, and Hunan).
532
 In addition, a similar two-tier system of 
cadre schools was also used to provide training. Employees of the central government 
were sent to cadre schools attached to various central ministries whereas provincial 
employees attended provincial cadre schools. Statistical training in these schools was 
organized in an ad-hoc manner and most likely substantial variation existed with regards 
to students, curriculum, and duration of study.
533
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 Two other methods were also employed to provide (supplemental) training: night 
schools 夜校 and correspondence courses 函授班. In 1957, night-classes were offered by 
the Shanghai, South-Central, Northeast, and Sichuan Academies of Finance and 
Economics. Correspondence courses were offered by the Correspondence Division of 
Renmin University directly from Beijing. The Division had also established coaching 
stations 辅导站 in nearby cities such as Tianjin 天津, Taiyuan 太原, and Baoding 保定. 
Each of these schools targeted already employed statistical workers who possessed the 
equivalent of a senior-middle school education. Even so, they were usually required to 
pass an admission test and the nature and content of training was likely modeled on the 
regular classes.  
 The formal and supplemental training described here, in addition to university 
level education described in the earlier section, thus comprised the central bulwark of the 
state as it sought to create basic human resource infrastructural capacity in statistical 
work. Li Ming was a recipient of a mixture of such training. His initial training was at a 
vocational school, which was later supplemented by a short-term course in 1954. While I 
have found no aggregate data that indicate how many cadres were trained through these 
methods, we are now in a position to make some very general estimates.  
 
Confronting Incapacity—Personnel Shortages and the Advocacy of Self-Study 
Let us begin with some simple arithmetic. By 1955, the SSB claimed a workforce of 
200,000 cadres. In an earlier section I estimated that the number of graduates trained in 
statistics at the university level was unlikely to have exceeded 20,000 for the decade of 




somewhat harder to estimate the numbers trained at vocational schools. By the mid-50s 
there were schools in at least fourteen provinces. The BFES had just below 600 students 
enrolled in three-year courses in 1951. By 1955 this would mean three full cycles of 
students. However, we do not know how many of these were trained for statistical work. 
For the purposes of estimation, let us assume other schools across the fourteen provinces 
were operating in similar fashion. In addition, we know that in 1956 about 5,000 students 
were attending three to six month long supplemental courses in these schools. That gives 
us an estimate for the year that ranges from 10,000 to 20,000. Assuming the same rate for 
1951-55 would give us a range of 50,000 to 100,000 students trained via this method. We 
should remember though that supplemental education implies that these cadres had 
already received basic training in statistics, either at vocational schools, on the job, or 
they were a hold-over from the pre-1949 regime. Like Li Ming, many of them shouldn’t 
be counted twice in our attempt to estimate total numbers trained. Statisticians were also 
trained at other venues, notably cadre schools and schools run by various ministries. 
Accepting that this method offers us an extremely imprecise estimate, we can still 
reasonably claim that it would be a real stretch to make the numbers add up to 200,000.
534
   
 So what can we conclude? Training of cadre, where it existed, consisted primarily 
of short-term courses, after which cadres were assigned to work in the hope that they 
would learn on-the-job. This mirrors the story at the national level as far as training of 
cadres went. The state was unable to train enough personnel through traditional schooling. 
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The response, as far as statistics was concerned, was the advocacy of ‘self-study.’
535
 In 
fact, in 1957 the Education Department of the SSB published a volume entitled The Self-
study of Statistical Cadre 《统计干部的自学》 where it went so far as to substantially 
abnegate responsibility for training sufficient numbers of personnel. As they explained in 
the volume’s first chapter:  
But, we must realize one thing: no matter whether in recent times or in the 
future, the country cannot nor must it establish statistical schools and 
training courses on a large scale and get students to attend them. Even 
night school and correspondence classes can only realistically be 
organized in large cities and in limited numbers. Therefore, the education 
of statistical cadre must rely on one method—self study while on the job 
[在职自学].536 
 
In addition to addressing the key limitation that not enough personnel were being 
trained, self-study also offered a solution to another common complaint. Li Ming had 
expressed dissatisfaction in his letter that in spite of his training there was much about the 
production process he did not understand. He worried that the blind application of 
statistical method was not in the least bit productive. One of the published responses to 
his letter began by confirming this precise problem: Li Yuren, a university graduate, 
acknowledged in his October 1955 letter his dismay at being unable to apply to statistical 
work the theory he had learnt in school. Only by learning on-the-job was he was able to 
bridge this divide.
537
 The publication of The Self-study of Statistical Cadre was thus 
aimed at addressing both these issues.  
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 Li Yuren. “Wo dui tongji gongzuo de renshi 我对统计工作的认识 (My Understanding of Statistical 




 In justifying the need for self-study, the volume offered some preliminary 
clarifications. The first of these had to do with the object of their study. China, it 
explained, was passing through a great historical epoch, transforming itself from a 
backward agricultural country to an advanced industrialized one. Such a goal could only 
be realized if the nation possessed the most advanced science and technology. But owing 
to the recent history of semi-colonization, and the even longer history of semi-feudalism, 
China’s culture, science, and technology had all been utterly backward 十分落后. Since 
1949, leaping progress 飞跃的发展 has been made, but much remained to be done. The 
previous year the party had prepared a twelve-year plan for science and technology, so 
that the nation might match or surpass the most advanced countries in the world. And 
now, the youth must march towards science and accomplish this great and formidable 
task. Statistical cadres were no exception to this expectation. The goal of their study was 
to unceasingly raise the standard of statistical work, to enrich the content of statistical 
science, and bring together statistical theory and practice, thereby contributing to nation-
building. In other words, they were to transform themselves into statistical experts 统计
专门家. This kind of expertise was particularly important—empty headed theoreticians 
空头理论家 whose study was not functional and divorced from actual requirements were 
labeled expressly undesirable. 
 The second clarification addressed the question of whether dedicated study was 
necessary. The volume explained that while statistical work naturally involved addition 
and subtraction 加加减减, it definitely was not limited only to those activities. Nor was 
statistics merely a numbers game 数字游戏. Rather, statistics possessed abundant 




hundreds of millions of people. Study would ensure the avoidance of errors and accurate 
analysis, and thereby help in the deduction of the intrinsic laws of all objective things. In 
particular, knowledge of economics and business, political theory, and statistical theory 
were all critical to becoming statistical experts. But, the volume went on to lament, in 
recent times the level of statistical workers had been lacking. The only way of solving 
this contradiction was for workers at all levels to self-study. Admittedly, this was no easy 
task—time was limited and guidance often absent. And yet, the volume exhorted workers 
to persevere and carry out long-term self-study.
538
  
 Having already deployed the rhetoric of expertise, the volume in equal measure, 
also asked workers to be warriors 战士 contributing to the construction of a socialist 
society. Guidelines for self-study were divided into two sections: those dealing with 
elementary or foundational knowledge common to all statistical workers; and specialized 




 Elementary knowledge began with ensuring that all statistical workers had 
attained at least junior-middle-school literacy. A basic knowledge of mathematics, natural 
science and social science was also required. Next on the agenda were subjects such as 
Political Economy, dialectical and historical materialism 辩证唯物主义; 历史唯物主义, 
and China’s revolutionary history. These subjects were viewed as the foundation of all 
social science and hence essential. This was followed by knowledge of the Party’s 
General and Specific Policies and familiarity with practical professional work 业务知识. 
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Familiarity with the Party’s policies was deemed necessary since it would enable 
statistical cadre to provide data and analyses to the leadership so that policy might be 
formulated and implementation scrutinized. Practical professional work consisted of 
familiarizing cadre with the two most important methods of statistical data collection: (1) 
The Periodical Report System 报表制度 and (2) Survey Plans 调查方案. And in 
mastering them, workers were also required to master the various relevant indicators 指
标 used within a bureau and their calculation methods 计算方法. Thus, in order to carry 
out good work one had to have familiarity with every indicator in the periodical reports 
and its overall place in organization 编制 and planning, in deciding policy, and in 
management.
 540
   
 General statistics related classes were divided into three categories.
541
 The first of 
these was a study of the basic problems in statistical theory, where the goals and methods 
of statistics, the collection of data, and their ordering and analysis were introduced. 
Concepts included were: mass surveys 大量观察法, summarization 汇总, stratification 
分组, averages 平均数, trends 动态数, and index numbers 指标数.542 The next category 
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 Recommended study materials included:  
i. Tongji lilun yiban wenti jianghua 统计理论一般问题讲话 (Common Problems in 
Statistical Theory). Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1956.  
ii. Tongji jiangzuo jiangyi 《统计讲座讲义》第 1-11 讲 (Statistical Lectures—No.1 to 11). 
Beijing: Statistical Press, 1957. 
iii. Tongjixue yuanli jiangyi 《统计学原理讲义》(Lectures on Statistical Principles). Beijing: 
Peoples University Press, 1956. 
Of these, the first is popular and easy to understand and meant for those with a low educational level, who 
have just begun the study of statistics. The contents of the second and third are relatively more detailed 
(abundant) and are suited for cadre with a higher level of education. [it is not specified what high and low 
here might be] For those statistical workers who want to study even further, they could study: Tongji lilun  




consisted of branch specific statistics, for example, capital construction statistics focuses 
on those phenomena relating to construction work and their analysis.
543
 Finally, there was 
the study of statistical economics, which involved the collection of data relating to 
economic activity (indices), their content, calculation, and analysis. The objects of such 
analysis were central economic concerns: national income, balance sheets, the 
organization of economic work, etc.
544
 In addition, two related subjects that workers were 
encouraged to also study were accounting and the analysis of Economic Activity. And 
finally, there were materials on Marxist-Leninism related treatises on economics and 
statistics. Only by studying (and mastering) all these materials could one aspire to 
become a true statistical expert.
545
 
 The basic organization of self-study was calibrated based on the education and 
experience of individual cadre.
546
  For those cadres who did not possess a Junior-Middle 
                                                                                                                                                              
Statistical Press, 1957. Additionally, they could consult《统计学》by  .Г. 斯特鲁米林 and 《统计一般
理论问题》by Т.И. 科兹洛夫 et al. For details, please see: The Self-Study of Statistical Cadre : 9-10. 
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 Recommended study materials included: 
i. 《统计讲座讲义》Every lecture following lecture no. 12 (国家统计局教育处编) 
ii. 《经济统计学讲义》(Xu Qian 徐前 et al. Statistical Press, 1957) 
iii. 《经济统计学教程》(by Prof. А.И. 彼得罗夫, Statistical Press, 1957) 
iv. 《统计理论》第 11-26 章(published by the Soviet Statistical Bureau) 
Of these the first two were meant for cadre whose education levels were relatively low; they were relatively 
easy to understand and their contents relatively comprehensive. The last of these was described as a good 
combination of statistical economics and basic problems in statistical theory; its portions on statistical 
theory were relatively comprehensive and it could serve as a principle reference book. For details, please 
see:  The Self-Study of Statistical Cadre : 9-10 
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School Education Level, the first task was to attain a level of education equivalent to 
Junior-middle school and to familiarize oneself with the basic professional knowledge 
required for one’s job. Spare time outside of work was to be utilized to become literate. 
Additional time, whether during or after work, had to also be dedicated to learning about 
party policies, and their implementation. At the next level were cadres who possessed 
education equal to or above the junior-middle school level but who had not 
systematically studied political and statistical theory. Such cadre had to exploit their 
familiarity with work and use it as a foundation for the study of theory. Their goal was to 
convert themselves into statistical cadre with the ability to work independently. Such 
study had three components:  Political Theory, the Party’s Policies and Knowledge of 
Professional Duties, and Statistics and related classes. During their study, the primary 
focus was to be on understanding the nature of work, especially the method of organizing 
periodic reports.  
Cadre with several-years’ experience of statistical work comprised the third group. 
In order to further raise their existing professional work experience, so that they could 
perform even better, their primary goal was to systematize their knowledge and 
experience and meld it with theory. These cadres were to dedicate the bulk of their spare 
time to study “statistics and related classes.” In order to do this they could begin by 
focusing on the specialized statistics of their branch and proceed to expand the scope of 
study based on specific needs that arose out of work.
547
 In the final category were cadres 
who had attained a university degree or had some university-level education. Their main 
tasks were to further research Political Economy and branch-specific economics, and to 
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master economic statistics and branch-specific statistics. In so doing, they would become 
Statistical Experts, capable of producing reports with statistical analysis, and able to 
scientifically and practically address complicated questions surrounding statistical 
methods. Once the general foundational content had been clarified, statistical workers 
were directed to the main content of The Self-study of Statistical Cadre. Details of 
pedagogical materials and study methods were laid out in seven branch-specific chapters, 
their sequence indicating their relative importance: Industrial Statistics; Agricultural 
Statistics; Capital Construction Statistics; Commercial Statistics; Material Supply; 
Culture, Education, Health, and Hygiene; and Surveys of Family Income and Expenditure. 
Finally, instructions were also provided on how workers might access the various 
study materials listed in The Self-study of Statistical Cadre. All books that had been made 
public 公开 could be purchased at the local Xinhua Bookstore. If a particular book was 
not available locally, then it could be ordered from the Beijing Mail-Order Bookstore 邮
购书店. Since the volume only listed a small proportion of the actual numbers of books 
available on economics and statistics, cadre were encouraged to browse catalogs and 
purchase other relevant books. As for those materials published or compiled and printed 
by the Interior 内部, somewhat different procedures would have to be followed. 
Materials published by the Renmin University Press or by the Statistical Press, such as 
different volumes of the compendia Compilation of Important Documents on Statistical 
Work 《统计工作重要文件汇编》, could be purchased from the relevant presses with a 
letter of introduction from the cadre’s home bureau. Compiled and printed materials, such 
as Statistics and Planning forms and their rules, survey plans, compilations of answered 




activist statistical workers meeting, and so on, could usually be obtained from the 




 That self-study was largely a fiction, a utopia, is not hard to imagine. The 
program of study outlined in The Self-study of Statistical Cadre is sufficient to intimidate 
a full-time student, let alone a worker with a  full-time job. Thus far, I have yet to find 
conclusive evidence that its adoption and use as a manual achieved any degree of 
popularity among statistical workers. And yet, such an assessment of The Self-study of 
Statistical Cadre is also important for it points to another basic incapacity. Self-study was 
a road to self-improvement, a pathway to greater contribution to the nation. But such self-
improvement could only be actualized if morale was high. For, only when morale was 
high would one expect to see cadres willing to dedicate their energies to advancing their 
own training and education. Let us, therefore, return once more to Li Ming and his 
frustrations.  
 
Responding to Li Ming 
Since its first issue in 1953, the Tongji gongzuo had served the dual role of a professional 
journal and didactic mouthpiece.
549
 By 1955, each monthly issue contained 
approximately 25 articles that spanned such topics as methodology, statistical data on 
specific questions or economic activities, reports of annual and local meetings concerning 
statistical work, translations of works by Soviet statisticians, reports from specific work 
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units on recent achievements, announcements declaring the start of a new campaign, and 
descriptions or transcripts of of major speeches that touched upon statistical work. By 
disseminating experience and information about statistical activities to various parts of 
the country many of these essays served a pedagogical purpose. Every issue also carried 
in it reports that touted achievements in statistical work or essays that wished to share 
experience 经验 about a particular kind of recently completed activity. Included also 
were essays by enthusiasts/activists 积极分子, meant to serve as encouragement to their 
fellow workers. On occasion, one could also find articles publicly shaming the poor work 
of a particular statistical worker or unit.
550
    
 By publishing Li Ming’s letter, however, the editors of Tongji gongzuo were 
adopting a new strategy. In what appears to be the first instance of its kind, the journal 
was used as a platform for a more open-ended debate on the very nature and purpose of 
statistical work. Instead of specific discussions on method or exhortations to do well a 
specific kind of statistical work, the editors (and the SSB as a whole) hoped to 
demonstrate and disseminate a mass ‘correct’ response to several key questions.
551
 The 
first of these centered on the claim that statistical work was mere arithmetic jugglery—
adding, subtracting, calculating percentages, and so on—and, therefore, utterly boring 枯
燥无味.552 Was such an understanding correct, the editors asked? How should one arrive 
at an accurate understanding (appreciation) of statistical work? The second question dealt 
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with the issue of usefulness. The editors invited readers to ascertain whether Li Ming’s 
verdict on the uselessness of statistics was correct. They encouraged readers to consider 
the role and status of statistics in the ongoing national construction (nation-building). 
How could statistics’ full potential be brought into play? The final question addressed Li 
Ming’s fears of the lack of advancement and the poor future prospects of statistical 
workers in general. Li Ming had lost faith 失去信心  in statistics, they acknowledged. 
But was this justified? What, after all, were the prospects of statistical workers; could 
they rise through the ranks?
553
 In October 1955, two months into the debate, the editors 
of the journal decided to collapse the three questions down to one central question: Why 
[are we] unwilling to do statistical work?
554
  
Over 600 responses were received by the journal in the fourth months from 
August to November.
555
 A representative handful was published each month: five in 
August, four in September, five in October, and three in November. The December issue 
brought the debate to a close and carried two articles. The first was a general overview of 
the debate, summarizing content from the numerous letters that had been received but not 
published. The second, as noted at the start of this chapter, was the essay by SSB Deputy 
Director Jia Qiyun. The eighteen responses as well as the summary essays were 
subsequently published as RWTG. Before an analysis of the debate can be offered it is 
worth probing the logic of switching to a single question prompt in October—the 
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unwillingness to do statistical work. For that, we need to consider the peculiar status of 
statistical work itself.  
 
The (Peculiar) Status of Statistics 
For a whole generation that came of age in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the gun-toting, 
landlord-slaying peasant revolutionary was a heroic ideal. Even if many did not directly 
participate in the revolution, sympathy for the communists was widespread. Accordingly, 
one of the principle challenges for the CCP once they came to power in 1949 was to 
successfully channel this popular fervor towards the task of national construction—the 
building of a new China. The broad economic strategy adopted to achieve this goal was 
that of industrialization. Any surplus produced in the economy was to be invested in 
industrial production. Agriculture, the dominant sector of the economy, was marginalized 
to the extent that its primary purpose was to support the ongoing industrialization. This 
bias in favor of production, a matter of economic policy, in turn dictated certain social 
policies. The emphasis on productivity and rapid industrialization at the expense of 
agriculture went hand-in-hand with a shift in focus from the country-side to the city. For 
a rural, peasant based, and largely peasant-led revolution, urban China had become the 
new field of action and achievement.
556
 It is not surprising that concerns with the un-
regulated movement of people, especially from the rural country-side into cities, began to 
grow, and were often justified via a need for stability and the desire to ensure the best 
conditions for production.  
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 One of the results of this shift was the birth of a new type of hero, who engaged in 
production for the country. This applied to agricultural and industrial work in equal 
measure, but the emphasis on industry meant that the especially heroic work was done by 
those working in factories, producing the raw materials and finished goods that would 
build a new China. This had implications for the valuation of administrative and service- 
based work. The “new hero was not the administrative cadre but the engineer.”
557
 For 
skill-based technical professions, such as statistics, the repercussions were dire.
558
 As 
Wang Xiangyuan explained in his essay in Tongji gongzuo:  
Right now there are many comrades who are unwilling to do non-
productive technical work [非生产技术性], but are willing to do 
productive technical work. This kind of thinking is present not just among 
statistical workers, but also those who work in accounting, note-taking, 




Statistics, along with the other professions that Wang listed, did not enjoy the common 
man’s respect because they did not produce tangible goods.
560
 This judgment is reflected 
in a table in Ten Great Years, which lists the relative labor distribution between 
productive work 生产部门 and non-productive work 非生产部门 annually from 1949 to 
1958.  Titled “Rapid Increase in Percentage of Workers and Other Employees in 
Productive Work,” the table shows a clear upward trend in the share of productive work: 
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climbing from 65% in 1949 to 85.1% by 1958; the share of non-productive work 
declining correspondingly from 35% to 14.9%.
561
 
Even amongst ‘non-productive technical’ professions, statistics stood out. A 
science that straddled the administrative and the productive, it required skilled workers 
capable of collecting and analyzing vast amounts of data so that tangible production 
could be better understood, organized, and improved. Its close cousin, accounting, had 
similar characteristics but was different in significant respects.
562
 Unlike statistics, it was 
not part of a national organization linking the center to village and work units. 
Accountants were usually restricted to a work-unit, village, cooperative, factory, and so 
on, and rarely operated at higher levels of aggregation. Statisticians, in contrast, were part 
of a national organization that numbered approximately 200,000 workers by the mid-
1950s. And statistics was fundamental to the rhetoric (and reality) of a socialist state, 
whose logic dictated that the centrality of planning was not merely economic theory, but 
also a philosophical and practical necessity, predicating all other activity. The collection 
and tracking of all information—productive and non-productive—so that informed and 
appropriate decisions regarding planning and allocation of men and materiel could take 
place was the very cornerstone on which everything rested. But making the argument 
theoretically and in the halls of power was one thing, getting the average statistical 
worker to do the work, quite another. 
 To address this problem two related strategies, one a broad appeal to logic and the 
other an emotional appeal to the romance of production, can be located. Let us look at the 
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broad appeal first. The logical solution was to claim that all kinds of activity were 
important and revolutionary—this, after all, was the view put forward in all textbooks 
and self-study books, explicitly or implicitly. As one statistical worker explained in his 
response to Li Ming:  
…I have come to realize [through my work] that all kinds of revolutionary 
work [一切革命工作] are important. There are no distinctions such as 
‘important and unimportant,’ ‘small and large,’ ‘valuable and worthless;’ 
rather, every profession produces its own leading authority [行行出状元]. 





The valorization of productive work over non-productive work was also attacked. 
Another interlocutor observed that “although statistical workers did not directly 
participate in production and, therefore, did not create value, their effect within the larger 
process of socialist development could not easily be calculated using such a metric.”
564
  
The most cogent and sustained exposition of this line of reasoning was provided 
by deputy director Jia Qiyun 贾启云. In his December essay he wrote that he wished to 
explain why every type of work was an important part of national development and that if 
one worked hard and with a focused mind, success was guaranteed. The logic to this was 
straightforward. Jia proceeded to explain that even though heavy industries were the basis 
of building a socialist society, and working in that sector of the economy was no doubt an 
honor, other sectors of the economy were just as important. Indeed, without development 
in other sectors of the economy, such as light industries, agriculture, transportation, 
commerce, and so on, developing heavy industries alone was impossible. Therefore, each 
type of work was equally honorable, equally glorious. Furthermore, it was imperative to 
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recognize that all these important activities could not proceed unless they were supported 
by administration, a justice system, diplomacy, national defense, education, and health. 
Regardless of whether it was productive 生产性 or non-productive 非生产性, each type 
of work was of equal importance and as honorable and full of glory as any other. And 
underlying all these activities was planning, for which statistics and numbers were 
absolutely critical. Statistics was thus the basis 依据 for everything: whatever the job, if 
statistical work was set aside, then it was tantamount to setting aside any prospects for 
progress.
565
 In such a way was statistics placed at the very heart of revolutionary work 
and the socialist enterprise.  
Cold, calculated logic, however, also found a worthy partner in powerful imagery 
and rhetorical flourish. If one was unmoved by the seemingly irrefutable logic of Deputy 
Director Jia’s argument, as indeed many may have been, then Feng Jixi’s formulation 
may have held greater appeal. Feng, another interlocutor in the Li Ming debate, began his 
essay with these words: 
Every time I complete a statistical table/chart, my happiness is like that of 
a peasant on his field catching sight of a golden ear of wheat, my 
excitement like that of a steelworker observing molten steel emerging 





The sleight of hand was obvious. In one sweeping sentence, Feng had equated statistical 
work with work in agriculture, industry, and the arts. The key lay in equating a statistical 
table (and the report it would invariably be a part of) with the tangible goods produced in 
other fields. The table, thus, was the tangible, material product that a statistician 
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contributed to the economy. In the previous chapter we have already encountered the 
kinds of problems this valorization of the table-as-product generated, in particular the oft-
repeated and much-lamented phenomenon of excess issuing of reports 滥发报表.  
 Feng’s was not the only case where Li Ming’s interlocutors resorted to rhetorical 
flights of fancy, but it was perhaps the most flowery and emphatic of them all. The 
romanticization of numbers and statistics had been legitimated just a few months earlier 
by none other a figure than poet and author Ba Jin 巴金 (1904-2005). In an essay 
published in the People’s Daily he relayed with approval the description of the ongoing 
five-year plan as a “song of numbers.”
567
 In the essay, Ba Jin accepted that in the past 
people liked to say that numbers were absolutely boring 枯燥无味, but felt such a 
formulation was no longer tenable.
568
 Numbers, he explained, contained in themselves 
abundant meaning. Far from being inert, they could speak; they could relay countless 
touching stories and paint beautiful paintings:
569
 
I have always believed: "Poetry should give people the joy of creation, 
poetry should spread life [?]." These numbers not only spread life and 
happiness, they not only depict to us a happy future, but they also 
guarantee that happiness. Not only do these numbers gather the sentiments 
of 600 million people, they also embody their common aspirations and are 
their signpost [pointing to the future]. With them, correctly, step-by-step, 
we shall arrive on the road to [building a] socialist society. They are like a 
bright lamp, illuminating the hearts of 600 million.
570
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The implication was clear. If Li Ming grasped the power of numbers and statistics in the 
New China, he would not find them boring at all. And the evocation of collective spirit, 
of course, was not incidental either; nor was the focus on the people’s common 
aspirations. These themes provided grounds for what was the most concerted and popular 
attack on Li Ming. 
 
Attacking Individualism, Honoring Model Workers 
Eleven of the eighteen responses published in the TJGZTX and the RWTG highlighted Li 
Ming’s problem as one essentially stemming from individualism. The broad basis of the 
critique was provided by the Qingdao Statistics Bureau’s Newsletter Group. In their letter, 
they observed: 
It is our opinion that the basic problem can be traced to the fact that 
Comrade Li Ming has not considered his statistical work in light of the 
needs of the nation and the people. He has not recognized that every kind 
of work carries with it great revolutionary significance…Instead Li Ming 





In similar fashion, another interlocutor explained that Li Ming was deceived, even 
blinded, by personal profit. As a result, he was unable to see the uses and effects of 
statistics.
572
 Indeed, for a revolutionary worker, individualism was very dangerous. It was 
like a noose tying the worker down, making him loose direction, much like a man lost in 
the darkness of the night. Such a worker would only go round and round in his small 
circle, paying attention only to himself, ignoring the community. He would focus on the 
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small, not the big; on the near, not the distant; and even after the passage of one, two, or 
three years, he would remain unchanged.
573
 Numerous other instances, declaiming Li 
Ming’s individualism, were published.
574
 On occasion, capitalist was added to the charge, 
making it an error not just of individualism but of capitalist individualism.
575
  
 Tied to individualism was the implicit tendency towards careerism 野心, even 
though it was never articulated as such. The term used instead to discuss the matter was 
‘future prospects’ 前途. Li Ming had raised the issue in his letter as well. One key 
problem stemmed from the fact that, unlike various other technical professions, one could 
not earn advanced degrees or certifications in statistics. The Self-study of Statistical 
Cadre had acknowledged this problem on its first page, observing that the SSB had 
received numerous letters decrying the absence of advanced degrees for statisticians. 
Neither advanced academic degrees of doctor or associate doctor 副博 nor any 
professional qualifications such as those granted to engineers were available to statistical 
workers.
576
 Such circumstances naturally raised concerns about career advancement, 
professional development, and pay scales among a statistical work force that was 
extremely young.
577
   
The response to problems of careerism began with the assertion that the pay-
scales were appropriate, but also sought to reframe the object of study and work. Cadre 
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were told that rather than the attainment of a doctorate, certification as an engineer, or 
some similar qualification, the goal was to develop and make prosperous the nation’s 
culture, science, and technology, and to bring about rapid industrialization. Statistical 
cadres were no exception to this call to arms. In other words, once people were clear 
about this, they would no longer obsess about degrees and status, and their achievements 
would be recognized appropriately. In the final analysis, accomplishments at work and 
not degrees or pay scales were the true measure of study.
578
  
 It is at this point that Li Ming, the negative model, had served his purpose. In 
order to stress achievement over qualification, positive models, worthy of emulation 
needed to be promoted.
579
 As Jia Qiyun wrote in his December essay, over the past few 
years there had been countless heroic model workers who had made stellar contributions 
across the various fields of national development work. And, as Jia clarified, statistical 
workers were very much among such heroes: 
At this year's "National Meeting of Youth Activists for the Construction of 
Socialism" were there not just model engineers and (industrial) workers, 
but also model shop assistants, model cooks, model pig-farmers?  Among 
our statistical workers was there also not an advanced youth group led by 
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Indeed, much like other cadre, statistical workers were also recipients of various model 
worker awards.
581
 Such awards were usually made after year-end appraisals had been 
carried out.
582
 One of Li Ming’s interlocutors had reported that because of his stellar 
work he had been recognized as a Third Degree Model Worker in 1953 三等工作模范. 
Continued excellence at work had resulted in his elevation to a Second Degree Model 
Worker the following year. This honor was not just limited to within the company but 
also across the city of Taiyuan, and he was handed the label of Shanxi’s Advanced 
Worker.
583
 Similarly, another statistical worker recalled how she was made a First and 
Second Degree Advanced Worker.
584
 The point was thus reiterated: statistical workers 
had prospects 前途; they could become statistical experts and model workers 模范工作
者.585  
By 1956, the time was ripe for a model worker conference dedicated to statistical 
work. The Beijing Statistics Bureau decided to take the lead at the local level. On April 
18 1956, it sent out a notification to all bureaus/departments, communes, and associations 
within the city to begin making preparations for the city’s (and nation’s?) first Activist 
Statistical Workers Meeting 统计工作积极分子大会.586 Held the following month, the 
two-day meeting brought together nearly 300 people and recognized and honored 
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advanced workers who were on the battle lines 战线 of statistical work.587 Their 
testimonies were compiled for dissemination in the hope that they would, in turn, inspire 
other statistical cadre to give free rein to their enthusiasm and creativity. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the PRC’s limited resources, the story of capacity building in the field of statistics 
very quickly turned into one of how best to handle incapacity. Such incapacity 
manifested itself in three successive areas. The first incapacity was reflected in the need 
to build training infrastructure, both in terms of schools and training centers and in terms 
of a statistical curriculum that could accommodate a very wide range of students. Indeed, 
barring a small minority of cadre who had college or high-school level education, most 
cadre were in their late teens with extremely limited education. A second incapacity was 
characterized by an inability to train cadre in sufficient numbers and in a rapid enough 
fashion. Finally, morale was another area in which the Statistics Bureau encountered 
tremendous challenges. By mid-1950s, as work was stabilizing and the PRC had entered 
the high point of its bureaucratic phase, the SSB could take stock of its achievements and 
also start on activities like self-study and model-worker meetings. This chapter has 
provided a sense of what the state aspired to do, how and where it fell short, where it 
abnegated responsibility, and what kinds of actions it took to address that shortfall.  
The consequences of some of the rhetorical flourishes one sees with regard to 
statistics and numbers have already been traced in the previous chapter. In particular, the 
fetishization of periodical reports—their being touted as the ‘product’ that statistical 
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workers were laboring to produce—exacerbated what was already a pretty common 
problem, the excess issuing of reports. As discussed in the previous chapter, the problem 
became increasingly insurmountable as leaders in the SSB recognized that the very 
system of periodical reports as much as their fetishization was responsible for masses of 














































































By 1956, an integrated statistical system modeled on the Soviet Union had allowed for 
unprecedented levels of penetration stretching down to the village level. With a staff of 
about 650 personnel, the SSB, headquartered in Beijing, oversaw 200,000 statistical 
cadre spread across provincial bureaus, roughly 2,200 county offices, and about 750,000 
village cooperatives. The scope and nature of statistical data collected, putatively, not 
only increases a state’s capacity to regulate society, but through the creation of new 
categories also reflects its vision of social change.
588
 1950s China was marked by several 
massive nationwide social engineering projects, such as cooperativization and 
collectivization of agriculture, state take-over of the private sector, minority classification, 
household registration and restriction of rural mobility, and perhaps most ambitiously, 
economic planning.  
Normally understood as top-down outcomes primarily of ideology, in this chapter 
I offer a preliminary investigation of the role of statistics and statisticians in such 
processes, taking as case studies economic planning and the institution of the work points 
system in the countryside. In each case, the object is to demonstrate the centrality of 
statistics to the conceptualization and execution of large scale social and economic 
transformation. In the case of the first five-year plan, the consistent challenge was to 
better coordinate the planning and statistical apparatuses of the state. Drawing upon 
Beijing Planning and Statistical Bureau documents from 1954, I first show the 
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relationship between statistics and planning and between the statistics bureau and the 
planning bureau, as it was understood during such an early an early stage of the plan. I 
then move forward in time to 1958 and look at the discussion surrounding the impending 
second five-year plan (1958-1962).  
Even if, in the end, the plan was haphazard and not very plan-like in comparison 
to other contemporary plans, the drive to plan and the idealization of total statistical 
information that it was based upon wrought several changes in the country side. While 
resistance to the state’s attempts to collect information and tax, the universal historical 
pattern one would expect to find, was indeed one response, the creation of new forms of 
statistical data and categories of accounting also resulted in numbers informing new 
conceptions of everyday life and work. In the second half of the chapter I explore one 
such instance: the work points system and the concomitant rise of what I term 
enumerative consciousness.  
 
The First Five-Year Plan and Statistics 
In most standard (economic) histories of the 1950s, the decade is divided into three 
periods: 1949 to 1952 is the period of recovery 恢复时期, 1953 to 1957 is the period of 
the first five-year plan 第一个五年计划, and 1958-1962 is the period of the Great Leap 
Forward 大跃进.589 The first five year plan thus occupies a central position in the decade, 
temporally as well as in terms of its impact on China’s development. Even though it 
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started in 1953, it was only after July 1955 that the plan itself was released as a 
document.
590
 Over the years, general scholarly consensus has been that it was less a plan 
in the strictest sense of the word and more a set of guidelines.
591
 As the economist (verify) 
Audrey Donnithorne summarized in 1967:  
China’s economic planning has been restricted mainly to the setting of 
targets, to drawing up lists of resolutions. It does not attempt to effect 
close integration of different economic sectors, nor is it much concerned 
with the optimum allocation of resources. Throughout, and this can 
scarcely be stressed too much, economic planning in China is constrained 
by the deficiencies of the information on which it has to work, as well as 
by the weaknesses in the administration and supervisory organs charged 




A significant component of the deficiencies of information that Donnithorne spoke of had 
to do with the quality of statistical data. Writing twenty years later, Carl Riskin would 
echo this assessment, noting that national economic planning could not proceed without 
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The importance of statistics to planning was stressed from the very earliest 
discussions about building statistical and planning infrastructure but the relationship was 
usually articulated in general terms. Recall Wang Sihua’s 1950 speech (from Chapter II), 
wherein he stated that by establishing a system of socialist statistics, China was already 
on the path toward a planned economy. A somewhat more precisely stated link between 
the planning and statistics can be found in a document entitled “Written Answers to 
Questions Concerning State Planning in China.” This document was prepared a few 
months prior to Li Fuchun’s speech in July 1955  and delivered to the Indian Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) through the offices of Vice-Premier Chen Yun 
陈云 (1905-1995). 594 According to the document, the plan was drawn up by working out 
control figures, making a draft plan, and approving it for delivery to lower organs. Two 
systems were critical to this process: the ‘administration under the central authority’ and 
the ‘system of local administration.’ In the first step, the State Planning Commission 
(SPC) worked out control figures for the whole nation. Upon the approval of the State 
Administrative Council (SAC), these figures were sent down to the lower organs.
595
 At 
this point, various ministries and local administrations would use these figures to draw up 
their own draft plans and submit them for approval to the SAC, with copies also delivered 
to the SPC. On the basis of these lower level draft plans, the SPC then revised the 
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 The process was recursive and relied on coordination across the 
various administrative levels and with statistical organs:  
The State Planning Commission maintains connections with local 
administrators through the planning commissions of the provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions. In addition to the planning 
commissions of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, 
local planning organs, to be known as “planning and statistical sections” 
are set up in the counties.
597
 (Original English translation) 
 
At the lowest levels, planning and statistical functions were thus combined within a 
single office. At the national level, the SPC’s principal partner was the State Statistics 
Bureau (SSB). Both the SSB and the SPC came under the direct control of the SAC. To 
quote the document: “the state takes the figures of the Statistical Bureau as base for 
drawing up its plan, and reviews the execution of the plan on the strength of the figures of 
the Statistical Bureau.”
598
 (Original English translation) 
 Much like Mao’s exhortation to “serve the people” 为人民服务, statistical work 
thus had to “serve national planning” 统计工作要为国家计划服务. As a report on 
Beijing’s Third Meeting on Statistical Work explained, such service involved three tasks. 
The first task was the supply of correct data 首先应提供正确的资料. Second, analysis 
and research was conducted on the correct data to discover problems 根据正确的资料进
行分析研究, 发现问题. Finally, based on the analysis, solutions to those problems were 
suggested 提出解决问题的办法. The statistical numbers so produced were, in turn, the 
basis for preparing plans 编制计划, inspecting plans 检查计划, deciding on policies 决
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定政策, and for checking the implementation of those policies 检查政策执行情况. So, 
for example, the statistics bureau could check the rate of industrialization 观察工业发展
速度, the rate of nationalization 公私比重变化, or formulate a variety of supply plans 制
定各种供应计划. The report argued that all these activities were important because they 
were closely linked to national construction 国家建设, to production 生产事业, and to 
the people’s lives 人民生活.599 
 Given the need for statistics to work closely with planning what was the reality on 
the ground? At the level of the central headquarters of each organization, coordination 
appears to have been the de facto norm. Such coordination was no doubt facilitated by the 
fact that both the State Statistics Bureau and the State Planning Commission were located 
on different floors of the same building in Beijing. But if we take the example of 
statistical and planning work at the city level, things are less clear. According to materials 
connected with Beijing’s Third Meeting on Statistical Work in 1954, of the 114 
sanctioned attendees to the meeting, only five were from the planning bureau.
600
 The rest 
were statistical cadres spread across forty-five units 单位 and key factories and mines 重
点厂矿. On first glance, these numbers indicate that the Beijing Planning Bureau’s input 
in statistical work was limited. But when the total number of cadre at the Beijing 
Planning Bureau is taken into account (forty-one), we find that a significant portion of the 
Planning Bureau was actually in attendance (roughly twelve percent; or five out of forty-
one). In order to investigate further the relationship between the two bureaus further, let 
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us therefore consider the annual work summaries 工作总结 for 1953 of the Beijing 
Planning and Statistics Bureaus.  
 
Reflections on Planning and Statistics, 1952-1958 
A summary report of statistical work carried out in 1953 in Beijing was prepared by the 
Beijing Statistics Bureau in April 1954.
601
 The report stated that there were 3,829 full-
time and part-time cadre involved in statistical work in Beijing.
602
 Over the course of 
1953, some major improvements were made in the timeliness of reports and in ensuring 
that numerical data were accompanied by textual explanations 文字说明.603  At the same 
time, most of the issues discussed in Part II Chapter II above, such as duplication, chaotic 
reporting, etc., were also pointed out in the report. One of the reports five sections 
(section three) was devoted to a discussion of the bureau’s contribution to planning work. 
 The section on planning began by observing that the bureau had provided 
statistical data to the leadership to help them draw up plans and decide on policies. For 
instance, in July of 1953, under the leadership of the Finance Committee, the bureau had 
compiled and consolidated annual reports for every year from 1949 to 1952 to aid in 
long-term planning. In the few cases where data was not available, they had provided 
estimates. These materials were then cross-checked by various relevant ministries and 
organs and printed in booklet form 印成册. In order to supply data needed for drawing up 
a plan for 1954, the bureau had also provided forecast figures for 1953. Data was also 
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provided to aid policy decisions and carry out key tasks 中心工作. For example, in order 
to research the relative magnitudes of the private and public economy, the bureau 
provided quarterly data on the share of the commercial economy. In similar fashion, 
Beijing’s population was verified so that the state monopoly for the purchase and 
marketing of grain could be effectively implemented. Data on average wages and labor 




 Even though the bureau felt that its various offerings had substantially met 
contemporary planning requirements, it acknowledged that shortcomings nonetheless 
remained. For starters, the bureau admitted that it was not good at utilizing statistical 
numbers from all possible sources, ignoring in particular statistical data from the 
administrative and professional departments 业务部门. Even in those cases where a 
mastery of all the numbers had been achieved, the data was often not fully utilized.
605
 A 
second concern was that specific needs were not addressed directly. Problems were 
discovered and the leadership informed only once data had been consolidated. As a result, 




What did the Planning Bureau’s annual summary of work for 1953 say about 
statistics? Drafted in January of 1954, the annual summary noted that the Beijing 
Planning Bureau had officially been set up on October 21 1953 and had more than forty-
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one cadre distributed across departments responsible for planning in industry, agriculture, 
infrastructure, trade, health and education, as well as five others.
607
 The Bureau received 
its instructions from the State Planning Commission, the City Committee, the City 
Finance Committee, and the city government. Its tasks were to examine, consolidate, and 
balance long-term, annual, and seasonal plans for local industry, agriculture, trade 
cooperatives, capital construction, health and education, and wages using data obtained 
from the statistics bureau.
608
  
 The report went on to note that planning work had suffered on account of three 
reasons. Leaders had been unable to focus on the organization of planning because they 
were busy with the state purchasing monopoly on food grains. The planners also 
encountered problems with the quality of index numbers and often did not get corrected 
numbers delivered to them on time. Finally, they complained about inadequate numbers 
of cadre and their poor overall training.
609
 Neither statistics nor statistical work was 
directly mentioned, and yet two of the three problems they listed were essentially 
statistical in nature. It was only later in the year, that the SPC directly addressed the issue 
of planning and statistics on a national level.  
On August 24 1954, the State Planning Commission passed a set of 
regulations/provisions 规定, which directly addressed the relationship between planning 
and statistics. “Regarding Uniform Provisions for a number of Problems [Encountered] in 
Planning and Statistical Work” was a six-page document that was sent to all central 
committees, departments, institutes, and to the statistics and planning bureaus of every 
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 Additionally, copies were delivered to all units of the 
planning commission and to the State Statistics Bureau offices in Beijing.
611
 The 
document noted that problems existed both at the systemic level and at the level of 
coordination. Coordination between Planning Units and Statistics Units, in particular, 
was frequently inconsistent. Such inconsistency, in turn, affected the calculation and 
meaning of specific indicators. Furthermore, subordinate planning and statistics 
departments often did not strictly enforce the SPC and SSB’s jointly issued regulations, 
or they habitually supplemented these regulations with their own contradictory 
regulations. Such ad hoc localized decision-making included changing a planning unit’s 
affiliations and economic structures without consultation.
612
 Finally, a single unit 
frequently possessed multiple sets of planning numbers and did not clearly specify which 
set was to form the basis for checking plan implementation. The consequence was that 
statistical work and planning work at any given level were disjointed. Duplication of data 
and the chaotic nature of statistical work adversely affected the quality of planning work.  
In order to resolve these problems of coordination, the SPC proposed five 
provisions. First, they insisted upon greater cooperation and understanding between the 
planning and statistics offices. At every level of administration, the statistics office must 
be in compliance with the corresponding planning committee. It was the statistics office’s 
responsibility to provide, examine, and approve all basic data needed for planning. This 
structure was to be replicated at all levels from the province down to the county. In order 
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for this to work in practice, planning departments were required to make their requests 
for statistical data well in advance of their use date, so that statistical activity could be 
properly planned and the data delivered in a timely fashion.
613
  
The second provision focused on problems with indicators, stressing that their 
meaning and the methods used to calculate and classify them should all be in agreement 
across statistics and planning work. Without such commensurability, it would be 
impossible to produce any meaningful comparisons. Where planning guidelines already 
existed, they were to be used to rationalize the indicators. Similarly, if in places the only 
guidelines were statistical ones, then they were to serve as the basis for the rationalization. 
And if neither statistical nor planning guidelines were available, then representatives 
from both statistical and planning offices were required to work together and devise 
mutually agreeable ones. In case of any special conditions or problems, the opinion of 
both the SSB and SPC had to be sought. Under no circumstances were local officials 
supposed to act before obtaining the SPC and the SSB’s approval. In general, indicators 
were to be calculated based on the following SSB catalogs and classification schemes:  
i. Catalog of Industrial Products 
ii. Catalog of Agricultural Products 
iii. Fixed Prices for Agricultural and Industrial Products 
iv. Industrial Sector Categories 
v. Classification of Workers and Wages 
If planning or statistics offices at any subordinate level considered a particular calculation 
method or categorization of indicator required improvement, they had to seek the joint 
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approval of the SSB and the SPC. And as noted above, they were not to take any action 
prior to obtaining such approval.
614
  
 Among the key tasks for statistical organs was checking the rate of plan 
implementation. Accordingly, the third provision stressed the need for statistics reporting 
units and summary (comprehensive) units to be in compliance with planning units. 
In particular, the planning units that fell within the National Economic Plan (NEP) were 
required to use the SSB’s periodical reports and survey estimates. Any changes in the 
relationship between planning units or in economic type again could only be carried out 
in consultation with both the SPC and the SSB and all catalogs used by planning units 
had to be copied to statistics offices.
615
 
 For statistics to effectively aid drafting of plans and to track their implementation, 
the fourth provision focused on the unifying the methods of plan implementation. In all 
cases, nationally approved numbers were to be used. So, for instance, when checking the 
implementation of a particular annual plan, the National Annual Plan was to serve as the 
basis for comparison. Similarly, when checking quarterly plans, quarterly numbers were 
to be drawn from the National Annual Plan and used as the basis for comparison. If such 
numbers did not exist, corresponding quarterly figures from the next higher level were to 
be used. In the case of monthly plans for grassroots industries, the quarterly plan of the 
superior administrative unit was to be broken into monthly estimates and used. As with 
earlier provisions, any major changes or corrections could only be made after obtaining 
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approval. In the absence of any approval, the units were to continue using the older 
[incorrect] numbers and copy all results to the statistics division.
616
  
 The final provision reiterated the relative administrative ranking of planning and 
statistical units. At every level planning had to provide leadership to statistical work. 
Cadres from both units were required to periodically meet and discuss statistical work, so 
that day-to-day work was better and more closely coordinated. In addition, cadres from 
each unit were required to attend each other’s work meetings and when necessary, to 
jointlyreport and discuss their work with the central government.
617
 
Reading against the grain, these five provisions as well as the annual reports for 
1953 from the Beijing planning and statistics bureaus suggest that in the first year of the 
five-year plan there was limited and poor communication between planning and statistics 
activities. Planning and statistics offices frequently operated on an ad hoc basis, 
calculating their own indicators without appropriate approval, thereby adding to the 
cacophony of data and analyses. The relatively skewed numbers of personnel for Beijing, 
where a little over forty-one planning cadre had to coordinate their work with nearly 
4,000 statistical cadres, is also suggestive of how difficult it must have been for the 
planning organs to provide leadership and oversight of statistical organs. Oversight by the 
planning organs also meant that statistical organs were under two different authorities—
people’s committees (as discussed in Chapter V) and planning committees. In many 
instances, and especially at the local level, there may have existed significant overlap in 
personnel between the two. But even so, administratively they were different and 
therefore could easily be the source of different and possibly contradictory requests as far 
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as the statistical units were concerned. In spite of these difficulties, however (and perhaps 
remarkably), the SSB did produce annual reports on economic development and plan 
implementation for every year during the first five-year plan. 
 Even though the problems plaguing statistics and planning were accurately 
assessed by 1954, their resolution remained elusive over the following years. A notice 
issued jointly by the SPC and the SSB in April 1958 repeated many items from the 1954 
provisions just discussed and indicates that many problems remained unresolved even at 
the end of the first five-year plan.
618
 At the same time, developments during the four 
years since 1954 had also generated new challenges. The 1958 notice remarked that in 
keeping pace with expansions in the scope 口径 [lit. aperture] of annual plans, the range 
of statistical work had also expanded every year. As a result, statistical work had 
surpassed the scope 口径 of the first five-year plan. For example, in the case of 
investment in infrastructure, the five-year plan did not include investments in the military 
commission, in the bureau for the management of government offices, nor in 
administrative departments. However, such investments were all part of individual annual 
plans by the end of the first five-year period. In similar fashion, the five-year plan for 
geological surveying did not include several items labeled infrastructure investment that 
were included within annual plans or in the plans of individual departments.  
Continuing differences in the classification methods used by statistical and 
planning organs also resulted in inconsistencies. For example, the sown area for tobacco 
土烟 and for different kinds of hemp and flex (Cannabis Hemp 大麻; Velvet Leaf 青麻; 
and Kenaf 羊麻) was included in the five-year plan. However, in regular statistical work, 
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which was more attuned to the requirements of annual plans, they were listed within the 
sown area for technical crops 技术作物. In another example, the five-year plan did not 
include tubers 薯类, the finances of food supply,619 and catering 饮食业用 in its figures 
for retail sales of food commodities 粮食商品零售量. These were included, however, in 
the annual statistical figures. Finally, there were quite a few indicators whose calculations 
methods were not consistent. For instance, the indicator for food did not include data for 
soybeans and indicators of infrastructure investment in agriculture, forestry, or water 
management did not include investment data from the forest industry. 
620
 
 Much like in 1954, the SSB and SPC again recommended a slew of measures to 
try and combat these problems. In those instances where the scope of statistics exceeded 
that of planning, they recommended that the results be publicly announced, without 
correcting for the differences. This was particularly acceptable when the expansion in 
scope was more-or-less offset by the reduction in prices or other factors, such as in the 
case of infrastructure investment.
621
 In those cases where the scope of planning exceeded 
that of statistics, the statistical data needed to be adjusted by making appropriate 
estimations, with the caveat that the adjustments could be avoided if the differences were 
small and did not affect claims about the overall completion of the plan. On the question 
of inconsistencies in classification, the SPC and the SSB now called for planning 
categories to take precedence over statistical ones.  
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The notice recognized that changes in the scope of the plan were sometimes made 
during the implementation process itself through a variety of actions, such as increasing 
or decreasing the number of construction units. Under such circumstances, instead of 
constantly revising plans, the notice asked that such changes be carefully recorded so that 
once the plan was completed the figures could be compared to the original plan figures. 
Furthermore, because the nature of the economy underwent substantial change during the 
plan period, when analyzing plan completion rates, it was best to use annual statistical 
data, since the planning data may not be commensurable for different years.
622
 It was 
with such considerations in mind that discussions about the second five year plan were 
undertaken. In late 1957 most provincial statistics bureaus drew up their own research 
plans. The Fujian Bureau, for instance, listed thirty-two questions ranging from analysis 





Work Points  
Even though agriculture was not the central thrust of planning, over the course of the 
decade the party-state progressively nationalized land, reorganized social relations in the 
countryside, and instituted a universal system of wages that fundamentally reshaped rural 
China. Statistics and quantification were at the heart of these changes. Measuring 
agricultural labor, in particular, developed into an increasingly important task as the state 
increasingly became not just the sole purveyor but also the sole provider of people’s 
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incomes. The principal method of keeping track of income earned through the 
performance of labor was the work-points system. The work-points system quantified 
every aspect of rural life by classifying every activity within the rural economy in terms 
of the number of points needed to perform it. Putatively, every activity was thus reduced 
to single number, accounted for on a daily basis. As a result, people’s relationship to 
numbers changed in new and fundamental ways. 
The Work-Point System 工分制, also known as the Labor-Day System 劳动日制, 
was a system of quantifying daily labor and allocating consumer goods in the rural 
countryside throughout most of the Mao era.
624
 According to Huang Yingwei 黄英伟, the 
concept of evaluating (someone’s) work and recording that evaluation in terms of points 
评工记分 was presumably in use before 1949.625 The first documentary evidence of the 
use of the phrase “evaluate work and record points” can be found in a mid-1950 report in 
China Agricultural Report 《中国农报》. By July of 1952, three methods for estimating 
a labor day had been proposed. In the first case, work points were preset and work was 
assigned based on those ratings. In the second case, work points for a task were 
predetermined 预定 but the actual assignment of points was carried out after the work 
had been completed by a democratic reckoning. Finally, the third method called for the 
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implementation of a system where quality, quantity, and the nature of work were all 
contractually fixed. These three systems would in later years be dubbed as ‘fixed points, 
fixed valuation’ 死分死评; ‘fixed points, negotiable valuation’ 死分活评; and ‘fixed 
labor’ 定额工.626 Sporadic discussions about these methods and their employment in 
tracking daily labor continued over the following few years.
627
 At this early stage, when 
mutual aid teams were the norm, “work points were used to keep track of the work put in 
by Farmer A on the plot of Farmer B, so that the latter could reciprocate fairly accurately, 
in accordance with the principle of “exchanging work for work”.
628
 Points were thus 
based solely on time, and did not distinguish between different types of work and their 
relative physical and mental requirements. Furthermore, as an exchange purely of labor, 
work points were not income in the strict sense.
629
 
It was not until November 9 1955, however, that a formal definition and 
interpretation were authorized by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress at its twenty-fourth meeting. From that point on, the work points system 
became a system of wages, operating on the principle: “calculate payment based on labor; 
the greater the labor the greater the gain” 按劳计酬、多劳多得.630 A work day 工作日 
was calculated as the quantity and quality of work that could be performed by a medium 
(average) amount of labor 中等的劳动力, taking into account a variety of factors such as 
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the nature of work, the quality of land, farm animals, agricultural tools, daylight hours 天
时, etc.631 One such work day was equal to ten work points 工分.632  
The following year, at the end of June, the transition from lower-state 
cooperatives to higher-stage cooperatives was initiated and all land was moved into 
collective ownership.
633
 Unlike in the previous period of lower-stage cooperatives, when 
land had remained privately owned even as it was collectively worked, this stage 
witnessed the quantification of every possible activity through what is known as the 
‘piece-work’ system.
634
 Accordingly, all forms of jobs were considered and rates were 
established for each in terms of work points. So, for instance, ploughing wheat could be 
worth 10 points per mu 亩, threshing it 9 points per mu, collecting manure 8 points per 
ton, and so on.
635
 Income from personal land was thus no longer possible and one’s entire 
earnings were based on wages calculated as work points.  
 
Enumerative Consciousness 
From the state’s perspective, a work-point system allowed for a degree of control over 
the harvest that payment in direct monetary terms would have made much more difficult. 
As Andrew Nathan explained:  
If wages are expressed in money terms, the State would be 
committed to certain expenditure in farmer’s wages; but with work 
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points, the money value is only known after State procurement. 
Then the total number of work points earned on the team is divided 
into the total value to be distributed to arrive at the value of each 
work point. Meanwhile, the farmer has competed with others to get 
more points only in order to get a higher proportion of the 




Monetary reckoning was usually done at the time of the Lunar Festival. Therefore, for 
much of the year work-points retained their abstract, purely numerical value. Even so, the 
rhetoric behind work points was very much one of emancipation from earlier feudal 
structures of state extraction. If in the pre-modern and early-modern past, statistics was a 
tool whereby the state and gentry taxed and oppressed peasants, then in the new China it 
was the tool of a munificent state that ensured the well-being of peasants and the 
development of the nation as a whole. In a section titled “The Abacus Clicks” in Lu Qi’s 
1963 poem “Willow Village Revisited,” this transformation is captured through the 
changing role of the abacus.  
…This abacus started clicking early: 
That year we staged the struggle, 
It computed exploitation, added up lost lives, 
Click, clack, click, clack… 
It’s the thousands of rifles firing salvos, 
And the battle drums thundering together; 
It added and added until  
Heaven and earth turned over and man changed his fate! 
 
It kept clicking till today, and today 
It no longer computes the rent, but work points.  
Yesterday it figured out whose hate was the strongest 
Today it tells us whose love is the deepest.  
Listen now, listen! 
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The abacus was a tool that originally calculated what peasants owed an extractive state 
and gentry. During Land Reform it became a tool in overturning the feudal order. It 
helped assess the value of that same extraction by quantifying the scale of exploitation so 
that peasants could be reimbursed through accurately calculated land redistribution. And 
shortly thereafter, even such harsh duties were set aside: “it no longer computes the rent, 
but work points.” Work points thus became indicators of peace and prosperity for all and 
were crucial to the social and economic transformation of the country-side.  
 Attitudes toward work points also pointed to whether one whole-heartedly 
supported the ongoing cooperativization. In Ma Feng’s “I Knew Three Years Ago,” a 
story written in the late 1950s but which was set earlier in the decade, the chief 
protagonist Uncle Chao (Man-tun) is portrayed as a “smart cookie” who had a difficult 
time adjusting to the cessation of his private commercial activities and the forfeiture of 
his assets, both of which were done to further the communal interests of the cooperative. 
Fretting over work points was one way in which his disgruntlement manifested itself: 
“Huh! Me grabbing for work points! Who doesn’t want to earn a few more 
work-day credits? You keep saying the co-op is your family. Why don’t 
you labor just for the co-op then? Or, “Even if you grew gold from the 
ground, if you don’t earn any work-day credit, you could stare till your 




A little later in the story, Uncle Chao’s wife confides in the author, noting that his 
attitude has improved:  
She paused and then said, “It’s much better now. For the past few years, 
our share at the end of the year has never been less than what we would 
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get if we worked on our own [land]. This has put his mind at ease. 




That Uncle Chao was only adding up his work points “every few days” is suggestive of 
how people may have fixated on their daily point tally as they sought to keep track of not 
just their own work points but also of their fellow co-op members. Both these literary 
examples thus point to the importance of work points as an increasingly pervasive and 
foundational element of life in the countryside.  This impression is also reflected in 
reports sharing positive work experience that were filed by village level statistical 
workers.  
 On April 18 1956, the Beijing Statistics Bureau sent out a notification to all 
bureaus/departments, communes, and associations within the city to begin making 
preparations for the city’s [and nation’s?] first Activist Statistical Workers Meeting 统计
工作经济发展大会.640  Held the following month from May 24 to 26, the meeting 
summarized and disseminated model work experience in statistics.
641
 In all, about 300 
statistical cadres from fifty-three departments, bureaus, and administrative units 
participated in the meeting.
642
 Among the at least twenty statements delivered at the 
meeting were two that focused on work in agricultural statistics.
643
 In each case, work 
points were central to the statistical cadre’s testimony.  
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 The first statement was made by Yang Shi’en 杨世恩, who was the statistician of 
the Number Nine Team of the Czech Agricultural Cooperative 中捷友好农业社 in the 
suburbs of Beijing.
644
 Yang was a graduate at the higher-primary level and during school 
would often listen to talks introducing Soviet collective farming and the happy lives of its 
members. Deeply influenced by them, he decided to volunteer in agricultural production. 
After graduating in 1953, he decided to put down his book bag and joined the village’s 
Tile Production Group 本乡的农业生产瓦助组.645 That same winter, Zhanglin 
Township 张邻庄乡 started to build a cooperative and he was sent (by the cooperative) to 
study agricultural technology. Upon returning, he was assigned the dual tasks of co-op 
statistician and technician. Even though he was initially concerned he didn’t have the 
ability to take care of statistical work, encouragement from his Team Leader Guo Baojin
郭保金 assuaged those fears.646  
 Yang encountered many difficulties during the first few months of statistical work 
at the cooperative. He discovered that the data being collected were completely unable to 
meet both the needs of the periodical reports that were reported up as well as the more 
local needs of the team and cooperative leaders. In many instances data was not freely 
provided; in those instances when it was, much of it appeared to be based upon 
estimation 估计. Yang proceeded to offer an example: while calculating the area under 
cotton he asked the Team Leader, “How many mu 亩 have you planted?” The Team 
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Leader replied, “Roughly 17 or 18 mu.” “Exactly how many,” Yang persisted. He replied: 
“You can write 17.5!”
647
 In similar fashion, no exact estimates of the amount of wheat 
sown or land under wheat cultivation existed. As a result, numbers couldn’t be 
successfully recorded and even when they were, the data recorded and the reality were 
frequently at odds with each other.  
  Yang discovered that work points were recorded in an especially chaotic manner. 
And unlike other kinds of data, their improper recording generated a tremendous amount 
of tension among members of the cooperative. To demonstrate this phenomenon, Yang 
recalled the case of an old cooperative member 老大爸 whose points had been under-
recorded. The old man had furiously accosted Yang, saying: "Right now the land does 
not ___, [only] through these [points] can we eat and drink. [If] you forget it [recording 
work-points] it's okay [for you], [but] for me each point is my very lifeblood."
648
 Yang 
found himself deeply troubled by such accusations, which he had to admit were true. But 
how, then, was one to apportion work points properly? The problem came to occupy him 
completely: “even food [I] was unable to eat; if [I] wanted to sleep [I] was unable to 
sleep.”
649
 In the end, it was Old Man Guo’s 郭大爸 statement that each point was his 
very lifeblood 纷纷就是命根 that made Yang resolve to improve the quality of statistical 
work. Work points, he recognized, lay at the root of everything: “if work points are 
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recorded well, then not only will that influence the life and production of the masses, but 
it will also influence the correctness of statistical materials.”
650
  
And so, he decided to work on improving his understanding of the relationship 
between work points and business and accounting calculations at the cooperative. During 
the spring planting season in 1955, Yang sought out the production team leaders to 
discuss and devise an improved system of recording work points and related statistical 
data. Based on these discussions, he devised a system whereby two types of data were 
simultaneously recorded. On the one hand, he accurately recorded each worker’s work 
points. On the other hand, he recorded in numeric terms the daily value of each worker’s 
completed farm work, such as plowing the land, sowing, removing pests, spreading 
manure, etc. This data was compiled into a daily interim summary. Every ten days, he 
would produce a full summary, which he would send to the county office. Yang 
explained that such a system allowed him to judge whether the allocation of work points 
was reasonable. In addition, he was now also able to assess in a more timely fashion the 
progress being made in production. His daily and ten-day reports had also improved the 
timeliness of statistical data—once members of the cooperative had reported to their 
teams, it only took him a day to produce summary reports on such things as amount of 
cultivated land or the number of livestock. 
Yang also compiled a couple of production handbooks 生产手册 for the team 
based on the production plans of the work team.
651
  These handbooks covered such things 
as how much area should be allocated for different crops, instructions for calculating how 
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much human and animal labor were required per mu of land and how much fertilizer to 
use per mu. In addition, he also delineated every job’s work point assignment. He gave 
copies of each handbook to leaders of small teams. In this way, team leaders were able to 
effectively and efficiently calculate each workers daily work points.  Yang asserted that 
such changes in practice not only helped reduce production losses, they also helped avoid 
the nightly wastage of time when everyone gathered to discuss the allocation of work 
points. The small-team-leader was so pleased with the outcome that he went to the extent 
of giving Yang’s handbook the epithet ‘teacher’ 老师.652  
 The second statement was filed by Liu Changming 刘长明, the statistician of the 
Number Seven Work Team of the Heping Agricultural Production Cooperative 和平农业
生产合作社, located in Heping Village 和平乡 in the Eastern Suburbs of Beijing 东郊
区.653 In 1954, Liu had left the Army and returned to the village and begun participation 
in agricultural work. The following year he took on the joint responsibilities of cashier 出
纳 and work points recorder 记工 for the South Lake Drainage Cooperative 南湖渠社.654 
At that time, Liu noted that the entire team’s work point distribution had not been 
checked for errors in a very long time. In order to correct this state of affairs, he focused 
on professional learning and worked with his subordinates so that all work-point 
recorders became comfortable with how to record work points. He taught all work point 
recorders in the cooperative and firmly established in their minds the importance of their 
work. In addition, whenever a meeting was organized, he would ask leaders of the 
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cooperative to invite other leaders to participate. This raised the meeting’s profile and 
made all attendees participate more seriously. Such a strategy had the added benefit of 
solving on-the-spot any difficulties that arose.  
In keeping with the Mass Line, Liu stressed that recording work points must also 
rely on the leadership of the masses. He would frequently go down to the grass-roots 
level to understand the actual problems that work-points recorders faced and helped them 
solve their problems. Liu also set up a team-wide system of mutual checks and 
comparisons. Good practices would receive praise, and the bad ones were criticized. 
Every ten days the work-point recorders and the members of the cooperative got together 
to reconcile labour manuals so that there was no incongruity between the logging of work 
points and the actual work that had been carried out. Every month, after reconciling with 
the entire team, Liu and his fellow points recorders also put together a work points 
account book .The recorders also took advantage of days and times when inclement 
weather made farm work impossible and organized fora 座谈会 where work-point 
recorders could jointly study methods for recording work points, share experience, and 
thereby improve the quality of their work. It was as a result of such measures that the 
recording of work points was no longer error prone.  
 The institution of work points thus served to invert the relationship to numeracy 
that we may have come to expect. As the power of the state expanded enormously over 
the past few centuries, scholars such as James Scott have located modes and sites of 
resistance to state intrusion.
655
 In a recent workshop paper, Jacob Eyferth sought to add to 
Scott’s strategies of ‘a-literacy’ and ‘a-historicity’ by proposing ‘a-numeracy’: not 
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knowing how to count was a way of keeping the state at bay during the tumultuous 
transformations taking of 1950s China.
656
 At the same time, the discussion of work-points 
in this chapter indicates that as higher-stage cooperatives became the de facto reality in 
the rural countryside, a-numeracy may have transformed into a new form of enumerative 
consciousness. As every day was reduced to a single nominal digit which represented 
one’s entire income, it became increasingly impossible to claim ignorance or disinterest 
vis-à-vis numbers and quantification.  
 
Conclusion 
Socialist statistics was central to both the way in which the state approached planning and 
to the changes that were wrought in the countryside. Complete statistical information 
demanded unmatched levels of cooperation and data sharing across all levels of the 
planning and statistical apparatus, even as at the grass-roots level the impetus to quantify 
each and every basic activity in the rural country-side generated enormous social tensions 
as numbers in the most basic form of work points came to occupy an increasingly central 
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The Turn to India:  






























Sunday, 9 December 1956. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Indian Statistical 
Institute (ISI) in Calcutta had not gone entirely according to schedule. The original 
itinerary called for a visit of half an hour. Strenuous protestations by P.C. Mahalanobis, 
the ISI’s director, had resulted in a further 45 minutes being granted. But the Premier’s 
party arrived almost a half hour late, throwing the carefully planned schedule into 
disarray. Various items on the agenda had to be jettisoned.
657
 Zhou himself did not help 
matters by getting deeply involved in several displays, asking questions, seeking 
clarifications. In the National Sample Survey Unit, he sat down on a table and refused to 
move until his questions had been satisfactorily answered. By the time he finally emerged 
out in the open, several minutes behind schedule, the West Bengal officials including the 
Chief Minister Dr. B.C. Roy, who had accompanied Zhou through his tour of the Institute, 
were all in a hurry to depart. Suddenly, Zhou caught hold of Mahalanobis’ arm, “side-
stepped the waiting car, waved his hand to shake off everyone,” and took him aside. 
“What are the countries most advanced in statistics? Are you in touch with them?” 
Zhou inquired. Mahalanobis listed the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, noting further that while they had been in touch with all three, it was not desirable 
to copy from any country and that “in India we are trying to adopt and develop the 
methods to suit our own needs.” Zhou nodded his head in vigorous approval. He 
observed that a group of Chinese statisticians would be visiting the ISI very soon. “I want 
them to see everything in detail. We want to learn from you. How long should they 
stay?..I shall tell them to stay as long as you think it advisable...Also, we want to send 
research scholars to work here. What is the kind of men who should come?” Mahalanobis 
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told Zhou that he wanted a mix of types, some advanced and some with good experience 
of practical work. He also wanted an economist or two who could share China’s planning 
experiences. Zhou again approved. “Yes, we must have exchange of men.” On the 
question of how long the research scholars should stay at the ISI, Mahalanobis suggested 
a period of at least six months and preferably one year, with some staying longer as 
necessary. Zhou was determined: “We shall arrange this. I shall tell them that they should 
consult you, and you should make the final decision.” He concluded the conversation by 




The exchange may have had a redemptive quality for Mahalanobis. For long, he 
had tried to engage with the Chinese on matters of planning and statistics, only to be 
rebuffed. But now, things seemed different. And Zhou’s urgency was real, the results 
tangible. On December 11, 1956, just two days after Zhou Enlai’s visit, a team of 
Chinese statisticians arrived at the ISI. Ostensibly to participate in the silver jubilee 
celebrations of the Institute, they stayed for a month. Led by one of deputy directors of 
the State Statistics Bureau (SSB) whom we have already encountered in Part I, Wang 
Sihua, the four-person delegation also included the noted demographer, statistician, and 
People’s University professor, Dai Shiguang 戴世光 (1908-1999). Within months of 
returning to Beijing, deliberations over inviting Mahalanobis to China began. “And next 
year in Peking,” did indeed become a reality. Mahalanobis, accompanied by his wife and 
by the statistician D.B. Lahiri, spent three weeks in China during the months of June and 
July 1957. The two statisticians lectured to large audiences at the Planning Commission, 
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Statistics Bureau and various universities, held numerous small group discussions with 
statisticians and planners, and planned future cooperation and exchange. Later that year, 
two Chinese statisticians, Wu Hui 吴辉 from the Industrial Statistics Division and Gong 
Jianyao 龚鉴尧 from the Agricultural Statistics Division, arrived at the ISI and spent over 
an year in India studying statistical theory and its applications.  
 
     * * * 
 
Ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1 1949, the 
Chinese had hewn close to the Soviet Union as a role model, regarding it as an older 
brother with advanced experience [先进经验 xianjin jingyan], who needed to be learned 
from and emulated. Made famous by Mao’s phrase of “leaning more to one side,” (一边
倒 yibian dao), the practical implications of this policy had been the disregard for those 
kinds of relationships and gatherings that fell outside of this special mentoring program. 
That the People’s Republic was in the Soviet camp fits a well understood Cold-War 
paradigm. The world had two centers, with their own zones of influence, and they each 
vied for control and influence over the vast regions they did not influence. In the 
immediate years following the end of World War II, the rapid unraveling of empires and 
the new emergence of nation states provided them with a playground for this exercise in 
influence. This center-periphery framework has come to dominate recent studies of the 






 As a result, studies of scientific exchange in the post-1945 years have frequently 
focused on West-centered or Soviet-centered networks at the neglect of regional- or self-
avowedly “Third World” links such as the Sino-Indian exchanges of the 1950s.  
As we have seen in Parts I and II, the story of statistics in the People’s Republic 
also appears to follow the general pattern: if Western involvement and influence in the 
spread of (social) sciences in China is one of the characteristics of the Republican period 
(1911-1949), then Soviet presence is often cited as a key factor in the evolution of 
(statistical) science in the immediate post-1949 years. But, as this chapter demonstrates, 
this fits a neat Cold War framework that elides even as it explicates. Starting as early as 
1951, and with increasing urgency after 1956, Chinese and Indian statisticians and 
planners traded visits as they sought to learn from each other’s experiences. The later 
exchanges, in particular, were qualitatively and quantitatively different from those in 
1951, and help shed light not only on a particular instance of scientific cooperation and 
knowledge production outside of the Cold War framework but also allow us to better 
appreciate the history of statistics in the early People’s Republic. In so doing, they also 
permit a more grounded understanding of the possible causes for the break-down in Sino-
                                                     
659
 There is a growing literature on the history of development and aid in the post-WWII era, much of it 
through the prism of US or Soviet centered networks of aid and influence. See for instance: Nick Cullather 
2010. The Hungry World:  America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Pres, 2010; David Ekbladh. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction 
of an American World Order, 1914 to the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010; the 
materials at the Cold War International History Project at the Wilson Center; Thomas P. Bernstein and 
Hua-yu Li, eds. China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present. New York: Lexington Books, 2010; 
Daniel Immerwahr. The Village Ideal: The United States, Community Development, and the World. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014; and Odd Arne Westad, ed. Brothers in arms: the rise 
and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1945-1963. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.  
For an insightful critique of the scholarship on the history of north-south scientific exchanges in the post-
World War II years, see: Alexis De Grief A and Mauricio Neito Olarte. “What We Still Do Not Know 
About South-North Technoscientific Exchange—North-centrism, Scientific Difussion, and Social Studies 
of Science.” In The Historiography of Contemprary Science, Technology, an Medicine—Writing Recent 





Soviet relations, moving us beyond causes/arguments that can be located at the highest 
levels of politics and in the egos of leaders.  
At the heart of the Sino-Indian exchanges was the desire to learn more about 
mathematical statistics and its applications, particularly the cutting-edge statistical 
method of random sampling, which, while technically complex, held great practical 
salience for large and diverse countries such as China and India. This chapter traces these 
exchanges, explaining their timing and the motivation behind them. The story of these 
exchanges provides a specific and highly illuminating case of the growing disaffection 
that the Chinese experienced with a strategy of overt reliance on the Soviet Union for 
technical and scientific advice. At the same time, these exchanges also highlight the 
possibilities of south-south cooperation and exchange that became particularly appealing 
after the April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. Each set of actors in these 
exchanges had their own agendas. The Indians were particularly keen to learn more about 
China’s planning methods. The Chinese, in turn, were much more focused on learning 
about statistical theory and methods, and more broadly, about an approach to statistics, 
which for political and ideological reasons had been rendered anathema. 
 
P.C. Mahalanobis and the Promise of Post-War Statistics 
As we have seen in Part I of this dissertation, the first half of the 20
th
 century was a time 
of tremendous statistical innovation, benefiting in particular from genuine attempts at 
melding theory with practice in order to solve the pressing concerns of the day. To review 




on two parallel tracks, one descriptive and the other analytic.
660
 The descriptive traced its 
origins to the “political arithmetic” of the seventeenth century, and through it to a much 
more fundamental and age-old phenomenon—the desire of the state to collect 
information about its constituents, its land, its produce, and so on. The analytic can be 




 centuries and was principally concerned 
with concepts of chance, probability, and estimating and controlling error, all in the 
abstract , mathematical, sense. Starting in the 19
th
 century, these tracks began to intersect. 
Statistical methods were brought to bear on the most pressing social concerns of the day. 
This cross-pollination led to tremendous innovation, resulting in many of the concepts 
that form the bedrock of modern day statistics—correlation, variance, regression, random 
sampling, and so on.   
 By the 1940s, statistics, operations research, and other numerically driven 
methods of understanding and organizing different aspects of day-to-day life were 
increasingly gaining legitimacy. A somewhat well known example of this phenomenon is 
found in the career of the Kennedy and Johnson era Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, who during WWII worked in the Air Force’s Office of Statistical Control, 
applying statistical and management theory (the ‘Harvard Method’) to enhance the 
efficiency of B-29 bombers.
661
 The end of the Second World War witnessed new 
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attempts at global organization, and coincided with the post-colonial wave of newly 
independent countries. Statistics came to be viewed as a key tool for national and 
international development and stability. Newly formed nation states sought to establish 
statistical bureaus, collect data, and address issues of governance and growth. At the 
global level, newly formed international organizations like the United Nations and the 
World Bank sought to render such data commensurable by establishing norms for its 
collection, collation, and analysis.
662
  
 Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis was in many ways among the most articulate 
spokesmen for the promotion and use of statistics. “A physicist by training, a statistician 
by instinct and a planner by conviction,”
663
 Mahalonobis melded scientific and 
intellectual heft with a tremendous drive to engage in practical matters, and to use 
statistics to understand and address the problems of every-day life. As a result, he became 
intrinsically involved not just with independent India’s first forays into economic 
planning and development, but perhaps even more significantly, with the development 
and establishment of statistics, most notably sample survey techniques, as a principal tool 
for knowing the world.
664
 Mahalanobis’ original training had been in physics, and it was 
a subject he continued to teach into the 1950s. But a chance encounter with statistical 
journals in a Cambridge University library led to his first exposure to statistics. By the 
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mid-1920s he had abandoned plans to return to Cambridge to continue a PhD in physics, 
choosing instead to stay in Calcutta and pursue various projects whereby he could apply 
statistical methods to practical problems. In 1932, along with a few likeminded 
individuals, he established the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Calcutta. Initially 
operating out of a tiny room at Presidency College, by the 1950s the ISI had moved to a 
sprawling campus in the north of the city and evolved into one of the premier centers for 
statistical research and application across the globe.
665
  
In his Presidential Address to the thirty-seventh session of the Indian Science 
Congress in January 1950 Mahalanobis had astutely observed that, “at each upsurge of 
social and political development, or during war, there is a rapid growth and expansion of 
statistical practice.”
666
 Later in the same speech, he added:  
Statistics is not only an applied science but is also a public science. It is 
because of the close connexion with public activities that big 
developments in statistics have always occurred only when there has been 
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And, to his mind, the 1940s and 1950s were precisely such a time. War time exigencies 
had spurred the application of statistical theory to practical problems, and now in the 
post-war world, statistics had a foundational role to play. In 1947 he brought his 
considerable expertise, acumen, and drive to the UN’s newly formed Statistical 
Commission and served as the chairman of its Sub-Commission on Statistical 
Sampling.
668
 Mahalanobis was the driving force behind the Sub-Commission. “With the 
vision of a pioneer he perceived how sampling methods could overcome the otherwise 
insoluble problems of obtaining accurate information about a vast and still largely 
illiterate country like India”
669
 
Sampling, of course, has a long history. In his 1950 Presidential Address 
Mahalanobis had explained that its twentieth century formulation was a combination of 
the long history of purposive sampling with that of the recent developments in probability 
and mathematics. Purposive sampling is a form of sampling in which the samples chosen 
for analysis are selected because of some specific characteristic they possess. Today, we 
would identify it more closely with qualitative research, not quantitative.
670
 For a long 
time it was regarded as the only proper method of sampling and as late as 1926 it was 
given considerable prominence by a committee of experts of the International Statistical 
                                                     
668
 A part of the UNESCO, the Commission is the “apex entity of the global statistical system. It brings 
together the Chief Statisticians from member states from around the world. It is the highest decision 
making body for international statistical activities especially the setting of statistical standards, the 
development of concepts and methods and their implementation at the national and international level.” 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/commission.htm accessed February 29 2012.  
 
669




 To put it crudely, imagine, for instance, that we were to select Morningside Heights for intensive 







 But since then evidence had been consistently mounting that it produced 
results that were neither representative nor accurate. The method of complete 
enumeration was also brought under increased scrutiny. In a 1950 paper in the Bulletin of 
the International Statistical Institute Mahalanobis had demonstrated “that with an 
acceptable level of precision the costs of sample surveys are only about ten percent of 
that of a complete enumeration.”
672
 In the same issue, Mahalanobis’ friend, collaborator, 
and colleague on the sub-commission, the statistician Ronald A. Fisher, went even further 
and stated that not only were sampling procedures ideal because of their adaptability, 
speed, and economy, but that they were also more scientific than complete 
enumeration.
673
 Mathematical theory undergirded sampling, and this permitted the 
“careful design of sample surveys with a preset level of precision.”
674
 
    “Large-scale sample survey techniques as practiced today,” declared the 
statistician C.R. Rao in his 1973 memoir of Mahalanobis for the Fellows of the Royal 
Society, “owe much to the pioneering work of Mahalanobis in the forties and fifties.”
675
 
According to Rao, Mahalanobis made three notable contributions to sample survey 
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techniques: pilot surveys, the concept of optimum survey design, and interpenetrating 
network of samples.
676
 He developed these methods during the 1930s and 1940s, starting 
initially by using sampling procedures to estimate jute yield in Bengal in 1937. Over the 
next two decades, along with his colleagues at the Indian Statistical Institute, he carried 
out numerous sample surveys, developing new procedures and fine-tuning old ones. 
Mahalanobis’ contributions were not limited to the development of theory and method 
and he also assisted in establishing the framework and standards through which they 
could be used across the world. As Chairman of the UN Sub-commission on Statistical 
Sampling, he oversaw the publication of “The Preparation of Sample Survey Reports,” 
which continues to provide the common guidelines for modern sampling procedures in 
use by statistical bureaus across the world today.
677
  
 Mahalanobis’ interest in statistics was almost entirely instrumental, a point he 
made most forcefully in his essay “Statistics must have a purpose.”
678
 This desire to use 
statistics to solve real world problems also got him involved in economic planning by the 
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late 1940s. His closeness to India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, led to an 
appointment on the Planning Commission, and before long he was charged with drawing 
up India’s second Five Year Plan (1955-59). In preparation for this work Mahalanobis 
spent the summer of 1954 traveling through the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, conferring with economists, statisticians, and 
planners.
679
 A two-sector growth model that he had created in 1953, similar to G.A. 
Feldman’s 1928 model, became the basis for India’s second Five Year Plan.
680
 Earlier in 
the decade, he had succeeded in bringing the biennial Conference of the International 
Statistical Institute to India. The Institute’s twenty-seventh session was held in Delhi in 
December 1951.
681
 With the exception of Japan, which had played host in 1930, this 
marked the first time that an Asian or African nation had hosted the prestigious 
conference. By the 1950s Mahalanobis had also built the ISI up to be one of the leading 
centers for statistical innovation in the world. It was a magnet for all kinds of scientists, 
from either side of the iron curtain and beyond the curtain.
682
 And with the help of the 
United Nations (UNESCO), in 1950 he had also set up at the ISI in Calcutta an 
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International Statistical Education Centre (ISEC), the principal purpose of which was to 
train statistical workers and students from Asia and Africa. By 1956, students from 




Initial Overtures and Estrangement 
The People’s Republic of China had largely stayed outside this newly globalizing world 
of statistical exchange. That this was so was not for want of trying on the part of 
Mahalanobis. He was acutely interested in what the Chinese were doing. In the summer 
of 1954 he had confided to Pitambar Pant:  
I had two talks with Blackett [P.M.S. Blackett, left-leaning English 
physicist] and on one occasion he mentioned that he could foresee that in 
10 years time India would be holding her own or even somewhat better 
her conditions of life but he thought China during the same time would go 
very far ahead; and he asked me whether this was not likely to have a 





And he was keen to visit China as well. Later that summer, while in the Soviet Union, he 
wrote again: “I must also go to China – but after our ideas have become more clear 
[sic].”
685
 Mahalanobis’ efforts at engaging with the People’s Republic had begun when 
India hosted the twenty-seventh biennial session of the International Statistical Institute 
in 1951. As the General Secretary of the National Committee charged with organizing the 
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conference, he oversaw the delivery of official letters of invitation to seventy-one 
countries, including the People’s Republic of China. Individual invitations were also sent 
to four Chinese members of the International Statistical Institute: Chen Da 陈达, J.P. Chu 
[Zhu Junyi 朱君毅], K.P. King (Jin Guobao 金国宝), and T.L. Woo. These are familiar 
names; prominent Republican era statisticians, they had attended the 1947 meeting in 
Washington, D.C. and we have already encountered them in Part I of this dissertation. 
The invitees were also informed that a special session of the International Statistical 
Association for Asia and the Far East (ISAAFE) would be held shortly after the ISI 
Conference with the aim of:  
(a) Converting the ISAAFE into a wider Asian Statistical Institute with 
both individual and governmental and institutional membership and 
working partly at an individual and partly at a governmental level and (b) 





Chinese participation was “earnestly” sought. It was hoped that a delegation from China 
would be sent, failing which, perhaps someone from the Chinese Cultural Delegation, 
then already visiting India, could be requested to attend.  
 There appears to have been no response from the Chinese government or from the 
individual invitees. Mahalanobis was forced to resort to other means. Shortly afterwards, 
at a party for ambassadors hosted by Nehru, he engineered a chance encounter with the 
Chinese Ambassador and urged the Chinese to attend.
687
 Within a few days a new set of 
invitations arrived at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. The ambassador deputed Shen 
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Jian 申建, a counselor in the Embassy, to meet with Mahalanobis. By 21November, So-
wan Pitt, the First Secretary in the Embassy was able to inform Mahalanobis that the 
Chinese government had accepted the invitation, and that “one or two members of the 
Chinese Cultural Delegation, which is now visiting India, will be instructed to participate 
in it.”
688
 A little over a week later, So-Wan Pitt confirmed the participation of Ti Chao-
pei (Di Chaobai 狄超白), a member of the Chinese delegation already in India.689   
 As it happened, Di was only able to attend the first day of the Conference. The 
Chinese delegation was on its way to Burma and he was forced to leave Delhi the very 
next day, on the 6th. To compensate, he drafted a short statement which he wished to 
have either read out or distributed during the Conference. In keeping with our discussion 
in Part I, this statement laid out the general view of statistics as it was taking shape in the 
PRC at that time: 
To us, statistics is one of the important means in the work of social 
construction and scientific researches. At the same time, we are of the 
opinion that the theories, methods and systems in connection with 
statistics adopted in a country cannot but be closely linked with the social 
system of the country in question; that only in a country where planned 
economy is practicable that statistics could be accessible to the work and 
daily life of the people and made for the people, its scope could be broad, 
correct, timely, and its utilization the maximum.
690
 (Original in English) 
 
With the jibe at the notion of a universal statistics successfully delivered, he lauded the 
attempt at mutual understanding and exchange of statistical theories and methods that the 
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Conference represented. Yet, he felt that “all these tasks could be satisfactorily fulfilled 
only after the realization of a genuine international peace and the extinction of the 
aggressive designs of imperialism.”
691
 Di made no mention of the Calcutta sessions but 
an undeterred Mahalanobis responded the very same day, thanking Di for his 
participation and contribution, and reiterated his desire that China, in spite of Di’s 
unavailability, be represented at the Calcutta sessions: 
“We are particularly eager that the People’s Republic of China should be 
represented at the speical [sic] meetings which will be held in Calcutta on 
18 and 19 December to consider the organization and programme of work 
of a regional international statistical association or institute for Asian 
countries…I hope this will be possible.”
692
   
 
Within a few days Mahalanobis was informed that Mr. Tai Ping (戴平 Dai Ping), the 
Consul at the Calcutta Consulate-General, would attend the Calcutta sessions.
693
  
 The Chinese appear to have come away unimpressed from the Calcutta sessions. 
They had likely been wary of the whole Conference right from the time the invitations 
first arrived. And their fears may have found justification as early as the inaugural session 
of the Conference on 5 December itself, when India’s Finance Minister, Chintaman 
Deshmukh, made the following observation toward the end of his (keynote) address: 
The International Statistical Association for India and the Far East, (which 
was established in 1949-50 through the efforts of the trainees from 10 or 
12 countries who assembled in Delhi in [sic] training centre in population 
and agricultural censuses under the auspices of the United Nations and the 
Food and Agricultural Organization), is arranging to have a special session 
on the 18th and 19th December in Calcutta to considers its future 
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organization and programme of work. The Government of India appreciate 
the benefits which would be secured through the building up of an active 
International Statistical Centre for the Asian countries, and would give 
their support to any suitable programme of work. Such an organization 




UN auspices for the Association could not have been viewed favorably by the Chinese 
who were themselves excluded from the UN in favor of the government of Chiang Kai-
shek (Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石) on Taiwan. But references to the Colombo Plan would also 
have raised flags. Its full name was the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and 
Social Development in Asia and the Pacific and it had been conceived at the 
Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) 
in January 1950. It was formally launched in mid-1951 and by the end of the year the 
United States had also become a member country.
695
 As a result, it would not have been 
difficult for the Chinese to construe the ISI Conference and the Association, which was 
renamed the International Statistical Association for Asia and the Far East during the 
Calcutta sessions, as ideologically compromised.
696
 
In a series of telegrams exchanged between the Calcutta Consulate General, the 
Embassy in Delhi, and the Foreign Ministry in Beijing that date from December 1951 
through March 1953, just such an understanding was arrived at. By the end of April 1952 
all documents and reports pertaining to the Conference sessions in Delhi and Calcutta had 
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been delivered to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing.
697
 It took another six months before an 
initial opinion was forthcoming. In the considered judgment of the Ministry, it was felt 
that the Chinese should “in principle not plan to maintain links with the [said] 
organization.”
698
 Early the following year, further explication was put down in writing: 
The [stated] Association has extremely close ties with the international 
statistics society, operates under the influence and control of imperialism, 
and there is a great probability that in the name of learning and science it 




Two months later, in March 1953, clear instructions were issued that it was no longer 
necessary to treat with this Association or respond to its overtures.
700
 The People’s 
Republic was much better off without involving itself in imperialist misadventures, 
especially when it had radically different views on the definition and purpose of statistics. 
As discussed in Part I, a close and profitable relationship had already been established 
with the Soviet Union, and little was to be gained by dealing with what appeared to be 
suspect organizations like the ISAAFE or the two ISIs.
701
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Statistics as a Case Study in Disaffection 
By 1956, however, confidence in the Soviet Union and its advanced experience was no 
longer taken for granted. Even though recent scholarship has highlighted the tensions in 
the Sino-Soviet story, including specific cases where initial idolization of Soviet models 
was confronted by the reality of their execution or their sheer inapplicability to Chinese 
conditions, the causes of the disenchantment that began in 1956 are still largely attributed 
to two more over-arching reasons.
702
 As Hua-Yi Lee and Thomas P. Bernstein have 
observed in a recent edited volume, the general consensus in the scholarship is that the 
evolution of Sino-Soviet relations strongly influenced Chinese attitudes toward the Soviet 
model.
703
 Accordingly, the causes for the disaffection are still largely framed either as an 
ideological dissonance, or an egotistical one, or both. They frequently center on how Mao 
and the CCP leadership reacted to Khrushchev’s 1956 speech denouncing Stalin’s 
personality cult, on Mao believing that in the post-Stalin era he ought to be regarded as 
the leader of the Socialist world, and also on the reception of events like the quashing of 
Hungarian revolt that year.
704
 In his January 1956 report, “On the question of 
intellectuals,” Zhou Enlai recognized other reasons as well. The report acknowledged the 
continuing central role that Soviet aid needed to play in order for China to advance in 
science and technology, but buried in the middle were also clear words of caution: 
On the question of the study of the Soviet Union, however, in the past 
there had also been such defects as undue haste, arbitrary learning, and 
mechanical application. Some comrades even arbitrarily rejected the 
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achievements of the capitalist countries in science and technique. These 




Zhou’s warning is redolent of the possibility that the disaffection was widespread and 
substantive. The articles in the Bernstein and Li volume have already suggested some 
bottom up causes for disaffection and frustration—most notably the claim that the advice 
being given by the Soviets did not take into account local Chinese conditions. But it is the 
case of statistics, perhaps, that provides one of the clearest instances of a widespread and 
substantive disaffection with Soviet advice and expertise.  
 To review briefly from Part I, the Chinese adoption of the Soviet approach to 
statistics occurred in the early 1950s. In the first couple of years after 1949, statistical 
treatises written by Chinese statisticians freely reflected, both, Soviet as well as what 
were subsequently identified as bourgeois English-American approaches to statistics. 
Starting in 1950, and gathering momentum from the following year, Anglo-American 
statistics was progressively critiqued and repudiated in favor of the Soviet understanding 
of statistics. By the time the SSB was established in 1952, the Soviet approach held sway, 
both in the academy as well as in the practical fields of statistical work. This Soviet 
approach attained even greater influence in the People’s Republic following the 1954 
conference on statistics in the Soviet Union. At this conference, statistics was reaffirmed 
as a social science, in service to building a socialist society, bifurcating it—rhetorically 
and substantively—from the tainted, bourgeois, and socially unproductive pursuit of 
abstract mathematical statistics.  
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 In the People’s Republic, the practical implications of this definition were two-
fold. Within the academy, the study of statistics stood divided. The discipline of statistics, 
now defined as a social science, was taught in statistics departments where the focus was 
primarily on procedure, methodology, and work. Mathematical statistics, that 
“unproductive” and bourgeois pursuit, was banished to mathematics department. As a 
result, much like in the Soviet Union, the theoretical and practical arms of statistics were 
separated, denying the possibility of mutual cross-pollination or the discovery of new 
theories and methods through application, experimentation, and testing.
706
 Outside the 
academy, in the world of statistical work, the impact was just as significant, and resulted 
in essentially two methods for gathering statistical information: (1) the establishment of a 
periodical report system based on complete enumeration wherein from the village level 
upwards, paper reports were compiled and supplied to each successive higher level till 
they all reached the headquarters of the State Statistics Bureau in Beijing; and (2) where 
complete enumeration was deemed impractical, sample surveys employing the typical 
sampling methods.
707
 Accordingly, by 1957, the SSB was able to summarize: 
“For the purpose of providing statistical data for drafting and examining 
national plan [sic], the complete enumeration periodical report system has 
been established in all the economic departments in the country. To 
supplement these, a sampling body of sixteen thousand farm households 
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The sampling spoken of here was purposive (also called typical) sampling. As already 
noted, this is a method of sampling in which the samples are not selected using any 
random or stochastic method. It was the precursor to random sampling and had had a 
long history of being regarded as a valid and worthwhile method. Even into the early 20
th
 
century it was officially accepted in many places and, as such, its employment into the 
1950s was not altogether unusual.
709
  
Within a few years, the constraints imposed by the methods of socialist statistics 
became unmistakable. For a country with limited technical resources and a limited supply 
of trained personnel, yet saddled with an enormous agricultural sector and the largest 
population in the world, the challenges posed by complete enumeration were legion. And 
they were made harder still by the employment of the periodical report system. Paper 
reports, full of tables and summaries, were generated at each level of administration. 
Very soon, not only Beijing, but every administrative level was complaining of a flood of 
papers and numbers, and little capacity to make any sense of them. Excess issuing (滥发 
lanfa) of reports was a problem that drew the attention of all levels of the statistical 
system. Even though repeated attempts had been made to tackle the problem, it remained 
a constant feature of statistical work into the second half of the decade.  
 The reliance on purpose sampling also generated problems. Where complete 
enumeration was not deemed possible, such as in accounting for total area under crops or 
calculating agricultural yield, the method of purposive sampling had been and was being 
employed. As Mahalanobis would himself later explain:  
An attempt is made to select sample-units (agricultural fields, households, 
etc) which are typical or have characteristics close to the average…It is 
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now recognized that the method of “purposive sampling” is not 
scientifically correct. The only sound method is “random or probability 
sampling” which can be relied upon to supply truly representative results; 





Chinese statisticians were, thus, frequently stuck with estimates that did not accurately 
represent any reality on the ground. Claiming that a particular village or tract of land was 
representative of an entire prefecture, and using numbers gained from a close analysis of 
its characteristics, only lead to inaccurate estimates. These estimates, upon collation with 
other inaccurate estimates, helped compound errors, and could eventually result in data 
that bore little relation to any reality on the ground.   
 By 1956, socialist statistics had exhibited weakness on at least three counts. First, 
by not taking into account the greater challenges posed by China’s larger population and 
predominantly agrarian economy, it demonstrated a rigidity that rendered it incapable of 
adapting to local conditions. Second, the insistence on using purposive sampling meant 
that the technology and scientific theories being employed were not the most advanced, 
or to use Mahalanobis’ even more blunt term, simply not correct. Finally, and most 
damningly, the methods had not been able to deliver the desired results, something best 
articulated by Wang Sihua himself, who noted that statistical work remained unable to 
address the needs of the Planning Commission and the demands of the nation’s leaders.  
It is precisely at this moment that the statistical exchanges with India were re-
established. That the Chinese were willing to explore solutions in, and in cooperation 
with, India was perhaps no longer as inconceivable as it was in 1951. Frustration with 
Soviet expertise and methods had already led Zhou Enlai to demand that the People’s 
Republic not neglect advances made in capitalist countries. India was a useful middle-
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ground, where the intellectual and policy environment was open to a variety of 
perspectives. And Sino-Indian relations, especially in the cultural sphere, had blossomed 
since the early 1950s.   
 
Sino-Indian contacts: Wrestling for Asia’s Soul
711
 
In 1953, Frank Moraes, then editor of the Times of India and recently returned from a 
tour of the People’s Republic of China, wrote:  
“By a quirk of fate Asia’s two most densely populated countries, which 
are also neighbors, are the testing grounds for two differing and 
contending political philosophies. If China proves that her system of 
government ensures economic security to the vast mass of her people 
without detracting greatly from their sense of freedom, Asia will be lost to 
Communism. If India, on the other hand, demonstrates that democratic 
government can ensure not only economic security but individual liberty, 
then Asia will be won to democracy. What India and China are today 
doing is wrestling for the political soul of Asia. That is why India’s role in 




The fate of the ‘political soul of Asia,’ as Moraes called it, captured the imagination of 
many minds in the 1950s.
713
 Not least among them were Indians and Chinese themselves. 
There was mutual suspicion, but also much admiration, at least from several individual 
Indian visitors. Unfortunately, the documentary record of this mutual appraisal, and of 
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the varied contacts that formed at least part of its basis, is rather lop-sided. The plentiful 
and varied writings of numerous Indian visitors, ranging from die-hard Communists 
through Communist sympathizers to those openly skeptical or even disdainful of 
Marxism, make it hard to pinpoint an “Indian” view of China.
714
 They do, however, 
suggest an always enthusiastic and at times also serious engagement. Chinese accounts, 
especially the impressions of individual visitors are harder to come by, making it difficult 
to gauge the nature and variety of views that individual Chinese may have entertained 
about India.
715
   
A survey of existing materials suggests that Sino-Indian contacts during the 
decade of the 1950s had three distinct phases. India was the sixteenth nation to recognize 
the PRC on the international stage in early 1950.
716
 Diplomatic relations were established 
with India’s ambassador to the Republic of China, K.M. Panikkar, carrying on in the 
recently renamed and re-designated capital of Beijing after 1949.
717
 Even so, the first 
phase, which lasted through much of 1951 was marked by limited contact, fueled in part 
by the first disagreements over border demarcations, the status of Tibet, and by Beijing’s 
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suspicions regarding India’s independence.
718
 The second phase, from 1951 to 1954, 
witnessed the beginning of mutual visits that were primarily political and cultural in 
nature and often included state and non-state participants in equal measure—whether as 
high diplomacy, as people to people contacts, or as part of cultural delegations. Starting 
in 1955, and carrying on through early 1959, these exchanges expanded to also include 
high powered state delegations on fact-finding missions and study tours. 1956, in 
particular, appears to have been the a high-tide of Sino-Indian exchanges.  
The first important milestone in the Sino-Indian exchanges was an unofficial 
Indian goodwill mission to China in September 1951. The Indians were invited by five 
Chinese organizations to celebrate the second anniversary of the founding of the PRC.
719
 
In return a Chinese cultural delegation consisting of fifteen scholars, artists, and scientists 
and led by Ding Silin (丁西林 Ding Xilin), Vice-Minister for Cultural Affairs visited 
India later in the year. According to Herbert Passin, “this was the first Chinese delegation 
to visit a non-Communist country.”
720
 The following year a cultural delegation, led by 
Vijaylakshmi Pandit, was sent by India to participate in China’s May-day celebrations.
721
 
India-China/China-India Friendship Associations (ICFA;中印友好协会 zhong-yin 
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youhao xiehui) had been set up in each country by 1952, and these quickly became one of 
the principal organizers of mutual visits.
722
 In June 1954, Zhou Enlai visited India and in 
October of the same year Nehru visited China. These two visits not only re-affirmed the 
principles of Panchsheela, the Buddhist inspired principles of mutual respect and 




The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in the spring of 1955 further served to 
enhance cultural exchanges.
724
 In September, thirty-two Indian teachers and students 
representing ten Universities went on a four-week trip to China. They were led by C.P. 
Ramaswamy Aiyer, the Vice-Chancellor of Benares Hindu University. That same month 
Chinese Muslims en route to Mecca were greeted by Indian Muslims and Hindus in 
Delhi.
725
 September also witnessed the visit to China of India’s Health Minister, Srimati 
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur.
726
 In October, an Indian film festival was held in China, which 
reportedly had three million viewers spread across twenty cities. During the festival, an 
eleven-member Indian film delegation visited China and was even granted an audience 
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 Other exchanges included a trip by Dr. Raghu Vira through China 
and Inner Asia to collect material for the Indian Academy of Asian Culture, the visit of 
10 Chinese students, mostly to study Hindi, and a Chinese exhibit at the India Industries 
Fair in New Delhi.
728
  
The post-Bandung bonhomie and euphoria, already evident during the second half 
of 1955, blossomed in 1956. In that year “alone, 26 Indian delegations to China were 
counted and 33 Chinese delegations to India.”
729
 But 1956 also marked a qualitative shift 
in the exchanges. As the Indian leader of an ICFA delegation to China noted,  
“We are proud to record here another important fact that premier Chou-en-
lai was pleased to grant us an interview which lasted for over an hour. We 
discussed very frankly and unreservedly several problems common both to 
India and China and the general feeling on both sides was that it would be 
in the interests of both the countries if an exchange on a more lasting basis 
between scholars and Scientists or technicians of both countries is made 





This appears not to have been just lip service. As many as three Indian Planning 
Commission delegations visited China in the summer of that year with the explicit aim of 
studying Chinese planning techniques and experiences. The first was actually to have 
been led by Mahalanobis himself, but owing to his unavailability on account of ill health, 
was led by his protégé Pitambar Pant, who served as the secretary to the Planning 
Commission. The goal of this delegation, which arrived in China in July, was to study the 
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Chinese economy and planning methods.
731
 That same month, two other delegations 
arrived in Beijing. The first was a seven member team that included experts on 
cooperative organizations and had come to study agrarian cooperatives. They visited 
nineteen producers’ cooperatives in eight provinces, spending altogether about two 
months in China.
732
 The second was a six-member agricultural team under Deputy 
Minister M.V. Krishnappa whose goal was to study Chinese Agricultural Planning and 
techniques.
733
 The Chinese, in turn, sent a three member team to India in August to study 
“various technique of using Hankoo [sic] in House Construction.”
734
 1956 was also the 
year when real substantive statistical exchanges were inaugurated, first by Zhou’s visit to 
the ISI on 9 December, 
 
which was then followed by the visit of the delegation led by 
Wang Sihua that stayed at the ISI for about a month. Other exchanges included a Chinese 
Women's Delegation, also in December; ten  journalists from India and as well as various 
student groups.
735
 Zhou Enlai summed up this new, more substantive enthusiasm for 
engagement in a letter he sent Jawaharlal Nehru on the same day that he visited the ISI: 
“Through the present visit, we have been able to know more [of] India and have realized 
that in many respects the Chinese people can learn from your people. The Chinese 
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Government will consult the Indian Government through diplomatic channels about 
sending people over to study.”
736
  
By the end of 1956, domestic concerns with an inefficient and ineffective 
statistical apparatus, combined with a greater engagement with India across all spheres, 
had made engaged statistical exchanges a possibility again.  
 
Re-engagement 
The foundation for the statistical exchanges that followed was laid during the visit of the 
first Planning Commission Delegation. By the time it arrived in Beijing on 12 July 1956, 
the Chinese may already have had some sense of the advanced statistical methods being 
employed in India. During his 1955 China tour, Nehru had informed Zhou Enlai of the 
work that Mahalanobis had been doing in the field of statistics and planning.
737
 Yet, it is 
unclear whether Zhou or the statisticians at the SSB had much detailed information.  
When Bahadur Singh, Counselor in the Indian embassy in Beijing, approached the 
Chinese in early April to inform them that Mahalanobis was interested in leading an 
Indian Planning Commission delegation to China, the initial response from Xue Muqiao, 
the director of the SSB and a Vice-Chairman of China’s Planning Commission, was 
lukewarm. He scribbled the less than enthusiastic note, “seemingly will not be good to 
refuse,” and forwarded the file to his boss, Li Fuchun for his approval. Li, in turn, agreed 
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with Xue and forwarded it to Zhou Enlai for his final approval. This Zhou gave on April 
19
th
, instructing the relevant bureaus and ministries to make necessary preparations.
738
  
 A reception team to organize the delegation’s activities was set up, with Xue 
Muqiao as its leader.
739
 Among the first things they did was to request more information 
about the delegation members. The Chinese embassy responded to their request by the 
third week of May. In addition to informing the Foreign Ministry of Mahalanobis’ 
credentials, they also pointed out that he was pretty open-minded 开明—having visited 
and drawn from the influences of both the socialist and capitalist worlds—and favorably 
disposed toward socialism.
740
 The other members—the statisticians M. Mukherjee and R. 
Natarajan, and Pitambar Pant—were similarly evaluated. It was acknowledged that the 
delegation was comprised of highly qualified specialists. The Chinese should adopt a 
warm and friendly attitude toward them and introduce not just the People’s Republic’s 
recent achievements but also her short-comings and failings.
741
 It was also felt that, given 
Mahalanobis’ fame and achievements, he ought to be invited to deliver a few lectures on 
important statistical questions.
742
 The delegation’s familiarity with statistics and planning 
approaches in the United States as well as the Soviet Union was especially attractive to 
the Chinese.
743
 Such expertise made the delegation ideal sources for learning about the 
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methods of capitalist countries. Accordingly, it was hoped that the delegation members 
would introduce not just statistics and statistical work in India, but also in the West. 
Lectures at universities on these subjects were also envisaged. Finally, advice was sought 
on what important statistical materials (such as journals and books) from the United 
Nations, South-east Asia, and the West were worthy of subscription. 
 As it transpired, Mahalanobis fell ill and had to withdraw his participation. The 
delegation was instead led by Pant and spent a total of forty days in the People’s 
Republic.
744
 During that time they held over thirty-six special discussion meetings with 
officials, planners, and statisticians across several bureaus. They were based out of 
Beijing, but they also traveled a fair bit across China, visiting the famous Anshan steel 
works and the cities of Tianjin, Changchun, Shenyang, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Such 
travel “gave an opportunity to the team to see the work of planning and statistical 
organizations at the provincial and municipal level.”
745
 It is not clear to what extent the 
Chinese demands to learn more about statistics outside the socialist bloc were met. The 
ISI Annual Report from that year states that:  
At the request of the State Planning Commission, the members of the team 
delivered a few lectures at the Planning Commission premises. Pitambar 
Pant spoke on Planning in India. R. Natarjan talked about Industries in 
India and M. Mukherjee spoke on the Statistical set up of India. M. 
Mukherjee gave another talk to a small group of technical workers on the 
method of estimation of national income in India and the logical basis of 
income estimation work in the West and in the East.
746
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This is the only indication I have found that the Indians actually delivered talks to the 
Chinese, though there must have been opportunities during the small discussion group 
meetings for informal exchanges on these subjects.  
 If they had not done so before, the benefits of mutual exchange and learning seem 
to have become evident by the end of the trip. Just before departing the People’s Republic, 
the delegation traveled up to the Communist Party summer resort town of Beidaihe 北戴
河 and spent two hours in conversation with Zhou Enlai. During the conversation Zhou 
stated that he was particularly impressed with Indian statistical methods in the field of 
agriculture. He lamented that the Chinese themselves had been using purposive sampling, 
which had led to non-scientific results. In this matter, India was more advanced 先进 than 
China, and China ought to study India.
747
 He went on to add that the history of planning 
in both countries was very short. Their experience was extremely limited, and they had 
committed errors along the way. But he “hoped that henceforth [the two nations] could 
mutually learn form each other.”
748
 Pant’s suggestion that an Indian team visit the 
following year was warmly received. So was his suggestion that one to three Chinese 
planners be sent to the Indian Planning Commission for a period of six to twelve months, 
though the internal memos went on to note that Pant did not make clear what exactly he 
expected the Chinese planners to do.
749
 Finally, Pant also invited a one to three member 
team to Calcutta in December of that year to participate in the silver jubilee celebration of 
the ISI. Zhou not only confirmed Chinese participation but added that a study team would 
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also be sent to the ISI. And then, for good measure, he added: “I myself hope that I [too] 
will be able to meet with Prof. Mahalanobis when I am in Calcutta in mid-December.”
750
 
The stage had been set. 
 
Silver Jubilee Assessments  
As we have seen, Zhou Enlai did indeed personally visit the ISI and meet with 
Mahalanobis on 9 December 1956.
751
 Two days after Zhou’s visit, a four member 
delegation arrived at the Indian Statistical Institute on 11 December 1956. The team was 
led by Wang Sihua, who was now one of the SSB’s deputy directors. Other members of 
the team were Hwang Chien To, the director of the SSB’s Agricultural Statistics 
Department; Tai Shih Kuang (戴世光 Dai Shiguang), a professor at People’s University 
in Beijing; and Sun Shih Cheng, a research officer of the SSB.
752
 Their first task was to 
attend the ISI’s twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations. Wang later reported that the 
People’s Republic and the Soviet Union were the only two countries to have sent official 
delegations. Representatives of twelve other countries—all “capitalist” ones—were 
present in a personal capacity, and included such notables as Ronald A. Fisher of the 
United Kingdom and the Americans Jerzy Neyman and Morris H. Hansen.
753
 The 
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festivities included boat rides on the Hooghly River, paper presentations [check], and 
much feting of the Institute’s success. Wang “conveyed to Indian statisticians the 
fraternal greetings of the statisticians in his own country.” He lauded the achievements of 
the institute, both in theory and in its practical applications, reserving special praise for 
the advances in sample survey and agricultural statistics.  
“In these fields, the Indian Statistical Institute has accumulated not only 
data for planning and policy making, but also a great amount of valuable 
experience and methods, which will not only be useful to India but also to 
other countries including China.”  
 
Wang highlighted the similarities that existed between the two countries and said that 
Chinese statisticians hoped to follow Chairman Mao’s instructions that one must learn 
from other countries by learning from Indian statisticians.
754
 With the niceties taken care 
off, the delegation then proceeded to spend over a month studying statistics and statistical 
methods.  
 Altogether, the delegation was in India from the 11 December 1956 to 16 January  
1957. Within a month of their return to Beijing, Wang Sihua published a report in the 
principal statistical journal, Statistical Work 《统计工作》, summarizing the delegations 
findings, and putting forward its recommendations.
755
 Wang informed his readers that 
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from the very beginning Prime Minister Nehru strongly promoted the setting up of a 
statistical organization for post independence India. Accordingly, in 1949 a National 
Income Committee was set up, which subsequently discovered that data for its work was 
lacking or fragmentary. In response, to collect data on income the National Sample 
Survey was established in 1950. The delegation spent most of their time in West Bengal 
and as a result was able to witness the ISI’s close relationship with state statistical organs. 
Wang concluded that even though it remained an autonomous body, the ISI had in effect 
become the Indian Government’s principal organ for statistical research and progress. Its 
principal activities included planning and design of country-wide sample surveys, the 
consolidation and research of statistical data, and the training of personnel. After 25 years 




 Overall Wang offered several key observations about statistical work in India. 
The first, and perhaps most striking to the delegation, was the fact that statistical work 
was not centrally organized or carried out. In line with the federal structure of the country, 
each state’s statistical work was different. Eleven states carried out their work 
independently, while the work of three states was jointly coordinated. The center only 
collected, coordinated and then summarized material it received from the various state 
statistical offices.
757
 Another worrying feature was the inefficiency of the system—the 
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rate of not filing reports was as high as ten to fifteen percent. Furthermore, the 
incompleteness of the data remained a problem. The national income estimate had a huge 
error that ranged from ten to thirty percent for different sectors of the economy. As a 
result, the principal method of collecting data remained sample surveys. Besides a 
decennial census, five-yearly farm and livestock census, annual census of twenty-nine 
heavy industries, all other kinds of data, relating to income, production, economic 
conditions in rural and urban areas, urban employment, etc., were collected using sample 
surveys. The delegation was impressed with the numbers involved in statistical work and 
the relative abundance of published material on sampling work. Statistical training too 
seemed to be more widespread than in China. Fifteen of the thirty-three national 
universities possessed departments of statistics or offered training programs and 
altogether 2,000 students were engaged in the study of statistics. The ISI itself trained 
advanced statisticians, focusing in equal measure on theory and practical application. 
Error checking was also done meticulously and the use of machines was central to the 
process. The ISI already have 250 machines and a dedicated staff of 400 to man them.  
 Sample surveys received the delegation’s particular attention. In this area, 
“especially as far as the technology [of sampling] was concerned, [the Indians] had 
carried out detailed research; and at the same time, with regard to checking the quality of 
data, [they] had conducted various kinds of studies and [gained much] experience.”
758
 
Furthermore, most of India’s statistical work relied on random sampling 随机抽样调查, 
whose theoretical basis was mathematical statistics 数理统计, i.e. probability theory 几
率论. To explain the salience of sampling in particular, Wang described India as an 
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agricultural nation with over 50 million households, drawing strong links to the reality as 
it obtained in the People’s Republic as well. To carry out complete enumeration would 
not only require a huge number of investigators 调查员 but would also be uneconomical 
这是很不经济的. And the entire process from designing a complete enumeration 普查 to 
collection, analysis, and publication would take anywhere from one to two years. 
Compared to this, sample surveys were much quicker and only need a small number of 
investigators who would be sent to a small number of sample households 调查户.759 
Wang told his readers that the Indians believed sample surveys were cheaper, quicker, 
and more accurate 较经济，较快，又较正确 and that random sampling was the best 
way of avoiding bias 偏见. “They believe that if the scope of the survey is very large, the 
survey area very extensive, and if one wants to obtain data within a short period of time, 
then the only practical and economical means of achieving this is through sampling.”
760
  
 Wang identified three major characteristics of sample surveys in India. The first 
was that they were in widespread use, and often national in scope. This was significant 
because India stood far ahead of other capitalist countries in its employment of sampling 
technology 远非其他资本主义国家所可比拟的. National sample surveys had been 
carried out in: industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, household industry, transportation, 
commerce, services, as well as on urban workers’ livelihood and rural cost of living and 
income. A second characteristic was that sample surveys were continuously carried out, 
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using the method of interpenetrating 交叉 samples. Accordingly, it was possible to check 
and cross-check results and easily discover errors. In addition, all methods of 
examination and verification, including purposive ones 典型研究, were used to raise the 
quality of the data. Finally, sampling work was closely tied to policy making in India, and 
so it received the attention and support of the government. To illustrate his point, he 
explained that when Bengal was struck by a famine in 1943, the ISI was able to 
investigate the effects of the famine in a detailed way. Wang cited other examples of the 
close links between policy and sampling as well. In all cases, he asserted, useful data and 
results were delivered in a timely 及时 fashion.  
 Having worked hard to establish the usefulness of sampling, Wang turned his 
attention to recommending it for his own country: 
On the basis of all that we have gained from an inspection of statistical 
work in India, having consulted and followed the Soviet experience of 
combining sample surveys with the periodic reporting of statistical tables, 
and on the basis of the recent specific circumstances of statistical work in 
our country, we offer this suggestion: vigorously/energetically launch 
national scale sample surveys in our country, and extensively collect [data] 
on every aspect of social and economic activity.
761
 [verify translation of 
last phrase] 
 
Wang bemoaned the recent status of statistical work in the PRC. On the one hand, 
statistical forms were too many to the point of overflowing 太多太滥, while on the other, 
the statistical materials so produced were unable to completely satisfy the needs of the 
party leadership. According to him, such an irrational situation needed to be swiftly 
remedied. And the only way to stop or limit the excess issuing of unscientific 不科学 or 
fiscally wasteful reports by various departments was to speedily adopt the use of 
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scientific sample surveys. But China’s planning apparatus was still rather rudimentary, 
and its society complex. Wang conceded that the complete enumeration periodical report 
system remained useful for tracking production and circulation 流通. But when it came to 
economic activities on a national scale, especially those dealing with the complex issues 
of allocation and expenditures, pursuit of complete enumeration at the ground level only 
resulted in all the data and indicators being flooded in needless trivial details 十分繁琐. 
The resultant workload was too onerous and was inconsistent with the principle of 
spending less material and human resources for greater results, i.e. it was inefficient. In 
conclusion, Wang declared that only by organizing specialized scientific sample surveys 
could the Chinese get twice the result with half the effort 事半功倍.762  
 
“And next year in Peking”
763
 
At about the time that that statisticians, planners, and leaders were reading Wang Sihua’s 
exhortation to adopt sample surveys, deliberations were initiated by the SSB to invite 
Mahalanobis to the People’s Republic for a lecture and discussion tour. The following 
month, the Foreign Ministry informed its embassy in Delhi that the State Statistics 
Bureau, Peoples University, and the Economic Research Institute of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences would jointly invite Mahalanobis to the People’s Republic.
764
 
Several months of negotiations over dates and other details followed. Sometime towards 
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the end of May (the letter was received 31 May 1957) the three designated host 
institutions sent a letter to the State Council reporting on plans for the impending visit.
765
 
They stated that his wife and one other statistical expert would accompany Mahalanobis 
and identified two principal areas for the visiting experts to lecture on: problems relating 
to statistical sample surveys 统计抽样调查问题 and the achievements of mathematical 
statistics and its application in practical work 数理统计学的成就及在实际工作中的应
用问题. A memorandum from earlier in May, meant to be forwarded to Mahalanobis, 
provides further details into the kinds of questions the SSB wanted to raise:   
1. The concrete procedures of the sample survey concerning crop yield, 
such as the criteria of selection of survey units and the adequate 
number of such units. 
2. How can one guarantee that the farm budget statistics as a result of 
such sampling method will, on the one hand, represent the [sic] 
national or provincial characteristics, and on the other hand, satisfy the 
needs of the administrations on [sic] the county level? What are the 
ways and means of controlling and investigating the representative 
character of the sampling of such a coordinated and complex nature? 
3. In order to study the economic activities such as the distribution of 
income of the agricultural producers’ cooperatives, sample survey is 
necessary. But how are the proper measures of sampling and the 
adequate number of sample units determined? How can such sampling 
be representative of the whole country and the various provinces and 
at the same time satisfy the requirements of the counties?
766
 
(Original in English) 
 
The memorandum further observed that sampling bodies of 16,000 farm households and 
6,000 industrial workers families had been selected, but wanted to know “to what other 
fields should we extend such sample surveys in our country?” Another letter, dispatched 
on 28 May 1957 to the Foreign Ministry by Wang Sihua himself, articulated additional 
topics for forwarding to Mahalanobis: Mathematical Statistics, its concrete uses and its 
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development trends, India’s experience with planning nation-wide sample surveys, and 
[Statistical] Quality control of industrial products in India.  
In return, the SSB acknowledged that Mahalanobis hoped to resolve three 
requests of his own while in the People’s Republic. The first was to organize visiting 
students who would travel to India for study; the second was to have specialists sent to 
the Indian Statistical Institute to help with translating materials from the Chinese; and the 
third was that he was interested in understanding the training of health services personnel 
in China. The letter went on to acknowledge that Mahalanobis was not just India’s 
premier statistician, and the moving intellectual force behind its second five-year plan, 
but also that he enjoyed much international fame 享有国际名誉. In receiving him an 
attitude of sincere and genuine friendship was to be adopted, thereby advancing Sino-
Indian friendship generally, and closer ties in statistical science in particular. Ideological 
differences ought to be set aside. The guiding principle would be to “seek common 
ground while accepting differences” 求同存异原则. The Chinese would learn with an 
open mind 虚心 and both achievements and shortcomings were to be presented honestly. 
A list of preparatory materials, including published statistics, was drawn up so that they 
could be presented to the visitors for context and background.
767
 Wang Sihua was 
designated the leader of the team responsible for the visitors’ reception.
768
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 Mahalanobis entered the People’s Republic via Shenzhen on the morning of 19 
June 1957. By three in the afternoon of the same day the party arrived in the southern 
metropolis of Guangzhou (formerly Canton).
769
 Accompanying him were his wife and the 
noted statistician and specialist in sampling methodology, D.B. Lahiri. The following 
morning they visited the Sanyuanli Agricultural Production Cooperative within the city 
and “saw the system of maintaining the village statistical records, and got acquainted 
with the method of “purposive sampling” (on the Soviet model) which was being 
extensively used for estimating agricultural production and for family budget 
enquiries.”
770
 Later that day Cheng Yingzhong 陈应中, the director of the Guangdong 
Statistical Bureau, and Guo Ling 郭凌, the director of the Guangzhou Statistics Bureau, 
gave Mahalanobis and Lahiri a short presentation on the nature of sampling work done in 
the province and city. They laid out the methods used to estimate agricultural production 
and rural and urban incomes and livelihood measures. Mahalanobis was immediately 
suspicious when told that the error in the sample surveys was barely two percent. He 
remarked that for such [purposive] sample surveys the error ought to be much higher, 
adding that in the Soviet Union it was of the order of fifteen percent, in the United States 
twelve percent, and in countries such as Germany and Japan it was above ten percent. 
The only way to carry out reliable surveys was to use random sampling 随机抽样, he 
exclaimed.  
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Over dinner later that evening Mahalanobis urged his hosts not to be too dogmatic 
in their approach to statistics. He told them that India had a few statistical methods which 
could greatly benefit a newly reborn socialist nation like China. Being newly reborn had 
significant advantages he explained: “even though the Soviet Union was the first nation 
to establish socialism, many of its statistical methods are too old and not easy to change 
anymore.” Indeed, this was exactly like England, whose “railways had the longest history 
in the world, and yet today [they] are the oldest and [therefore] rather difficult to alter.”
771
 
Through his visits to the Soviet Union and his numerous interactions with its leading 
statisticians and economists Mahalanobis was well aware of the status of statistical 
research and work there. Three years earlier, he had written to Pitambar Pant that, “one 
orthodox viewpoint in USSR has been to exclude mathematics from economics; to insist 
on statistics to be almost exclusively the handmaiden of economics; and to separate 
mathematical statistics as a separate (and somewhat abstract) subject under probability 
and mathematics.”
772
 Since then he had had time to further understand developments in 
the Soviet Union. In his unpublished report of his China tour, he explained:  
This dichotomy became at one stage particularly rigid in USSR partly due 
to the conservation [sic] of older statisticians (who were mostly 
economists lacking the knowledge of statistical mathematics) and partly to 
the antagonism of a certain school of thought which objected to the use of 
“abstract” mathematical methods in biology and agriculture. Soviet 
mathematicians (among whom Kolmogorov is recognized all over the 
world as the greatest expert in the theory of probability of the present age, 
who has supplied the rigorous mathematical foundations of modern 
statistical theory) and mathematical statisticians have, of course, always 
recognized the superiority of “random or probability sampling” and have 
always advocated its use in sample surveys. During the last 3 or 4 years 
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this question is being increasingly debated in USSR. From published 
reports of the proceedings of scientific and statistical conferences as well 
as from personal discussions with Soviet statisticians I have the 
impression that opinion is turning increasingly in favour of “random or 
probability sampling.” Statistical practice in USSR, however, still 
continues to be based on “purposive sampling.”
773
 [Emphasis added.] 
 
Whether Chinese statisticians were aware of this ferment in Soviet statistical circles is a 
moot point. Much like in the Soviet Union, statistical practice in the People’s Republic 
had not moved towards any reconciliation with mathematical statistics. But Mahalanobis’ 
presence in the People’s Republic suggests that the Chinese were aware of the limitations 
imposed by their methodology. And discussions over the following three weeks would 
indeed indicate to him that the Chinese were “keeping an open mind” to the possibilities 




Xue Muqiao’s Briefing 
The following day, on 21 June, Mahalanobis and company flew to Beijing, arriving in the 
capital at three in the afternoon. The welcoming committee at the airport was a veritable 
who’s who of statistical luminaries of the People’s Republic and included Xue Muqiao, 
the director of the SSB, as well as the familiar faces of Wang Sihua and Dai Shiguang. 
Wang and Dai personally accompanied the visitor’s to the Beijing Hotel, where they were 
to be put up. Over the course of the next day Mahalanobis and Lahiri met with 
representatives of the three host institutions, to decide upon the goals and tasks for the 
coming weeks. In addition to offering his knowledge and experience, Mahalanobis was 
                                                     
773
 P.C. Mahalanobis. Some Impressions of a Visit to China 19 June – 11 July 1957: 5. PCMMA, Kolkata. 
Later in his trip he would also inform his Chinese hosts that ever since 1947 the Soviet Union had not 
attended any sample surveys activities organized by the International Statistical Institute. They just didn’t 
attach importance to mathematical statistics. See: WJB 105-00530-06: 15. 
 
774




keen to learn about all aspects of socialist construction in the People’s Republic. He 
naturally had an interest in statistics and the statistical system, but his long list of 
questions and topics touched upon all aspects of planning, training of personnel, and 
national income. He was also keen to get his hands on a copy of the Peoples Republic’s 
‘Twelve Year Plan for Scientific Research,’ which had been announced the previous 
year.
775
 When it came to discussing his lectures, Mahalanobis wanted to know the general 
level of the audience, so that he could better calibrate the technical parts of his 
explanations. A formal welcoming party was thrown for the visitors on the evening of the 
23
rd
 with an even bigger and more impressive list of Chinese statistical luminaries in 
attendance. In his welcome speech at the party, Xue Muqiao stressed the advances India 
had made in developing and applying sample surveys. It was precisely this experience 
that the People’s Republic wanted to mine, and therefore, had invited Mahalanobis, or 
Prof. Ma, as he came to be called, to visit. The usual pleasantries from both sides 
followed. At the end of the evening, D.B. Lahiri turned to his interpreter and expressed 
the hope that future dinners would be smaller in scale so that more meaningful 




 The delegation’s work began in earnest on 24
th
 June with a briefing by Xue 
Muqiao on statistical work in the People’s Republic.
777
 Xue explained that over the 
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course of the preceding five years an integrated statistical system modeled on that of the 
Soviet Union had been set up and reached down to the level of village cooperatives all 
over the People’s Republic. With a staff of about 650 personnel, the SSB headquarters 
served as the apex body of this system and was responsible for collection and auditing of 
all statistical data and its subsequent delivery, as required, to various government 
agencies. Below it, at the provincial level, were statistical offices that coordinated and 
guided work across the roughly 2,200 counties 县 in the country. Under the counties were 
the village 乡 administrations, which coordinated the statistical work of about 750,000 
village cooperatives. At this level, much of the work was carried out by part-time workers. 
In line with the Soviet model, the scope of statistics was “comprehensive” and covered 
population, agriculture, industry, transport, trade, consumption, health, education, finance, 
national income, employment, and so on. Unlike the Soviet Union, though, the provincial 
statistical bureaus were under the administrative control of the Provincial People’s 
Councils and their expenses were paid out of provincial budgets. Xue explained that this 
made the Chinese system more administratively decentralized but he still felt that it was 
“probably as integrated as the Soviet system.”
778
  
 Xue then proceeded to explain the methodology employed by the SSB. The 
preferred choice was complete enumeration. This worked rather well in several sectors. 
In the industrial sector, 3,000 units sent monthly returns and another 60,000 units 
submitted annual report. In construction, about a 1000 of the most important projects 
reported monthly, with the rest doing so on an annual basis. Reports from the railways, 
shipping, and trucking were submitted monthly, as were government purchase and the 
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consumption of important commodities. The agricultural sector, however, posed a much 
larger problem. Data of interest included area sown, yield per unit area, “outturn” of 
important agricultural crops, livestock, and so on. The provincial bureaus had their hands 
full trying to completely enumerate the 750,000 village cooperatives. Delays were the 
norm, and the accuracy of the results was not always high. As a result, in 1955, an initial 
attempt was made to calculate the yield of crops per unit area over a large part of the 
country using sample survey techniques. In addition, sample surveys had been carried out 
in order to better assess the standard of living of rural, working class, and urban 
households. For instance, a rural survey in 1955 had covered 15,000 farm families across 
twenty-three provinces and an urban survey in 1956 had included 6,000 families. Xue 
clarified that the technology used was purposive sampling, and concluded by observing 
that through increased contact with India, and in particular following the Wang Sihua 
delegation’s visit to India, the Chinese had become particularly interested in learning 
from India’s expertise and experience in carrying out sample surveys.
779
 At the end of the 
briefing, Lahiri , apparently so frustrated at the People’s Republic’s refusal hitherto to 
adopt more advanced sample survey techniques, pointedly told his interpreter that he 
couldn’t fathom why the Chinese lacked confidence 信心不足 in sample surveys. 780 
Mahalanobis would later claim that after this “brilliant survey,” both he and Lahiri had a 
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“Quite a heavy programme” 
With their brief firmly established, Mahalanobis and Lahiri set about preparing their 
lectures. Over the course of the following two weeks Lahiri and Mahalanobis led eight 
group discussions on sample surveys and delivered a total of nine lectures. The group 
discussions usually lasted from three to four hours and were frequently quite technical in 
nature. Of the nine lectures, Mahalanobis delivered five and Lahiri four. In the lead-up to 
each lecture, both of them had to prepare a synopsis, which was translated and pre-
circulated, leading Mahalanobis to remark: “this was quite a heavy programme.” The 
lectures were usually day long affairs, divided into two three-and-a-half hour sections. 
Mahalanobis delivered two lectures on “Sample Surveys” at the SSB, one on “Planning 
in India” at the Planning Commission, and two on “Recent Developments in the Theory 
and Applications of Mathematical Statistics” at Beijing and Peoples Universities. For 
most of these lectures the audience, comprising as many as 300 people, included 
statisticians, economists, senior mathematical students, and members of the mathematical 
staff of the two universities.
782
 Lahiri’s four lectures were similar in format, though he 
spoke exclusively on “Applications of the Theory of Mathematical Probability in Sample 
Surveys.” Two of these were delivered at the SSB, one at Peoples University, and one at 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Lahiri’s lectures, in particular, were especially 
technical and the audience was restricted to thirty to thirty-five persons familiar with 
statistical work and knowledgeable in mathematics.
783
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On the 24 June, after Xue finished his briefing, Mahalanobis had offered a three 
stage strategy for the discussions. Each successive stage would only be entered once he 
had received the approval of his audience. If it became necessary, he even offered to 
extend his stay in Beijing and cancel sightseeing tours to create additional time for 
discussions and lectures. In the first stage he wanted to introduce the general principles of 
sampling 一般原则的介绍. If everyone was satisfied with this discussion, he would 
proceed, in the next stage, to discuss these principles with much greater thoroughness 详
尽的讨论这些原理. The final stage would be more practically oriented: starting with a 
particular province they would try and draft a detailed and concrete sampling program 从
一省开始试拟详细具体的抽样调查方案.784 Having clarified this plan, Mahalanobis 
began stage one. He spoke about what a sample 样本 was, about errors 误差, the survey 
object 调查对象, the differences between random sampling 随机调查 and purposive 
sampling 典型调查, outlined their histories, and so on. In discussing the overall structure 
of statistical work, he stressed the importance of scientific and intellectual freedom and 
the need to engage with other disciplines since statistics was essentially an applied 
science. He also spoke of the importance of training. By this he meant training at all 
levels, and not just middle school students who could become statistical workers. Just as 
important was the training of statistical researchers and instructors. To make his point 
clearer he drew comparisons with the operation of a hospital. “The medical school must 
maintain an intimate relationship with the hospital. Similarly, statistical research organs 
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must remain in touch with the organs carrying out actual statistical work.”
785
 Based on 
the experience gained in India, he estimated that if the Chinese were to conduct a national 
sample survey with the sole purpose of satisfying the center’s requirements, then all they 
needed were 1,200 surveyors. If, at the same time, they also wanted to satisfy the needs 
of the various provinces, then 2,500 would be required.
786
 
 On the morning of 27 June, Mahalanobis delivered his first lecture on Sample 
Surveys at the SSB and followed that up with a second one the next afternoon. On both 
days the audience numbered around 300. At the end of the second day Xue reported that 
even though the lecture was at times too specialized, it was still very helpful for the entire 
audience.
787
 The next day, which happened to be Mahalanobis’ birthday, both he and 
Lahiri continued group discussion on sample surveys at the SSB.
788
 The previous day 
Mahalanobis had also handed over a much more detailed list of questions regarding 
planning and statistical work in the People’s Republic. This list contained a total of 
seventy-three  items and covered topics such as the organization of long term planning, 
the structure of planning, the technology used and its improvement, population and labor, 
gross domestic product and national income, production of goods, natural resources, trade, 
capital goods industries, the training of scientific personnel, and so on. The final item was 
potential Sino-Indian cooperation on planning and statistical matters.
789
 After a day of 
rest, preparation, and sightseeing, the discussions continued on the afternoon of the 1
st
 of 
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July at the State Planning Commission. On the 2
nd
 of July Mahalanobis delivered a 
lecture on the Indian planning experience. This lecture was attended by over 250 people 
from the State Planning Commission, Economic Commission, Peoples University, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the SSB. Mahalanobis also delivered lectures to 
similarly large audiences at Beijing and People’s Universities on 5 and 6 July on the 
subject of “The development of mathematical statistics and its applications in the social 
sciences.”
790
 Mahalanobis and Lahiri then held independent group discussions over the 
next few days, visiting the three host institutions as well as the Bureau of Public Health.   
The principal content of all the lectures and group discussions—the lecture 
synopses, lecture transcripts, subsequent questions and answers, as well as the minutes 
from the group discussion—was compiled, translated, edited, and published in a year 
later in May 1958 by the Statistical Press.
 791
 The foreword of this publication granted 
that there were specific points on which the Indians and the Chinese did not see eye to 
eye, but advocated that in spite of those differences, the Chinese needed to pay greater 
attention to the science and technique of sample surveys. The book was produced, 
therefore, as a reference for future research and discussions on mathematical statistics 
and sampling. Its distribution, however, was most likely limited to statistical bureaus and 
offices across the country. Whether it entered curricula at teaching institutions or was 
used in any other specific way remains unclear.
792
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 The discussions as well as the visits to statistical organs and various bureaus left a 
rather favorable impression on Mahalanobis.
793
 K. Natwar Singh, then a young attaché in 
the Indian Embassy, met Mahalanobis on July 5
th 
and found him “a forthright and 
interesting man,” who was “pessimistic about the implementation of our Five Year Plan.” 
Mahalanobis told him “that the Chinese were ahead of us [Indians]. Their implementation 
was first rate.”
794
 Indeed Mahalanobis found much to admire in what he saw. He wrote 
later that he felt their lectures and discussions, 
Were really appreciated and might lead to some fruitful results. We were 
deeply impressed by the seriousness of the purpose with which the 
Chinese discussed these questions and by the amount of details into which 





The Chinese had repeatedly told him that China had a “clean sheet of paper before her in 
the field of statistics, and was therefore in the fortunate position of adopting the best 
methods from all over the world.”
796
 This may have been particularly appealing to his 
catholic mind. Mahalanobis was also generally trusting of the quality and accuracy of the 
published and unpublished statistical materials he had been shown, noting:  
 “We were favorably impressed not only by the size of the statistical 
organization but also by the wide range and internal consistency (which 
we had occasion to test in some cases) of Chinese statistics. Changes in 
production, income, employment, etc., from year to year (1952-56) should 
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be quite reliable and comparable. The statistical position (with the 
exception of sample surveys and mathematical statistics) seems to be 
appreciably better than that in India in respect of coverage, availability, 
and accuracy of data required for purposes of planning and current policy 
decisions. It is, therefore, possible to use Chinese official statistics with 




Meeting Vice-Premiers and the Premier 
Mahalonobis had the opportunity to express his admiration for the general progress the 
People’s Republic appeared to be making to its leaders on two separate occasions. On 
July 3
rd
 Mahalanobis and Lahiri met with the Vice-Premiers Li Fuchun and Bo Yibo 薄
一波.798 Li and Bo were also chairmen of the Planning and Economic Commissions 
respectively and Li was also the Minister for Statistics. At the meeting, which began at 
9:50 in the morning and lasted for approximately an hour and a half, Mahalanobis told 
the Vice-Premiers that on general statistical work he had little advice to offer. He 
regarded China as being far ahead of India when it came to building a socialist society, 
and statistical work as a concomitant part of that, was also more advanced than in India. 
But Mahalanobis did want to specifically offer advice on linking planning and statistical 
work more closely, and promoted the widespread adoption of sample surveys through the 
setting up of a dedicated sampling bureau. He reiterated the advantages of sampling—
that it was faster, more accurate, its error easier to ascertain, and cheaper. With a national 
scale sample survey in place, he claimed one would only need four to eight weeks to get a 
sense of economic development and socio-economic conditions across the country. On 
specific techniques, he recommended the use of interpenetrating samples 交叉抽样 and 
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probability sampling 机率抽样. Given China’s 2,200 counties, Mahalanobis estimated 
that the sampling bureau could begin with a staff of about 2,000. Work could initially 
begin in five or six provinces, and as it intensified each county would be assigned two 
surveyors on average, resulting in total staff numbering between four and five thousand. 
Transcribers, computers (humans), and statisticians would, of course, also be required. 
Mahalanobis urged that a training institute along the lines of the ISI be set up, so that not 
just statistical workers, but also a highly specialized cadre of statisticians could be trained. 
This institute would also foster closer ties with the Chinese Academy of Science, and 
more generally, between statistics and the disciplines of mathematics and economics—
“this was the way of the future.” 
Li and Bo were very receptive to Mahalanobis’ suggestions. They requested that 
he bring them up during his conversation with the Premier later in the week as well. Both 
Li and Bo were particularly keen to see sample survey work begin as soon as possible. 
And yet, lingering doubts about sampling technology remained. Li specifically enquired 
whether “on the matter of the accuracy of sample surveys, Prof. Ma could once more 
carry out discussions with the SSB.”
799
 Bo wondered if India could send a specialist or 
two to help with a sample survey of cotton production in Hebei that he wanted to see 
carried out in September or October. Mahalanobis replied that September target date was 
too soon and wouldn’t allow enough time for planning the survey. Better preparation 
would be to carry out pilot surveys on the paddy crop. He also recommended that they 
immediately send one or two people to the ISI so that planning for such work could begin.  
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Mahalanobis also took the opportunity to reiterate his specific proposals for 
enhanced Sino-Indian cooperation in statistics and planning. He requested that the 
Planning Commission and the SSB arrange for the regular forwarding of technical data to 
the Indians. He suggested that a small “China Unit” be set up at the ISI. This group 
would help translate into English important Chinese publications, articles and technical 
data, teach Chinese to a few statisticians and professors, and maintain direct links with 
Beijing. To man this unit he requested one or two people be sent over, and assured that 
all their costs would be borne by the Indian side, and that they would be treated as guests. 
In return, he offered to happily share materials for the teaching of statistics, and also 
impart training to those Chinese who visit the ISI. The hope was that three to four people 
would be sent to India for further study and that this would later become an annual 
practice. Indian specialists in statistics on sample surveys, mathematical statistics and 
other areas, could also be sent to help in further research, training or the drafting of 
technical schemes.
800
 Li and Bo agreed with this advice and indicated that the details 
could be worked out with Xue Muqiao and Wang Sihua, both of whom were also present 
at the meeting.  
About a week later, on 9 July, Mahalanobis, his wife, and Lahiri were invited to 
dinner with Zhou Enlai.
801
 Xue Muqiao and Wang Sihua were also present, as were the 
Indian ambassador, R.K. Nehru and Mrs. R.K. Nehru. Mahalanobis repeated much of 
what he had told Li and Bo. He was pleasantly surprised to discover that Zhou had been 
kept informed of his activities and had “studied some of the rather technical points in my 
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recommendations as he asked some searching and critical questions on the methods of 
assessing the accuracy of the results of sample surveys.”
802
 The Premier agreed in 
principle with most of Mahalanobis’ suggestions. The setting up of an institute might take 
some time, he observed, since the People’s Republic still lacked enough trained personnel. 
But he welcomed Indian help in the organization of statistical work and research, and 
expressed interest in continuing the exchange of personnel, expertise, and experience. He 
also told Mahalanobis that while it may be difficult to send experts immediately to lecture 
on Chinese statistics and planning, the two SSB staffers that would be sent later in the 
year could help get the work of the Chinese Unit started. The dinner was a pleasant affair 
and was subsequently reported upon in the People’s Daily with an accompanying 
photograph of the group.
803
 As the trip wound down, both sides threw farewell parties, 
the Chinese one much grander than the smaller affair the Indians organized at the Beijing 
Hotel. Continuing cooperation was the buzzword. On 12 July Mahalanobis and company 
left the People’s Republic the same way they had entered, via Shenzhen, assured that 
exchanges and future cooperation had been put on a solid footing.  
 
Domestic Difficulties 
A couple of months after Mahalanobis’ return to India, Wang Sihua addressed the 
Conference on National Statistical Work. His speech, titled “Report of An Inspection of 
Statistical Work in India,” started by referring his audience to his article from earlier in 
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 Wang stated that he had already covered the general outlines of statistical 
work in India in that piece and would not revisit trodden terrain. Instead, he wanted to 
focus exclusively on sample surveys. His report was less enthusiastic, more guarded, and 
more strategic than his February article.  
Wang now took pains to stress that Mahalanobis was aware not only of Soviet 
statistics, but that he also knew that Chinese statistics were largely a product of learning 
from Soviet experience. Furthermore, Mahalanobis, he assured his listeners, actually 
thought very highly 评价还很高 of the Chinese periodical report system. It was only in 
those instances where original records 原始记录 were missing, or where the numbers 
were too large and too many, such as in matters relating to the people’s livelihood, that 
the use of sample surveys was recommended. As a socialist country, Wang 
acknowledged, the People’s Republic should of course use a system of complete 
enumeration as the main methodology, but it was also important to study other methods, 
something which had not been done sufficiently before. He then addressed the doubts, 
fears, and criticisms head on:  
“There are those who are suspicious: Does our visit to India mean that we 
have changed our policy of learning from the Soviet Union? Such an 
understanding is in error. Our India visit and Prof. Ma’s [Mahalanobis’] 
coming to the People’s Republic absolutely do not mean that we have 
abandoned [a policy of] learning from the Soviet Union. In reality, sample 
surveys have already been in use in the Soviet Union from an early time. It 
can be confidently stated: in the past, today, and in the future, we want to 
learn from the Soviet Union. But, at the same time, we must also study 
those methods of capitalist countries that are relatively good, especially 
the methods of sample surveys and the problems relating to statistical 
technology [check translation of this]. As far as method is concerned, not 
just India, if other capitalist countries have even better methods, we can 
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study those as well. Our study’s goal is to provide better service in the 




Wang then went on to outline the nature of sampling work in the Soviet Union, providing 
evidence of its use for decades. He reminded everyone that Soviet specialists were the 
ones to design the rural livelihood survey 农家收支调查. It was only after this that he 
began a detailed discussion of India’s sampling work, concluding with a list of four 
advantages. The first of these was that the scale and nature of sample surveying in India 
were larger and more expansive than in England, the United States, and other capitalist 
countries. The second was that Indians had made new contributions to the technology of 
sample surveys, namely the methods of continuous sampling 连续抽样 and 
interpenetrating samples 交叉抽样. Thirdly, they had carried out detailed comparative 
research and experimentation on various survey methods. Finally, the contents of the 
surveys were tailored to meet practical requirements. [Check last bit for whether meaning 
has been translated properly].
806
 
What was known to Wang and many of his comrades in Beijing had to be 
communicated more effectively, and subtly, to the various regional representatives at the 
conference, and through them to the vast numbers of statistical workers across the 
country. This was that sample surveys were a general category that included purposive 
sampling as well as random sampling. And what was new and particularly relevant to the 
People’s Republic were the Indian random sampling methods, not the prevailing Soviet 
methods. Wang adopted a two-stage strategy to bring this point home, without actually 
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stating it. He first differentiated sample survey from complete enumeration, highlighting 
advantages already familiar to us: sample surveys were cheaper, required fewer personnel, 
and that since their scale was smaller than complete enumeration, they could accordingly 
accommodate many more indices and much greater complexity.
807
 Having established the 
usefulness of sample surveys, Wang proceeded to differentiate what he called subjective 
主观 sampling from random or stochastic 随机 sampling. For this purpose he again 
resorted to a laundry list of advantages: (1) if the survey design is good, it can completely 
reflect every characteristic of the totality, (2) random sampling avoids the subjective 
influence of the surveyor, and is therefore more accurate, (3) subjective sampling only 
allows for one or two indices 指标 unlike random sampling which allows all indices to be 
used [check this translation], (4) random sampling is more objective, (5) random 
sampling is a simple and easy method, and (6) random sampling can provide accurate 
estimates of sampling error, and allows for the estimation of the accuracy of the overall 
survey.
808
 But he did not advocate the abandonment of other forms of sampling. As long 
as a method was scientific it ought to be used. What then was the definition of scientific? 
For Wang, “[a method] was scientific only if it could truly reflect the objective real 
situation.”
809
 Thus, subjective sampling, under the right conditions of the Party’s Mass 
Work Line 群众工作路线, could be scientific too. He further comforted his audience by 
invoking the authority of Mahalanobis himself:  
In the past some comrades believed that the difference between purposive 
surveys and sample surveys rested on whether it was random or not. But, 
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on the basis of Prof. Ma’s introduction [to sampling], even within 
sampling there can exist subjectivity. Setting aside random sampling, to 
varying degrees both mechanical sampling and sampling by classification 
have subjective elements. Therefore, I believe the principle difference 
between sample surveys and purposive surveys lies in that sample surveys 
use a small number of objects [对象—find more accurate translation for 
this] to calculate the entire object. That is, the entire sample must represent 
the whole and the totality [全及总体]. [On the other hand,] the principal 




Wang pointed out that the method of purposive (or typical) surveys had not been 
effective in the past because the selection of typical cases 选典 had not reflected the 
objective reality. The task, as it lay before them, was to carry out small scale experiments 
to find out which method would be most suitable.  
The transformation from February to September was stark. From the vigorous 
promotion of establishing nation-wide sample surveys, the mood had shifted to one of 
qualified, even muted, endorsement. After several years of denigrating ‘capitalist’ 
statistics, Wang had uncharacteristically written favorably about them in February. This 
speech, seven months later, suggests he did not strike enough of a conciliatory tone in the 
earlier article and, therefore, had to make amends. Indeed, Wang’s speech at the 
conference can be read as an exercise in persuasion meant to assuage reactionary cadre 
who feared not just ideological compromises, but perhaps even more importantly, being 
shifted out of their comfort zones and established statistical practices and habits. Larger 
domestic political currents also no doubt played their part. Starting with the Hundred 
Flowers movement in 1956 and through May 1957 when free expression by intellectuals 
was encouraged, the political climate had been relatively conducive to the exploration of 
new possibilities. In June 1957 the Anti-Rightist campaign began, leading to the 
                                                     
810




narrowing of those possibilities, and no doubt, to the much more cautious tone that we 
find Wang adopting in September. A couple of months later the xiafang [下放] 
movement began with cadres being sent to factories and villages to work with their hands. 
The movement was later extended to intellectuals as well. Under the circumstances, 
advocating capitalist methods could no longer just be a matter of their scientific-ness.  
 
The Study Tour of 1958
811
 
It was in this somewhat confused milieu, where intellectuals and city-dwellers faced the 
prospect of manual labor in the countryside, that Wu Hui 吴辉 and Gong Jianyao 龚鉴尧 
found themselves on a mission to India. Wu, born in 1926 [verify], and Gong, in 1927, 
had received degrees in statistics from Chongqing and Nanjing Universities respectively 
in 1950. They were part of a whole generation that had been introduced to and trained 
under an inclusive understanding of statistics, which drew from texts and materials from 
the United States, Britain, as well as the Soviet Union. After 1949, they had to recalibrate 
their training to serve the newer and narrower definition of statistics within the People’s 
Republic. By the mid-1950s both were working at the SSB headquarters in Beijing. Gong 
was assigned to the agricultural statistics division and Wu to the industrial statistics one. 
In 1957 they were among ten young cadres shortlisted for additional testing to determine 
who would be sent to India. Each shortlisted candidate was made to write an essay 
demonstrating their English language skills. In the end, Wu and Gong’s facility with the 
language coupled with their specializations in the key areas of focus—industrial and 
agricultural statistics—won out.  
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 Wu Hui and Gong Jianyao arrived in Calcutta on January 4 1958. They were 
immediately invited by Mahalanobis to travel to Madras (present day Chennai) to attend 
a conference on statistical work and planning [find details]. Upon their return to Calcutta, 
they began their studies at the Indian Statistical Institute. Their official status was that of 
Visiting Scholars (访问学者 fangwen xuezhe). At that time, the ISI had several tens of 
students form various Asian countries who were receiving training at the International 
Statistical Education Centre (ISEC). As visiting scholars Wu and Gong’s status was 
different from these students and they did not attend classes. Instead, they were given 
study spaces and permitted to conduct their own independent reading and research. The 
primary focus of their work was the study of Indian sampling techniques. This they began 
by reading all previous documents and publications relating to the ISI’s statistical 
sampling activities, which were held in the ISI library. From there, they moved to a close 
study of the theory and methods of sampling. In the process, they studied simple random 
sampling, stratified random sampling, cluster sampling, double sampling, multi-stage 
sampling, and other sampling methods. Periodically, they would meet with Mahalanobis, 
Lahiri or C.R. Rao and discuss progress made and problems encountered.
812
 D.B. Lahiri, 
in particular, was their principal guide and interlocutor throughout their studies. Exposure 
to the latest Western texts on statistics and sampling rounded off their readings. 
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While the bulk of their work was theoretical or centered on book-learning and 
based at the ISI, Wu and Gong also had the opportunity to gain first hand experience in 
the practice of sampling by participating in two sample surveys. The first of these was a 
land use sample surveys where they witnessed the Mahalanobis devised method of 
cutting circular crop samples in the fields. The second was a family budget survey carried 
out in Calcutta. Other activities included sitting in on meetings of the National Sample 
Survey (NSS) where sampling teams would report their recent experiences, problems, 
and discuss solutions for the next round of the NSS. Both Wu and Gong also had the 
opportunity to interact with the various Indian and foreign statisticians present at the ISI 
during 1958. Both remembered, in particular, the visit of the Soviet statistician A. Ezhov, 
who had served as the first Soviet statistical expert to the PRC from 1950 to 1952.
813
 
Gong also became close friends with C.R. Rao, who at that time ran the ISI’s training 
school [verify]. During the year, both of them visited Bombay, Pune and Delhi, as well as 
several paddy and jute sample survey sites across the country.
814
 While in Delhi, they 
also met with Pitambar Pant, who was still serving on the Indian Planning Commission.  
 During the exactly one year and five days that Gong and Wu spent in India, 
events within the People’s Republic had pushed statistics, as they had just about 
everything else, in new directions. Gong recalled reading about the Great Leap Forward 
in the papers, and receiving letters from friends and family describing the push towards 
communes. Wu also remembered discussing the agricultural growth results of the Great 
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Leap Forward, claiming that Gong was openly suspicious of them. Statistics too, they 
were informed in time, was changing. In August 1958 an “on-the-spot meeting” 现场会
议 was held in the town of Baoding, just south of Beijing.815 At this meeting, statistical 
work carried out by the SSB over the previous seven years was repudiated, and a call was 
made for a Great Leap Forward in statistics as well. The logic was straightforward:  
[With] the collectivization of peasant production and consumption, all 
[statistical] data could basically be obtained [directly] from the communes. 
The peasant family revenue and expenditure survey, which had been set 
up on the basis of surveys of sample households, had fulfilled its historical 
obligation/role [历史使命].816 
 
In one fell swoop, established statistical systems, including the purposive sampling 
already carried out, as well as future potential surveys based on random sampling, were 
all consigned to history. The Sino-Indian exchanges and much touted statistical 
cooperation too were to become a victim of this development. Towards the end of their 
India stint, Wu and Gong had worked hard to draft a lengthy report of their activities in 
India and their recommendations for future statistical work in China. Upon their return in 
early 1959, it “too had to be rewritten and was converted into a simple report and 
submitted to the SSB’s leadership to read and dismiss [参阅了事].”817 
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Things Fall Apart 
Just as the reengagement had been facilitated by domestic and international factors in 
1956, in 1959 again, a combination of domestic and international factors drove the two 
nations and statistical exchange apart. The previous section has already alluded to the 
changes within China that had a deleterious impact on statistical work. On the 
international stage, events were to overtake the Sino-Indian statistical exchanges as well. 
Disagreements over the Sino-Indian border, which had existed since the start of the 
decade began to dominate diplomatic exchanges as each side hardened its position. The 
ensuing frosty relations no doubt served to reduce some of the spirit of Bandung and 
endanger the Panchshila principles.   
It is unclear to what extent Mahalanobis and the ISI had cottoned on to these 
differences or to the major upheavals within the People’s Republic during 1958. In 
October of that year, he lobbied the Chinese to send a couple of planners with expertise 
in heavy industries to help with the drafting of India’s third Five Year Plan.
818
 He 
lamented that the half-hearted development of heavy industries in India during the years 
of the second Five Year Plan had been a big mistake and wanted to take advantage of 
China’s direct experience 直接的经验 in this area. The Chinese Embassy in New Delhi 
duly forwarded Mahalanobis’ request to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing and sought 
further instructions. The Foreign Ministry, in turn, asked the Planning Commission for 
advice on the matter. In doing so, they also added that were Chinese experts to be sent, 
their primary goal would be to “expand our country’s influence.”
819
 After additional 
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deliberation involving the Foreign Ministry and the Planning Commission it was 
eventually agreed to send a three-man team. A telegram sent to the Chinese Embassy in 
New Delhi on 26 February 1959 listed the members of this team: the Deputy Director of 
the Planning Commission’s Long term Comprehensive Planning Bureau, Chen Xian; 
Deputy Director for the Comprehensive Department of the Capital Construction Planning 
Bureau, Wang Yilin; and the recently returned Wu Hui, who would serve as the team’s 
interpreter. The telegram made clear that these experts would only serve as consultants 
who would introduce the People’s Republic’s recent general experience in heavy 
industries. Under no circumstances would they advise the Indians on their problems. The 
Chinese Embassy in New Delhi wrote back a few days later on March 6, stating that 
Mahalanobis welcomed the Chinese experts and hoped they could visit from April to 
June. Pitambar Pant and M.M. Mukherji, both of whom had been part of the 1956 
Planning Commission delegation, and were now involved in comprehensive planning, 
would receive them and arrange their activities.
820
  
The archival trail turns cold after this. On 10 March an uprising occurred in Lhasa 
and by the end of the month the Dalai Lama and several tens of thousands of his 
followers had escaped to India. They were granted asylum and allowed to settle in the 
northern hill resort of Dharamshala. At a scientific conference held in Moscow in May, a 
little over a month after the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa, Mahalanobis bumped into 
the Chinese physicist Zhou Peiyuan 周培源 and the two engaged in a long 
conversation.
821
 Zhou later filed a report of this meeting with the Foreign Ministry.
822
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Eight of the report’s nine pages were devoted to a discussion of Tibet and geopolitics. 
Only on the last page did Zhou dwell on a few scientific points that had also come up. As 
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1958 marked a watershed in the history of the early PRC. The execution of the first five-
year plan had been a success, meeting and in many cases exceeding the targets that had 
been set. And yet, instead of a second five-year plan that built upon the first one, China 
was launched down the path of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 大跃进. At its most basic 
level, the GLF was a radically different approach to economic and social organization. It 
retained plan-like characteristics of setting specific production and agricultural targets, 
but did so by implementing a far-reaching reorganization of labor and production 
technologies. In the agricultural sector, farming was collectivized and the people’s 
communes 人民公社 so created held several thousands of households that ate in 
collective kitchens and labored in nationalized fields and back-yard blast furnaces. 
Similar labor-intensive practices were also introduced in the industrial sector as China 
sought to overtake England’s steel production within fifteen years.
823
  
 Much of the impetus behind the GLF came from Mao’s disavowal of the Soviet 
Union and her ‘advanced experience.’ At the Chengdu Conference in March 1958, “Mao 
applied the label of ‘dogmatism’ to previous Chinese policies towards heavy industry, 
planning, banking, and statistics, explaining that because China lacked native experience 
and competence in these areas, she had rigidly copied Soviet practices regardless of their 
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appropriateness to Chinese conditions.”
824
 Like almost everything else, statistics too did 
not escape the consequences of a rejection of Soviet practices.  
Between 26 June and 8 July the State Statistics Bureau convened a national ‘on-
the-spot conference 现场会议 in the northern city of Baoding 保定 to promote its vision 
of a great leap in statistics. Consisting of regular meetings as well as extended site-visits, 
the Baoding conference had two explicit aims: one, to criticize statistical practice of the 
past few years, especially given the new dictum of ‘politics in command’ 政治挂帅; and 
two, to promote statistical work done in the province of Hebei 河北 as the exemplar of a 
new approach to statistics.
825
 After two days of meetings on 26 and 27 June, the delegates 
visited an exhibition of statistical work 统计工作展览, which had been jointly curated by 
the SSB and several provincial and municipal statistical bureaus, including Beijing, 
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Shanghai, Shanxi, and Sichuan.
826
 After that, approximately twenty delegations were 
organized and dispatched across Hebei to various factories, construction sites, schools, 
streets and districts, townships, communes, and [work] teams to carry out week-long site 
visits. In all, nearly one-hundred grass-roots statistical units were visited. The conference 
was reconvened in Baoding on 6 July and the following three days witnessed statements 
by twenty-four delegates, representing a range of provinces, districts 区, and 
municipalities.
827
 In their speeches, various delegates promised to not only catch-up with 
Hebei’s reforms but to also completely reform statistical work within three months, and 
thereby be able to report such good news as a gift to the nation at the upcoming National 
Day on 1 October.
828
 The delegates brought the meeting to a close on 8 July by sending a 




 The Baoding Conference was also followed by two additional conferences in 
Beijing in 1958 and 1959. Restricted to provincial, municipal, and regional bureau chiefs, 
                                                     
826
 See: “Yige fengfu duocai de ‘tongji gongzuo zhanlanguan 一个丰富多彩的 ‘统计工作展览’ (A Richly 
Colored Exhibition of Statistical Work).” Tongji gongzuo 统计工作 1958.14: 28-29. The exhibition 
contained approximately 1,000 items displayed in over ninety rooms spread across three floors.  
 
827
 The statements delivered by representatives from Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang 
were republished as individual articles in the Tongji gongzuo’s 14
th
 issue in 1958. An additional twenty-one 
statements from representatives were summarized and reproduced in the order they were delivered in an 
article in the same issue: Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Beijing, Guangxi, Shanghai, Hubei, 
Liaoning, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Fujian, Xinjiang, Tianjin, Qinghai, Shangdong, 
Yunnan, and Hebei. See: “Ge sheng qu shi tongji gongzuo yuejin zhishi 各省区市统计工作跃进指示 
(Instructions for a Great Leap Forward in Statistical Work at the Province, Regional, and Municipal Level).” 
Tongji gongzuo  统计工作 1958.14: 26-28. 
 
828
 “学河北, 赶河北, 国庆节报捷、献礼.” See: State Statistics Bureau (“Ganqing, chongtian—quanguo 
shengshi tongji gongzuo baoding xianchang huiyi shengli bimu”), 1958.14: 25. 
 
829
 “Xiang mao zhuxi baozheng—kuzhan sange yue, shixian quanguo tongji gongzuo de da gaige, da yeujin!
向毛主席保证—苦战三个月，实现全国统计工作的大改革，大跃进! (A Guarantee to Chairman 
Mao—Three Months of Hard Work to Achieve Reforms in National Statistical Work, [an d bring about] A 




these conferences sought to discuss the progress made and problems encountered during 
the post-Baoding rectification 更正 of statistics. The first of these meetings took place 
four months after the Baoding meeting, and lasted from 25 October to 3 November. 
Summary materials produced in its wake, and meant for internal circulation, reiterated 
that the Baoding Conference had created a new situation 新的局面 in statistical work.830 
By the time of the next meeting, which took place from 11 to 21 April 1959, the SSB had 
a new director in Jia Qiyun 贾启允.831 The Deputy Director of the SPC, Jia Tuofu 贾拓
夫 also participated in the meeting.832 
 In his speech at the Baoding Conference, Xue Muqiao had rhetorically asked: 
“What is a Great Leap Forward in Statistics?”
833
 For Xue, a great leap in statistics was 
marked by two key characteristics.
834
 The first, in line with Mao’s general critique, was 
based upon a rejection of dogmatism. Statistics was not an end unto itself but rather a tool 
工具 in service to promoting political and productive struggles 为政治斗争、为生产斗
争服务. And so, in a dramatic turnaround, Xue rejected the primacy of the very 
principles that he and the SSB had been espousing over the past several years. Xue now 
explained that a Great Leap Forward in statistics could not be achieved merely by 
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ensuring the correctness, timeliness, and completeness of periodical reports. And yet, he 
warned that there were many who continued to hold on to such antiquated beliefs. What 
they practiced was nothing but ‘statistics for statistics sake’ 为统计而统计. Another 
common mistake was to regard vigor and dynamism 轰轰烈烈 in statistical work as a 
Great Leap Forward in statistics. Unless one also reflected on how one’s statistical work 
contributed to a high tide 高潮 in production, such vigor was of little use. Xue proceeded 
to equate both these types of errors, observing that statistical workers of the ‘vigor and 
dynamism’ brand often ridiculed their ‘statistics for statistics’ comrades. In truth, there 
was no difference between the two groups; much like Mencius’ allegory about the 
soldiers who had retreated fifty steps mocking those who had retreated one hundred steps, 
both groups were guilty of misunderstanding the true nature of a great leap in statistics.  
 The second characteristic of a great leap in statistics was the mobilization of the 
masses to actively participate in statistical work. In this way, Xue explained, the theory of 
the mass line could be implemented in statistics: “Statistics was much like other kinds of 
work: it cannot rely solely on dedicated organizations or dedicated personnel, nor can it 
rely on a vertically integrated leadership structure.” Instead, each level of administration 
was required to participate in statistical work, and even more significantly, the masses 
themselves could not remain indifferent 漠不关心 to statistical work.835 The idea of mass 
participation in statistical work was subsequently promoted through the phrase “the entire 
party and all the people [must] attend to statistics” 全党全民办统计.836  
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Within a short period of time after the Baoding Conference, publications and 
reports that sought to distill and spread the message of the Conference or claim a leap in 
the effectiveness of statistical work began to make an appearance. In August 1958, the 
Hebei Statistical Press published The Experience of a Great Leap in Statistics.
837
 That 
volume was followed by The High Tide of Statistical Work in Baoding City.
838
 Early the 
following year, the Fujian Planning Committee published a volume on how to carry out 
statistical surveys, explaining that the establishment of People’s Communes 人民公社 
required new procedures for statistical work.
839
 Internal reports began to offer 
descriptions of what these changes looked like. A summary of the first post-Baoding 
meeting in Beijing produced by the SSB in November 1959 noted: 
Since the Baoding Conference, statistical work has emerged on a new 
scale. Now, statistical authorities at all levels, from the central to the local, 
can within a few hours, or within a few tens-of-hours, master statistical 
data on all aspects of industrial and agricultural production and 
construction at the national, provincial and regional levels. [And] within 
three or five days, they can conduct one-time comprehensive surveys, and 





The SSB had strived long years to achieve the goal of meeting the party leadership’s 
requirements, but here, the Great Leap Forward had helped realize that goal in mere 
months. Or so it was claimed.  
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Regardless of whether such claims were true or not, and they were most certainly 
‘true’ only if a host of issues including accuracy and representativeness were kept in 
abeyance, the very ability to make them pointed to a fundamental shift in the terrain of 
statistical work.  The down-grading of the periodical report system and the promotion of 
mass participation in statistics effectively bypassed the tussle between socialist statistics 
and its non-socialist alternatives in favor of a return to Maoist mass science, expressed 
via the promotion of the Maoist method of social investigation. Discussed in Part I 
Chapter I, this form of typical sampling had been largely ignored by the SSB through 
much of the 1950s. After the Baoding Conference, it was elevated to the status of 
orthodox method.
 841
 A March 1960 article explained that: 
Typical surveys are an innovative survey method utilized in our nation 
under particular historical and social conditions; it is the concrete 
manifestation in statistical survey methodology of Chairman Mao’s 





The authors of the article went on to list the various qualities of typical sampling. They 
claimed it could solve those problems that exhaustive enumeration could not and it could 
also help address problems where it was not necessary to carry out exhaustive 
enumeration. In addition, typical sampling also served to supplement the results of 
exhaustive enumeration. It was flexible and lightweight 灵活轻便; it helped save on 
manpower and reduced problems 省人省事, thereby doing more with less 事半功倍. 
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Using it, new things could be discovered or developed in a timely fashion. It was thus 
like a dagger 短剑, which dissected problems in the national economy and across society, 
and offered specific analyses of complex social phenomena. In so doing, it also promoted 
continuous improvements in the style and methods of leadership. Finally, such typical 
sampling was an important way of cultivating 培养 red and expert 红又专 cadre, and 
thus avoided problems in [earlier] statistical work, which was divorced not just from 
reality but also from the masses 脱离实际、脱离群众.843  
Rebadged as Mao’s synthesis, such typical surveys quickly became the dominant 
method for collecting information.
844
 As Yang Bo explained in the first of a series of 
articles titled “How to Carry Out Typical Sampling,” which were published in the first 
five issues of Statistical Work in 1959: 
In recent times, there has emerged an extremely valuable new 
phenomenon among statistical leaders at all levels: [they] often dispatch 
large numbers of cadres deep into the countryside, factories, mines, shops, 
basic construction sites, and other grass-roots units to conduct highly 
specified, on-the-ground research work and thereby grasp the new 
circumstances and problems of the development of the national 
economy…[such activity] is the distinctive marker of changes in the style 




This state of affairs continued unabated until 1961. In June of that year, Wang Sihua 王
思华 was appointed the SSB’s third director and under him attempts were made to re-
establish statistical work along the lines of the pre-GLF years. Even so, the influence of 
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mass science, with its emphasis on anti-expertise and anti-professionalization, persisted 
within the practice of socialist statistics through the rest of that decade and the decade of 
the 1970s. It is this notion that has come to inform our understanding of statistics during 
the Mao era.
846
 But as this dissertation has shown, the picture till 1958 was quite different, 
far more contested, and open to very different paths.    
 It was not until 1979 that a debate about socialist statistics was re-kindled. That 
year, statistician and Renmin University professor Dai Shiguang 戴世光 published an 
article in the journal Economic Research in which he set about demolishing what he 
called the theoretical cloak 外衣 of Soviet socialist statistics. The article was republished 
in the journal Statistics 统计, the descendant of Statistical Work 统计工作, and ignited a 
major reform movement within the world of Chinese statistics.
847
 But that is the subject 
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